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At the turn of  the millennium seven years ago, the 
international community made a commitment 
to halve the proportion of  people living in 
extreme poverty and hunger between 1990 
and 2015. Now, at the halfway point between 
the millennium declaration and the deadline, 
it is clear the world has achieved considerable 
progress. However, though poverty and 
malnutrition rates are declining, it is less clear 
who is actually being helped. Are development 
programs reaching those most in need, or are 
they primarily benefiting those who are easier 
to reach, leaving the very poorest behind?
WHO ARE THE POOREST AND WHERE DO  
THEY LIVE?
One billion people live on less than $1 a day, 
the threshold defined by the international 
community as constituting extreme poverty, 
below which survival is questionable. That 
number encompasses a multitude of  people 
living in varying degrees of  poverty—all of  
them poor, but some even more desperately 
poor than others. To better answer the question 
of  whether the very poorest are being reached, 
we first divided the population living on less 
than $1 a day into three categories according 
to the depth of  their poverty: 
• Subjacent poor: those living on between 
$0.75 and $1 a day
• Medial poor: those living on between 
$0.50 and $0.75 a day
• Ultra poor: those living on less than $0.50 
a day1 
 This allowed us to look below the dollar-
a-day poverty line to determine who the 
poorest people are, where they live, and how 
each group has fared over time. We found 
that 162 million people live in ultra poverty on 
less than 50 cents a day. This is a significant 
number of  people: if  all of  the ultra poor were 
concentrated in a single nation, it would be the 
world’s seventh most populous country after 
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1 To be more precise, subjacent poverty is defined as the proportion of  the population living on between $0.81 and $1.08 
a day; medial poverty as between $0.54 and $0.81 a day; and ultra poverty as below $0.54 a day. All are measured at the 
1993 PPP exchange rates.
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China, India, the United States, Indonesia, 
Brazil, and Pakistan.
 As it is, the ultra poor are overwhelmingly 
concentrated in one region—Sub-Saharan 
Africa is home to more than three-quarters of  
the world’s ultra poor. Sub-Saharan Africa is 
also the only region in the world in which there 
are more ultra poor than medial or subjacent 
poor. In contrast, most of  Asia’s poor live 
just below the dollar-a-day line; only a small 
minority of  the population is ultra poor.
 By examining the three categories of  poverty, 
we see that while remarkable progress has 
been made in some regions, progress against 
poverty and hunger has been slow in regions 
where poverty and hunger are severe. Between 
1990 and 2004, East Asia and the Pacific 
experienced a substantial reduction in the 
number of  subjacent, medial, and ultra poor. 
In South Asia, the number of  subjacent poor 
actually increased during that period, but at 
the same time, there was a significant decrease 
in the number of  medial and ultra poor. Sub-
Saharan Africa, in contrast, experienced 
increases in the number of  poor people in 
each category, particularly in ultra poverty. 
Sub-Saharan Africa’s lack of  progress indicates 
that if  current trends continue, improvements 
over the next seven years may reach people 
below the poverty line, but will largely exclude 
a large share of  the world’s absolute poorest.
 The diverging experiences of  Asia and 
Sub-Saharan Africa call into question the 
assumptions behind economic growth models 
that predict a convergence between growth 
and poverty reduction. The severity of  poverty 
in Sub-Saharan Africa and the limited progress 
in reducing it indicate that the poorest in Sub-
Saharan Africa may be trapped in poverty. To 
better understand this dynamic, we calculated 
the amount by which poverty would have been 
reduced in each category if  everyone’s income 
had grown by the same amount between 1990 
and 2004. We compare this “equal growth 
scenario” with the amount of  poverty reduction 
that actually took place during this period.
 We found that progress against poverty has 
been slower for people living well below the 
dollar-a-day line. Had poverty reduction been 
equal in all three categories, the proportion 
of  people living in ultra poverty would have 
declined by 3.6 percent. In actuality, the 
proportion declined by only 1.4 percent, less 
than half  the expected rate. However, there 
are marked regional differences. In East Asia 
and the Pacific, rapid economic growth has 
benefited all groups nearly equally, while in 
Sub-Saharan Africa those in ultra poverty are 
being substantially left behind in what little 
progress against poverty has been achieved in 
the region.
PROGRESS AGAINST HUNGER
According to the Global Hunger Index (GHI), 
the hot spots of  hunger are in Sub-Saharan 
Africa and South Asia. In Sub-Saharan Africa, 
overall progress in the 1990s was slow. The 
proportion of  people who were food-energy 
deficient decreased, but there was very little 
improvement in underweight in children and in 
the under-five mortality rate. The high under-
five mortality rate is consistent with the high 
prevalence of  ultra poverty in this region.
 South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa have 
similar GHI scores despite the fact that South 
Asia’s poverty rate is about 10 percentage 
points lower than Sub-Saharan Africa’s. South 
Asia made tremendous strides in combating 
hunger in the 1990s, but despite remarkable 
improvement in child nutritional status, the 
region still has the highest prevalence of  
underweight in children in the world, which 
explains its high GHI score. East Asia and the 
Pacific experienced only a small reduction in 
its GHI score during the 1990s and early 2000s. 
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However, the region had a lower GHI score at 
the outset, suggesting that in the early 1990s, 
it was more able than Sub-Saharan Africa and 
South Asia to meet its population’s most basic 
food and nutritional needs.
 To obtain a more in-depth look at hunger, 
we analyzed household survey data in 15 
countries. As we did with people living below 
the poverty line, we also separated the hungry 
into three categories: 
• Subjacent hungry: those who consume 
between 1,800 and 2,200 calories per 
day
• Medial hungry: those who consume 
between 1,600 and 1,800 calories per 
day
• Ultra hungry: those who consume less 
than 1,600 calories per day
 International experts recommend 2,200 
calories as the average energy requirement 
for adults undertaking light activity. The 1,800 
calorie cut-off  identifies people who do not 
consume sufficient dietary energy to meet 
the minimum requirement for light activity, 
as established by the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of  the United Nations. Those 
consuming less than 1,600 calories per day 
are at risk of  dying from extreme hunger or 
starvation.
 We found that in most of  the Asian and Latin 
American countries surveyed (Bangladesh, 
Guatemala, Laos, India, Pakistan, Sri-Lanka, 
Tajikistan, and Timor-Leste), there are almost 
as many or more people facing subjacent 
hunger than ultra hunger. However, in the 
African countries surveyed (Burundi, Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda, Senegal, and 
Zambia), most of  the hungry consume less 
than 1,600 calories per day. The percentage of  
the population suffering from ultra hunger in 
these African countries ranges from 27 percent 
(Kenya) to an appalling 60 percent (Burundi). 
In Sub-Saharan Africa, most of  those defined as 
hungry live in ultra hunger and are at risk of  
dying from extreme hunger or starvation.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE WORLD’S POOREST 
AND HUNGRY
The poorest are those from socially excluded 
groups, those living in remote areas with 
little education and few assets, and—in 
Asia—the landless. To better understand the 
characteristics of  the world’s poorest and 
hungry, we summarized the findings from 
an analysis of  household data and from a 
review of  empirical research in 20 countries 
in developing regions of  the world. We found 
that the poorest are also hungry, although not 
everyone classified as hungry lives on less than 
$1 a day. Selected findings include:
1. Despite a global trend of  poverty shifting 
toward urban areas, the incidence of  poverty 
is still higher in rural areas. And as poverty 
deepens, the income disparities between 
rural and urban areas tend to increase. On 
average, poverty rates are 2.4 times higher for 
the subjacent poor and 2.7 times higher for 
the medial poor in rural areas than for their 
counterparts in urban areas. But the poverty 
rates for the ultra poor are nearly four times 
higher in rural areas than in urban areas.
2. The poorest and most undernourished 
households are located furthest from roads, 
markets, schools, and health services. To some 
extent, an electricity connection indicates the 
degree to which a household is “connected” 
in a broader sense to roads, markets, and 
infrastructure. We find that households living 
in ultra poverty are on average four times less 
likely to be connected than households living 
above the dollar-a-day line.
3. The proportion of  poor people who are educated 
varies from country to country. However, there 
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is one consistent pattern in every part of  the 
developing world: adults in ultra poverty are 
significantly less likely to be educated, be they 
male or female. In nearly all study countries, the 
proportion of  adult males without schooling is 
almost double or more among the ultra poor 
than the non-poor. In Vietnam and Nicaragua, 
adult males living in ultra poverty are three 
times more likely to be unschooled than those 
living on more than $1 day. In Bangladesh, 
nearly all women in ultra poor households 
are unschooled (92 percent), compared to less 
than half  in households living on more than $1 
a day (49 percent). The data overwhelmingly 
show that the poorest are the least educated.
4. In all study countries, children from poorer 
families are less likely to go to school. In India, 
48 percent of  children living in ultra poverty 
attend school, compared to 81 percent of  
children living above the dollar-a-day poverty 
line, representing a 33 percentage-point gap. 
In Vietnam, the gap is 30 percentage points, 
in Ghana it is 28 percentage points, and in 
Burundi it is 24. Without education, the future 
of  children living in ultra poverty will be a 
distressing echo of  their current experience.
5. There does not seem to be a uniform pattern 
of  higher landlessness among the poor, though 
the relationship varies among Sub-Saharan 
Africa, Latin America, and Asia. Land is a vital 
productive asset in rural economies. We would 
thus expect the association between poverty 
and landlessness to be high. In all parts of  Asia, 
those who are landless are the poorest. For 
example, nearly 80 percent of  the ultra poor 
in rural Bangladesh do not own cultivable 
land. In Sub-Saharan Africa, however, little 
difference was found between the incidence 
of  landlessness among the poorest and less 
poor households, and in some cases the 
reverse pattern was found. This corresponds 
to the findings of  other studies that in Sub-
Saharan Africa the poorest often own some 
land (usually very small plots), but they lack 
access to markets and other key resources 
such as credit and agricultural inputs. In 
Latin America, although the incidence of  
landlessness is high, it was actually found to 
be higher among those who live on more than 
$1 a day than among those living on less than 
$1 a day. 
6. Each of  the 20 countries has minority and 
other subgroups that have consistently higher 
prevalences of  poverty and hunger, especially in 
Asia. In Laos and Vietnam, ethnic minorities 
in upland areas experience a higher probability 
of  being poor. In Sri Lanka, the incidence of  
poverty is highest among Tamils, and in India, 
disadvantaged castes and tribes consistently 
experience deprivation in a number of  
dimensions. For example, tribal people in India 
are 2.5 times more likely to live in ultra poverty 
than others. In Latin America, indigenous 
peoples are overrepresented among the poor, 
and increasingly so further below the dollar-a-
day poverty line. There is some evidence that 
female-headed households and women are 
overrepresented among the ultra poor, but in 
general, no large differences were found.
POVERTY TRAPS AND EXCLUSION
What are some of  the reasons these 
characteristics prevail among the poorest? 
Why do people in ultra poverty stay poor? 
In the last few years, much has been learned 
about the causes of  persistent poverty and 
hunger. This report summarizes the findings 
of  these studies, particularly the empirical 
studies of  the 20 developing countries. Three 
main observations are:
1. The location of  a household—its country of  
residence and its location within the country—
has a large impact on potential household welfare. 
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The disparity in rates of  poverty and hunger 
across countries attests to the importance 
of  locational characteristics in determining 
poverty and hunger.
2. The coincidence of  severe and persistent poverty 
and hunger indicates the presence of  poverty 
traps—conditions from which individuals or 
groups cannot emerge without the help of  others. 
Three commonly found causes of  poverty 
traps are
• the inability of  poor households to invest 
in the education of  their children, 
• the limited access to credit for those with 
few assets, and
• the lack of  productive labor of  the 
hungry.
 Within a trap, poverty begets poverty and 
hunger begets hunger. A number of  studies at 
the level of  individuals and households provide 
clear evidence that poverty and hunger in 
combination put into play mechanisms that 
cause both conditions to persist. Poverty and 
hunger inherited at birth, or resulting from 
unfortunate and unexpected events, can persist 
for years. These conditions or events in the life 
of  a household—particularly serious illness—
explain the descent of  many households into 
absolute poverty.
3. The systematic exclusion of  certain groups 
from access to resources and markets increases 
their propensity to be poor. These groups include 
ethnic minorities, disadvantaged castes and 
tribes, and those suffering from ill-health and 
disability. The exclusion of  individuals from 
these groups from institutions and markets 
that would allow them to improve their welfare 
results in persistent poverty and hunger.
THE ROAD AHEAD
The dismally slow progress in reducing ultra 
poverty and the relative lack of  success in 
reaching the very poorest clearly demonstrate 
that “business as usual” will not be good enough 
to reach the poorest within an acceptable 
timeframe. As the world moves toward 
the deadline for achieving the Millennium 
Development Goal of  cutting hunger and 
poverty in half, it cannot be content to focus 
only on the marginally poor and hungry—the 
desperate, grinding poverty of  the world’s 
absolute poorest must also be assuaged.
 A focus on policies and programs that are 
particularly effective at improving the welfare 
of  the world’s poorest and hungry is needed. 
This report suggests interventions along the 
following lines that are essential to helping the 
poorest move out of  poverty:
• Improving access to markets and basic 
services for those in the most remote 
rural areas
• Providing insurance to help households 
deal with health crises
• Preventing child malnutrition
• Enabling investment in education and 
physical capital for those with few assets
• Addressing the exclusion of  disadvantaged 
groups
 These findings also highlight the importance 
of  improving our knowledge and understand-
ing of  who the world’s poorest and hungry 
are. It is only with carefully collected, context-
specific, and time-relevant data that it is pos-
sible to correctly design, monitor, and evaluate 
policies and interventions for improving the 
welfare of  the most deprived.
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INTRODUCTION
Despite considerable progress in poverty 
reduction in the past decade, millions of  
people around the world remain preoccupied 
solely with survival, and hunger is a reality in 
their everyday lives. Today, there are about 1 
billion extremely poor people in the develop-
ing world who subsist on less than $1 a day. Of  
those, half  a billion live on less than 75 cents a 
day and 162 million live on less than 50 cents. 
The most unfortunate consequence of  wide-
spread poverty is that more than 800 million 
people cannot afford an adequate diet. Chroni-
cally underfed and largely without assets other 
than their own labor power, they remain highly 
vulnerable to the crushing blows of  illness 
and natural or man-made calamities. These 
extreme poor are a group that hovers on the 
outer limits of  human survival.
 In September 2000, the Millennium Dec-
laration was adopted by 189 member states 
of  the United Nations, whereby the heads of  
states confirmed their countries’ commitment 
to achieving the eight Millennium Develop-
ment Goals (MDGs) by 2015. The first MDG 
is to halve—between 1990 and 2015—the pro-
portion of  people living on less than $1 a day 
and suffering from hunger. The explicit inclu-
sion of  “hunger” in the first goal appropriately 
focuses attention on the most critical problem 
of  the poorest. 
 Will the poverty and hunger MDG be met? 
If  it is, at least 800 million people will still be 
trapped in poverty and hunger in 2015. But who 
will have moved out of  poverty and hunger 
and who will remain left behind? This report 
addresses these questions by developing a bet-
ter understanding of  the characteristics of  the 
world’s poorest and hungry and by examining 
whether business as usual is likely to improve 
their welfare. The analysis—which is based on 
a detailed, issue-specific, and intertemporal 
information base representing the regions and 
countries of  the world—suggests it is not.
 We find that while remarkable progress 
has been made in some regions (notably East 
Asia and the Pacific), progress has been slow in 
regions where poverty and hunger are severe. 
As a result, the first MDG goal seems far out 
of  reach for most of  Sub-Saharan Africa.  
 We also find that within regions, poverty just 
below $1 a day has fallen faster than poverty 
below 50 cents a day. This suggests it has been 
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easier to reach those living closer to the dollar-
a-day line rather than those living well below 
it. In fact, the incidence of  poverty below 50 
cents a day has proven somewhat intractable 
in many regions of  the world. Although there 
have been some improvements in this group 
over time, progress against poverty is so slow 
that business as usual will not be enough to 
reach these extremely poor people within an 
acceptable period of  time.
 Who are the poorest and the hungry? We 
find that three-quarters of  those living on 
less than 50 cents a day—the world’s poorest 
162 million—are in Sub-Saharan Africa. An 
analysis of  household data from 20 countries 
representing all major developing regions of  
the world shows that those in hunger and 
poverty often live in remote rural areas, are 
more likely to be from ethnic minorities, 
and have less education, assets, and access to 
markets. 
 The report is organized into five chapters. 
Following this introduction, Chapter 2 
examines where the poor and hungry live, and 
includes country rankings and trends in poverty 
and hunger. Chapter 3 presents the findings of  
the analysis of  household survey data on the 
incidence and correlates of  extreme poverty 
and hunger. Chapter 4 brings together an 
understanding of  the major causes of  persistent 
poverty and hunger to determine what roles 
culture, gender, disability, remoteness, and 
repeated shocks play. Chapter 5 concludes.
32
GLOBAL POVERTY AND 
HUNGER:  LOCATION AND 
TRENDS
This chapter focuses on two measures of  depri-
vation corresponding to the two components 
of  the first MDG: halving poverty and hunger. 
 The MDG indicator of  extreme poverty—
the proportion of  people living on less than $1 
a day—is used to show where the world’s poor 
live and to indicate trends in poverty from 1990 
(the base year for the MDGs) to 2004. This mea-
sure of  poverty is then disaggregated to exam-
ine the location and changes in welfare of  those 
living on much less than $1 a day. By doing this, 
we capture changes in the severity of  poverty. 
While poverty gap ratios have traditionally 
been used to indicate the depth and severity of  
poverty, the approach taken in this report (of  
disaggregating the dollar-a-day poverty rate 
into groups) provides a more intuitive picture, 
and makes it easier to understand trends in the 
severity of  global poverty. 
 Progress in meeting the hunger MDG is 
examined by using the Global Hunger Index, 
an index designed to capture three dimensions 
of  hunger: the lack of  economic access to food, 
shortfalls in the nutritional status of  children, 
and child mortality. The index is calculated for 
countries and regions to show the concentra-
tion of  hungry people, hunger trends, and the 
extent to which poverty trends coincide with 
those of  hunger. Countries are also ranked by 
the Global Hunger Index.
 Although we have considered a lack of  con-
sumption (as a proxy for income) as the mea-
sure of  poverty, we recognize that poverty 
and deprivation are multidimensional reali-
ties. Indeed, the MDGs—each with quantified 
targets—address many dimensions of  depri-
vation and well-being: poverty and hunger, 
primary education, gender equality and wom-
en’s empowerment, child mortality, maternal 
health, HIV/AIDS and other diseases, environ-
mental sustainability, and global partnership. 
The MDGs are mutually reinforcing—the goal 
of  halving poverty and hunger is closely linked 
with the other MDGs since poor and hungry 
populations tend to have little access to educa-
tion and health services, high child mortality, 
and poor maternal health. 
 The use of  the Global Hunger Index 
broadens our measures of  well-being, but this 
analysis does not include all dimensions of  
deprivation and much of  the analysis focuses on 
income poverty alone. Recent developments in 
5.36 billion people in 2004, 969 million lived on 
less than $1 a day. The regional composition of  
the developing world’s poor also changed over 
the 14-year period. East Asia and the Pacific’s 
share of  the world’s poor decreased by more 
than half  to only 17 percent, South Asia’s share 
increased to almost 50 percent, and Sub-Saharan 
Africa’s share increased to 31 percent. 
 The trends in numbers of  those living in 
dollar-a-day poverty are also presented in 
Figure 2.2. It is again clear that the difference 
between the East and the Pacific region and the 
South Asia region is remarkable. While both 
regions had about the same number of  poor in 
1990, East Asia and the Pacific had 277 million 
fewer people in poverty than South Asia had in 
2004. From this it is also clear that East Asia and 
the Pacific is the only region that experienced 
a substantial decline in the numbers of  those 
living on less than $1 a day (from 476 million 
to 169 million) between 1990 and 2004. The 
number of  poor decreased by a modest 33 
million in South Asia, and actually increased 
by about 58 million in Sub-Saharan Africa. The 
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measuring subjective well-being have allowed 
for comparisons of  subjective well-being across 
continents. Income is often associated with 
both well-being and deprivation and provides 
a rationale for the predominance of  income 
poverty in the measurement of  deprivation. 
However, consideration of  these other measures 
of  well-being is also important and McGillivray 
(2006) provides an excellent summary of  these 
measures.
2.1 LOCATION AND TRENDS IN DOLLAR-A-DAY 
POVERTY
In 1990, the developing world had a population 
of  4.36 billion,1 of  which 1.25 billion lived on 
less than $1 a day.2 East Asia and the Pacific 
and South Asia each accounted for almost two-
fifths of  the world’s dollar-a-day poor, and Sub-
Saharan Africa accounted for about one-fifth 
(Figure 2.1). From 1990 to 2004, the number 
of  people in developing countries grew by 1 
billion, and the number of  people living on less 
than $1 a day fell. Of  the developing world’s 
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FIGURE 2.2 Trends in Global Poverty Numbers: Living on Less Than $1 a Day (1990-2004)
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FIGURE 2.3 Trends in Global Poverty Rates: Living on Less Than $1 a Day (1990-2004)
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total number of  poor in Sub-Saharan Africa 
became larger than that in East Asia and the 
Pacific during this period.
 Figure 2.3 shows trends in the dollar-a-day 
poverty rate—the measure by which the MDG 
will be assessed. The proportion of  the develop-
ing world’s population living on less than $1 a 
day fell from 28.7 percent in 1990, the base year 
for the MDGs, to 18.0 percent in 2004. At this 
pace of  progress, the poverty component of  the 
first MDG will be met in 2015 at the global level. 
Regional progress, however, has been uneven. 
The decline in the global poverty rate has been 
largely driven by East Asia and the Pacific, aided 
by South Asia. Indeed, East Asia and the Pacific 
has overachieved the poverty MDG; the dollar-
a-day poverty rate in the region fell more than 
20 percentage points, from 29.9 percent in 1990 
to 9.1 percent in 2004. The dollar-a-day poverty 
rate also fell substantially in South Asia, from 
43.1 percent to 30.9 percent during the same 
period. Although other regions experienced 
some decline in the poverty rate from 1990 to 
2004 (except Eastern Europe and Central Asia, 
where the rates increased slightly), the situation 
can more aptly be characterized as stagnation: 
poverty rates fell from 46.8 percent to 41.1 per-
cent in Sub-Saharan Africa and from 10.2 per-
cent to 8.6 percent in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. 
2.2 LOOkING BENEATH THE DOLLAR-A-DAY LINE: 
SUBjACENT, MEDIAL, AND ULTRA POVERTY
While the MDGs categorize the extreme 
poor as those living on less than $1 a day, we 
disaggregate those living on less than $1 a day 
into three groups according to their location 
below the dollar-a-day poverty line:3
• Subjacent poor: those living on between 
$0.75 and $1 a day
• Medial poor: those living on between 
$0.50 and $0.75 a day 
• Ultra poor: those living on less than $0.50 
a day4 
These cut-off  points were chosen to split the 
distribution into meaningfully sized groups 
and also to be able to use simple, equally 
spaced units (consistent with the metric of  
absolute measures of  global poverty). 
 By disaggregating the number of  poor in 
this way, we are able to look below the dollar-
a-day line to see where those in each group 
live and how each group has fared over time. 
This is first done for major regions in the 
developing world, then for specific countries.
Location and Trends in Subjacent, Medial,  
and Ultra Poverty
Of  the 969 million people living on less than $1 
a day in 2004, half  were subjacent poor, one-
third were medial poor, and about 17 percent 
were ultra poor. Figure 2.4 shows where the 
subjacent, medial, and ultra poor of  the devel-
oping world live. While South Asia accounts 
for most of  the developing world’s subjacent 
(53 percent) and medial (51 percent) poor, Sub-
Saharan Africa is home to three-quarters (76 
percent) of  all ultra poor; in 2004, 121 million 
Sub-Saharan Africans lived on less than a mea-
ger $0.50 a day. Although Latin America and 
the Caribbean has a relatively small share of  
global dollar-a-day poverty, its share increases 
with the depth of  poverty: it has 4 percent of  
those in subjacent poverty, 5 percent of  those in 
medial poverty, and 7 percent of  those in ultra 
poverty.
 Figure 2.5 and Figure 2.6 show the trends 
in subjacent, medial, and ultra poverty rates 
and numbers of  people, respectively, in the 
developing world as a whole and in the four 
major regions from 1990 to 2004. In the 
developing world as a whole and in all regions 
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 FIGURE 2.4 Where Those in Subjacent, Medial, and Ultra Poverty Live: 1990 and 2004                   FIGURE 2.4,  continued
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excluding Sub-Saharan Africa, the 
rates (and numbers) of  people in 
subjacent poverty are higher than 
those in medial and ultra poverty. 
The rate and number of  those in 
ultra poverty is the lowest, often 
accounting for only the bottom 
1–2 percent of  the region’s poor. 
However, Sub-Saharan Africa is 
uniquely and alarmingly different. 
In Sub-Saharan Africa, there are 
many more people living in ultra 
poverty than in subjacent and medial 
poverty, indicating the severity of  
poverty in this region (a 17 percent 
ultra poverty rate in 2004 compared 
to 12 percent subjacent and 12 
percent medial poverty rates). 
 Although in 1990 there were 
more people living in each type 
of  poverty than in 2004, this was 
particularly true for medial and 
subjacent poverty. The geographic 
distribution of  poverty was also 
somewhat different in 1990, as Asia 
rather than Sub-Saharan Africa was 
home to many more of  those living 
in ultra poverty (see Figure 2.4). As 
with the dollar-a-day poverty trends 
discussed in the previous section, the 
four major regions in the developing 
world have experienced quite 
different trends among these three 
groups since 1990. Figure 2.7 and 
Figure 2.8 summarize these trends 
by depicting the changes in the total 
number of  people living in subjacent, 
medial, and ultra poverty from 1990 
to 2004.
 South Asia and East Asia and the 
Pacific were very similar in 1990 in 
that the number of  the world’s poor 
living in each of  the two regions 
was virtually the same for each type 
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FIGURE 2.5 Trends in Subjacent, Medial, and Ultra Poverty Rates: 1990-2004
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FIGURE 2.6 Trends in the Number of Subjacent, Medial, and Ultra Poor: 1990-2004
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FIGURE 2.7 Change in the Number of Poor in the Developing World from 1990 to 2004 
FIGURE 2.8 Regional Changes in the Number of Poor from 1990 to 2004 
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of  poverty. They were each home to about 
40 percent of  the world’s subjacent poor, 
40 percent of  the world’s medial poor, and a 
quarter of  the world’s ultra poor. However, as 
Figure 2.6 shows, they have experienced very 
different development paths since then. East 
Asia and the Pacific experienced a substantial 
reduction in numbers of  all three types of  
poverty. In contrast, South Asia found itself  
with increasing numbers of  people in subjacent 
poverty and significant but smaller reductions 
in the number of  medial and ultra poor. East 
Asia and the Pacific experienced substantial 
growth of  about 8 percent annually during 
this period and also had initial conditions such 
that the growth benefited many people living 
in subjacent, medial, and ultra poverty (the 
region’s growth elasticity of  poverty reduction 
was very high). South Asia also achieved 
remarkable growth rates during the 1990s 
(about 5 percent), but was less able to convert 
this growth to reductions in poverty. Factors 
that contributed to these differences in impact 
of  growth on poverty reduction are considered 
in Chapter 4.
 Latin America and the Caribbean has seen 
very small changes in the number of  people 
living in each type of  poverty, but experienced 
increases in the number of  both subjacent and 
ultra poor. As a result of  limited growth and 
poverty reduction, Sub-Saharan Africa has 
experienced increases in the number of  poor 
in each group, particularly in ultra poverty. 
 Sub-Saharan Africa’s high poverty rates in 
1990 and its limited growth and progress in 
reducing poverty since then indicates that busi-
ness as usual will not lead to improvements in 
well-being in a timely manner for a large share 
of  the world’s absolute poorest. Indeed, the 
continued prevalence and severity of  poverty 
in Sub-Saharan Africa is one of  today’s major 
ethical challenges.5 The diverging experiences 
of  Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa call into ques-
tion standard economic growth models that 
predict convergence. Theories of  poverty traps 
link severe poverty with slow improvements in 
welfare. The severity of  poverty and the limited 
progress in reducing it indicate that the poorest 
in Sub-Saharan Africa may be trapped in pov-
erty, as some recent literature suggests (Col-
lier 2007, Sachs 2005, Azariadis and Stachurski 
2005). Micro-level evidence of  poverty traps has 
been found for a number of  countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa, while little evidence has been 
found for countries in regions of  the world 
where the severity of  poverty is lower (such as 
Russia, China, and Mexico).6 We consider this 
further in the next section.
Analysis of Changes in Subjacent, Medial, and 
Ultra Poverty
According to mainstream theories of  economic 
growth, the convergence hypothesis implies 
that gains should come most quickly to those 
living in ultra poverty. However, if  poverty traps 
exist, those in ultra poverty may be so poor that 
optimal behavioral choices cause them to move 
out of  poverty much more slowly than those 
who are less poor. Some reasons for this are 
suggested in Chapter 4.
 How can we tell whether those in ultra 
poverty have fared better or worse than those 
closer to the line? While panel data is needed 
to answer this question, it is possible to get 
an indication from national poverty data by 
calculating the amount that subjacent, medial, 
and ultra poverty would have decreased (or 
increased in some cases) if  poverty reduction 
had come from everyone’s income growing 
by the same amount, with the underlying 
income distribution remaining unchanged. 
We compare this “equal growth scenario” 
poverty reduction with the amount of  poverty 
reduction that actually took place. The “equal 
growth scenario” poverty reduction is shown 
as a white bar next to the actual change in 
each poverty rate in Figure 2.9 (Appendix 1 
gives details on how this was calculated). For 
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FIGURE 2.9 Percentage-Point Change in Poverty from Changes in Subjacent, Medial, and  
 Ultra Poverty: 1990-2004
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example, if  the 10.6 percentage-point decrease 
in global poverty had come from the income 
of  everyone in the world growing by the 
same amount, there would have been a fall in 
subjacent poverty of  3.1 percentage points, a 
fall in medial poverty of  3.9 percentage points, 
and a fall in ultra poverty of  3.6 percentage 
points. 
 We find that the incidence of  poverty 
among those just below the dollar-a-day pov-
erty line fell more than it would have had all 
incomes grown equally, whereas the incidence 
of  ultra poverty fell less than it would have had 
incomes grown equally. Subjacent poverty fell 
by more than 3.1 percentage points and ultra 
poverty fell by much less than 3.6 percentage 
points. This finding suggests the well-being of  
those just below $1 a day improved more than 
the well-being of  those well below the line. 
It points to a theory of  poverty traps holding 
true for those in ultra poverty.
 Disaggregating further, we see that in all 
major regions ultra poverty rates decreased 
less than they would have had everyone’s 
income grown equally, suggesting reductions 
in poverty benefited those closer to the line 
than those further away from it.  
 However, there are differences across 
regions. In East Asia and the Pacific, growth 
benefited all groups nearly equally (the differ-
ences observed are probably not greater than 
the error with which they were measured). In 
this region, then, there seems to be little evi-
dence of  poverty traps, although there is little 
evidence of  convergence, either.  
 In South Asia, those experiencing ultra pov-
erty benefited the least, although those in sub-
jacent poverty benefited almost as expected 
and those in medial poverty benefited the 
most. Such a pattern would be consistent with 
poverty traps being present for some groups 
in ultra poverty, but convergence applying to 
those in subjacent and medial poverty. 
 The pattern observed in Latin America 
and the Caribbean is not dissimilar to South 
Asia, although it is starker and consequently 
is worrisome. Again in Latin America, those in 
medial poverty benefited the most and those 
in ultra poverty benefited the least. However, 
unlike in other regions, the incidence of  ultra 
poverty rose in Latin America and the Carib-
bean during 1990 to 2004. There were more 
people falling into this type of  poverty than 
moving out of  it. 
 Not only is the number of  people living in 
ultra poverty highest in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
but trends suggest these people are also being 
substantially left behind in what little progress 
against poverty is being achieved in the region. 
The subjacent poor in Sub-Saharan Africa ben-
efited much more than they would have had 
all incomes grown equally, as did those living 
in medial poverty, although to a lesser extent. 
The pattern of  poverty reduction found in 
Sub-Saharan Africa is consistent with the pres-
ence of  poverty traps in this region, as found 
in micro-level studies on Kenya, Madagascar, 
South Africa, and Côte d’Ivoire. The slow 
reduction in ultra-poverty rates in this region 
suggests that the majority of  those living in 
ultra poverty will continue to be in Sub-Saha-
ran Africa in the future. 
 In summary, the data are consistent with 
the premise that it is the poorest who benefit 
the least, and that poverty traps may exist in 
some regions. While the evidence is consistent 
with this interpretation, panel data is needed 
to further test these hypotheses.
2.3 COUNTRY TRENDS IN SUBjACENT, MEDIAL, 
AND ULTRA POVERTY
In this part of  the report we consider the extent 
to which the regional trends are also observed 
at the country level for some key sample coun-
tries in each region.
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East Asia and the Pacific
China’s experience dominates the poverty 
trends observed in East Asia and the Pacific 
since it accounts for about 70 percent of  the 
population in the region. This is indeed what 
is shown in the graphs in Figure 2.9 for East 
Asia and the Pacific and Figure 2.10 for China: 
trends observed within China almost match 
regional-level trends. However, there have 
been other fast-growing economies in the 
region that have experienced similar successes 
in reducing poverty, as the case of  Vietnam 
suggests (Figure 2.10). Changes in poverty 
rates in Vietnam occurred almost as if  every-
one had benefited equally. However, in China, 
those closest to the poverty line benefited less 
than they would have had all incomes grown 
equally.7
FIGURE 2.10 Trends in Subjacent, Medial, and Ultra Poverty in China and Vietnam, 1990-2004
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South Asia
In the same way that population trends in East 
Asia and the Pacific largely reflect changes in 
China, trends in South Asia’s population reflect 
changes in India. However, other countries in 
South Asia are quite large; two in particular 
(Pakistan and Bangladesh) each comprise 
one-tenth of  South Asia’s population. Figure 
2.11 examines trends in subjacent, medial, 
and ultra poverty in India and Bangladesh. In 
Bangladesh, the initial reductions in poverty 
at the beginning of  the 1990s were offset by 
increases in all three types of  poverty during 
the middle of  the 1990s. However, all poverty 
rates have fallen since the end of  the 1990s.
 In India, the medial poor fared better than 
the subjacent poor and the ultra poor (mar-
ginally). Although Bangladesh achieved mini-
mal poverty reduction from 1990 to 2004, it 
is remarkable that the ultra poor fared better 
than they would have had all those below the 
line fared equally, suggesting that the severity 
of  poverty lessened in the country.8
FIGURE 2.11 Trends in Subjacent, Medial, and Ultra Poverty in India and Bangladesh, 1990-2004
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Sub-Saharan Africa 
Nigeria is the single largest country in Sub-
Saharan Africa, accounting for between 21 
percent and 30 percent of  the number of  
ultra, medial, and subjacent poor people liv-
ing in the subcontinent. Nigeria experienced 
increases in the incidence of  subjacent, medial, 
and ultra poverty between 1990 and 2004 and 
has therefore contributed to limited progress 
against poverty in the region, despite better 
performances in a number of  countries that 
are home to between 5 and 10 percent of  the 
FIGURE 2.12 Trends in Subjacent, Medial, and Ultra Poverty in Nigeria, Mozambique, and       FIGURE 2.12,  continued 
 Zambia, 1990-2004
continent’s poorest, such as Ethiopia, Tan-
zania, Uganda, Zambia, and Mozambique. 
Figure 2.12 shows the changes in subjacent, 
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Mozambique because it underwent consider-
able recovery after the civil war that had rav-
aged the country for more than 15 years ended 
in 1992 (Simler et al. 2004). 
 In Nigeria, all three poverty rates increased 
between 1990 and 2004; although there was a 
substantial increase in ultra poverty, the data 
suggest the incidence of  ultra poverty did 
not increase as much as it would have had all 
incomes fallen equally. In Zambia, while there 
was little change in the overall dollar-a-day 
rate, this masked shifts in subjacent, medial, 
and ultra poverty during this time: ultra 
poverty fell remarkably while subjacent and 
medial poverty became more prevalent. Thus, 
in Zambia there was a lessening of  the severity 
of  poverty experienced by many people, with 
more people in 2004 living on just under $1 a 
day and less living on under 50 cents a day than 
in 1990. Although Mozambique saw substantial 
reductions in ultra poverty between 1990 and 
2004, ultra poverty would have fallen more had 
all incomes grown equally.
FIGURE 2.12 Trends in Subjacent, Medial, and Ultra Poverty in Nigeria, Mozambique, and       FIGURE 2.12,  continued 
 Zambia, 1990-2004
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Latin America and the Caribbean 
Brazil and Mexico are the largest countries in 
Latin America and the Caribbean and are home 
to the largest number of  people living on less 
than $1 a day in the region. Peru, Colombia, 
and Argentina are also home to a large number 
of  poor. However, most of  these countries have 
very few people living in ultra poverty. 
 Despite its small population, Haiti is home 
to the highest number of  ultra poor in the 
region (2.24 million) on account of  its high 
FIGURE 2.13 Trends in Subjacent, Medial, and Ultra Poverty in Brazil, Haiti, and Venezuela,      FIGURE 2.13,  continued 
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together with the government’s inadequate 
pricing policies, these factors have depressed 
agricultural production and food availability 
(Icart and Trapp 1999). Although it lags behind 
other countries in the region, the poverty 
situation has been improving since 1990. 
 From 1990 to 2004, the number of  ultra 
poor in Venezuela increased dramatically, from 
close to 0 to more than 2 million, contributing 
substantially to the regional trend of  increased 
ultra poverty.
 In general, Brazil, Haiti, and Venezuela 
experienced quite different poverty trends 
from 1990 to 2004 (Figure 2.13). In Brazil and 
Venezuela, the ultra poor fared worst. And 
despite a decrease in the severity of  poverty 
in Haiti during this time, the ultra poor did 
not benefit quite as much compared to the 
counterfactual of  all incomes growing equally 
(although the difference is small).10
FIGURE 2.13 Trends in Subjacent, Medial, and Ultra Poverty in Brazil, Haiti, and Venezuela,      FIGURE 2.13,  continued 
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2.4 GLOBAL HUNGER: RANkING AND TRENDS 
This section focuses on hunger—the second 
component of  the first MDG. Hunger has many 
faces: loss of  energy, apathy, increased suscepti-
bility to disease, shortfalls in nutritional status, 
disability, and premature death. The Global 
Hunger Index (GHI) was designed to capture 
three dimensions of  hunger: lack of  economic 
access to food, shortfalls in the nutritional status 
of  children, and child mortality, which is to a 
large extent attributable to malnutrition (Wies-
mann 2006). Accordingly, the Index includes the 
following three equally weighted indicators: the 
proportion of  people who are food-energy defi-
cient as estimated by the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of  the United Nations (FAO), the 
prevalence of  underweight in children under 
the age of  five as estimated by the World Health 
Organization, and the under-five mortality rate 
as estimated by UNICEF (see Appendix 2 for 
details on the measurement and construction 
of  the GHI). Note that all three components 
of  the GHI were selected to monitor progress 
toward the Millennium Development Goals 
(United Nations 2001).
 The Index ranks countries on a 100-point 
scale, with 0 being the best score (no hunger) 
and 100 being the worst, though neither of  these 
extremes is found in practice. In general, a value 
greater than 10 indicates a serious problem, 
greater than 20 is alarming, and greater than 
30 is extremely alarming. The Global Hunger 
Index is restricted to developing countries and 
countries in transition. Developed countries are 
excluded because they have for the most part 
overcome hunger, and overconsumption is now 
a greater problem than is a lack of  food.
 As compared to using a group of  single 
indicators, a composite index such as the GHI 
has several advantages. It integrates different 
aspects of  multifaceted phenomena like hun-
ger, it reduces the impact of  random measure-
ment errors, and it facilitates the use of  statistics 
by policymakers and the public by condensing 
information. The Index thus goes beyond mea-
suring hunger as food-energy deficiency, which 
is the focus of  the FAO measure of  hunger (FAO 
1996a).  
 However there are also problems in using an 
index. Three dissimilar measures are arbitrarily 
weighted equally, assuming substitutability 
between various measures that have intrinsic 
value and information as separate indicators. 
Additionally, the quality of  the data used in all 
three measures of  the Index varies widely across 
countries, and aggregating may compound this 
or hide underlying data problems (see Appendix 
2 for a fuller discussion of  the problems). Ide-
ally, an index should be used to summarize, not 
replace, its component measures and should be 
seen merely as an entry point from which to 
explore many dimensions of  a single concept. 
In the following section, we present the Global 
Hunger Index and its components to examine 
where the hungry live and how the prevalence 
of  hunger has changed over time. 
Where Are the Hungry? 
The Global Hunger Index 2003 ranking for 119 
countries is shown in Table 2.1, with the best 
performers at the top of  the list. The world map 
in Figure 2.14 shows that according to the GHI, 
the hot spots of  hunger are in Sub-Saharan 
Africa and South Asia. Sub-Saharan Africa had 
a GHI score of  25.4 in 2003, closely followed by 
South Asia (see Figure 2.15) despite the fact that 
poverty is about 10 percentage points lower in 
South Asia. East Asia and the Pacific, the Mid-
dle East and North Africa, and Latin America 
and the Caribbean follow. The GHI is lowest in 
Europe and Central Asia, at 5.6. There are a few 
exceptions to this regional pattern: countries 
with GHI scores higher than 20 are Haiti in the 
Caribbean; Yemen in the Near East; Tajikistan 
in Central Asia; Laos, Cambodia, Timor-Leste 
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(East Timor) in Southeast Asia; and the Demo-
cratic Republic of  Korea in East Asia. 
 Belarus occupies the top rank with a GHI of  
1.6 (the child malnutrition data for this coun-
try are based on the author’s preliminary esti-
mates, however), which is closely followed by 
Argentina, Chile, Ukraine, and Romania (Table 
2.1). Countries that experienced long-lasting 
violent conflicts affecting the infrastructure, 
the productive base of  the economy, and the 
population’s livelihoods have very high GHI 
scores, indicating grave outcomes in terms of  
hunger. Nine of  the 12 countries at the very 
bottom of  the list—Burundi, the Democratic 
Republic of  Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sierra 
Leone, Angola, Liberia, Cambodia, and Tajiki-
stan—were affected by war in the GHI refer-
ence period from 1999–2003 or are still recover-
ing from severe conflicts (UCDP 2006).
Trends in Hunger
In Sub-Saharan Africa, overall progress from 
1992 to 2003 was relatively small compared to 
that in other regions (Figure 2.15 and Figure 
2.16). The proportion of  people who are food-
energy deficient fell by about 4 percentage 
points, but there was very little improvement 
in the prevalence of  underweight in children 
and in the under-five mortality rate (a decline 
of  less than 1 percentage point). 
 South Asia made large strides in combating 
hunger in the 1990s. In 1992, South Asia’s GHI 
score was five points higher than Sub-Saharan 
Africa’s, but by 2003, South Asia’s regional 
score had caught up with Sub-Saharan Africa. 
The GHI decreased by seven points, with a 
reduction in the prevalence of  underweight in 
children from 58 percent to 44 percent contrib-
≥ 30.0 extremely alarming 
Global Hunger Index
excluded from GHI 
Sources:  FAO 2005, WHO 2006, UNICEF 2005, and 
Doris Wiesmann's estimates calculated for 2003.
20.0 – 29.9 alarming
10.0 – 19.9 serious
1.5 – 9.9 low to moderate hunger
no data
FIGURE 2.14  Global Hunger Index 2003: Mapping of Countries
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FIGURE 2.15 Regional Trends in the Global Hunger Index and Its Components for the Years  
 1992, 1997, and 2003 
FIGURE 2.16 Changes in the Global Hunger Index from 1992 to 2003 
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uting the largest share to this decline. Despite 
the remarkable improvement in child nutri-
tional status in South Asia, the region still has 
the highest prevalence of  underweight in chil-
dren in the world.
 Starting from a much lower GHI score of  
about 15, East Asia and the Pacific experienced 
a reduction of  only 4 points in the GHI from 
1992 to 2003. However, the lower level of  the 
GHI at the outset suggests that in the early 
1990s, a larger share of  the population was 
already able to meet the most basic food and 
nutritional needs in this region than in Sub-
Saharan Africa and South Asia.
 China and India, the world’s population 
giants in South Asia and East Asia and the 
Pacific, made large contributions to the over-
all positive development in these two regions. 
Food-energy deficiency declined in both 
countries, child malnutrition was reduced by 
more than 7 percentage points in China and 
by more than 13 percentage points in India, 
and the under-five mortality rate was cut by 
about 30 percent in India from 1992 to 2003. 
However, the lack of  improvement in India’s 
GHI score between 1997 and 2003 despite 
continued growth is a cause for concern, since 
India’s GHI still indicates alarming levels of  
hunger. 
 Notable among countries in South Asia 
and East Asia and the Pacific, the Demo-
cratic Republic of  Korea is the only country 
for which hunger increased, according to the 
GHI. However, its place in the GHI may be 
far surpassed by Afghanistan if  data had been 
available to calculate the index for this South 
Asian country.
 In Latin America and the Caribbean, there 
was sustained progress up to 2003, though not 
at a great pace: the GHI declined by about 
three points. A look at the composition of  
the GHI in 1992 reveals that the proportion 
of  people who were food-energy deficient 
amounted to 13 percent and exceeded the 
prevalence of  underweight in children and 
the under-five mortality rate. 
 For Europe and Central Asia, a lack of  data 
on food security and nutrition for the early 
1990s prevents observation of  long-term 
trends. Most of  these nation-states came into 
existence after the dissolution of  the Soviet 
Union or after the Balkan War in the 1990s.
2.5 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POVERTY  
AND HUNGER
Poverty is a key factor affecting the underlying 
determinants of  household food security, caring 
capacity, and health environments. Poor house-
holds and individuals are unable to achieve food 
security, have inadequate resources for care, or 
cannot utilize resources for health on a sustain-
able basis (Smith and Haddad 2000). Higher 
rates of  child malnutrition and child mortality 
are found in poor households. Poor families not 
only struggle to put a sufficient quantity of  food 
on the table, but are also prone to food insecu-
rity with regard to the quality of  their diets: 
even when dietary energy requirements are 
met, their diets may lack essential micronutri-
ents such as iron, iodine, zinc, and vitamin A. 
 Because undernourished people are less 
productive and child malnutrition has severe 
and permanent consequences for physical and 
intellectual development, poverty and hunger 
can become entwined in a vicious cycle. Babies 
born to severely undernourished and anemic 
mothers are at higher risk to be underweight 
and die soon (Smith et al. 2003). If  they sur-
vive, they will never make up for the nutritional 
shortfalls at the very beginning of  their lives. 
Adults who were malnourished as children are 
less physically and intellectually productive, 
have lower educational attainment and lifetime 
earnings, and are affected by higher levels of  
chronic illness and disability (UNICEF 1998; 
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Behrman, Alderman, and Hoddinott 2004; UNS 
SCN 2004). Thus, poverty can be transmitted 
to the next generation via the pathway of  child 
malnutrition.
 Given these links between hunger, malnutri-
tion, and poverty, we would expect that trends 
in these indicators largely coincide. However, 
in addition to increasing income, reducing child 
malnutrition and mortality also requires invest-
ment in basic health and education services, san-
itation and safe water supply, and changes in the 
behaviors of  caretakers (UNICEF 1990). And 
on a technical note, the relationship between 
prices for food and nonfood items influences 
how poverty translates into hunger and mal-
nutrition. All of  these factors may weaken the 
observed relationship between the GHI and 
measures of  dollar-a-day poverty. 
 A comparison of  countries’ GHI rankings 
with a ranking of  their dollar-a-day poverty 
estimates shows that the estimated correlation 
between the GHI and the poverty ranking is 
high.11 The hot spots of  poverty outside South 
Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa are partly the same 
as for the GHI: Laos, Cambodia, and Haiti have 
poverty headcount ratios at $1 a day of  27, 34, 
and 54 percent, respectively, and have alarm-
ingly high levels of  hunger according to the 
GHI. However, the overlap between poverty 
and GHI estimates is not perfect. For example, 
the poverty headcount ratio at $1 a day is greater 
than 15 percent for El Salvador, Ecuador, Ven-
ezuela, Bolivia, and Turkmenistan, although 
these countries fall into the “serious” and not 
“alarming” category according to the GHI (and 
for Venezuela, the GHI indicates even low to 
moderate hunger). And there are some notable 
outliers, which may speak to data problems as 
much as anything else. 
 We examine the empirical relationship of  
levels and trends in regional poverty and hunger 
and compare the GHI and its components with 
dollar-a-day and ultra-poverty rates. Sub-Saha-
ran Africa has both the highest GHI score and 
the highest proportion of  people living on less 
than $1 a day, amounting to 41 percent (Figure 
2.3). Reductions in both dollar-a-day poverty 
and the GHI were slow during the 1990s and 
early 2000s (see Figure 2.16 and Figure 2.3). The 
high proportion of  ultra-poor people in this 
region—both as a share of  the population and 
as a share of  the poor—is particularly striking. 
In addition to the high burden of  diseases such 
as malaria and AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
this most likely contributes to the compara-
tively high child mortality rates found in this 
region. Food shortages, the high extent of  ultra 
poverty, and a high prevalence of  life-threaten-
ing infectious diseases are major problems that 
have to be tackled in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 South Asia’s GHI score is only marginally 
below that of  Sub-Saharan Africa, even though 
dollar-a-day poverty is about 10 percentage 
points lower. A more marked decline in the 
GHI as discussed above coincides with a fall in 
the poverty headcount ratio at $1 a day by 12 
percentage points. 
 It has already been noted that despite the 
remarkable improvement in child malnutrition 
in South Asia, the region still has the highest 
prevalence of  underweight in children in the 
world. The main reason proposed to explain 
a higher child malnutrition rate in South Asia 
than in poorer, conflict-plagued Sub-Saharan 
Africa is that South Asian women’s nutrition and 
feeding and caring practices for young children 
are inadequate, which is related to their status in 
society and their lower level of  education (World 
Bank 2006a, Smith et al. 2003). South Asia has 
particularly high rates of  underweight women 
and low birth-weight babies (Smith et al. 2003, 
UNS SCN 2004). According to a recent study 
in Bangladesh, intensive nutrition education 
for mothers improves child nutritional status 
significantly and sustainably even when no 
nutritional supplements are provided, and this 
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effect is attributable to changes in maternal 
child-feeding and caring practices (Roy et al. 
2005). 
 Smith and Wiesmann (2007) use estimates 
of  food insecurity from household expenditure 
surveys to show that severe to moderate food-
energy deficiency (defined as per capita calorie 
availability below the average requirements 
for light activity) is at about the same level in 
South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa (51 and 57 
percent, respectively). However, severe food-
energy deficiency (defined as per capita calorie 
availability below the minimum requirements 
for light activity) is much more prevalent in 
Sub-Saharan Africa: 51 percent as compared to 
35 percent in South Asia. And moderate food-
energy deficiency is higher in South Asia (16 
percent) than in Sub-Saharan Africa (6 percent). 
This suggests there is not only a higher severity 
of  poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa (as evidenced 
by the high share of  ultra poor) than in South 
Asia, but also a higher severity of  hunger. This 
is not surprising, given that the conceptual link 
between poverty and hunger and the estimates 
for these two indicators come from the same 
data sources.
 East Asia and the Pacific’s four-point reduc-
tion in the GHI is much lower than its dramatic 
decline in poverty of  21 percentage points dur-
ing the 1990s and early 2000s. However, this 
disparity in poverty and hunger trends should 
be seen in the light of  a lower level of  the GHI 
at the outset. 
 In Latin America and the Caribbean, slow 
progress against both poverty and hunger was 
observed, starting from a lower level for both 
indicators. The increase in proportion of  the 
ultra poor living on less than 50 cents a day 
was not matched by increases in any of  the 
components of  the GHI.
2.6 CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
This chapter has presented a global picture of  
extreme poverty and hunger and the way it has 
changed over time. It has highlighted regions 
of  the world in which poverty and hunger are 
highly prevalent and remain persistent. Sub-
Saharan Africa continues to experience a high 
incidence of  poverty and even though improve-
ments in poverty have been evident in South 
Asia, hunger remains persistently high. We have 
also shown that the world’s absolute poorest are 
overwhelmingly located in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 Improvements in well-being were expe-
rienced in all regions from 1990 to 2004, as 
evidenced by falling measures of  poverty and 
hunger. However, progress has been markedly 
uneven between regions, and in general, global 
and regional trends indicate that improvements 
have been the least for those who need them 
most: the poorest.
 
In this chapter we take a closer look at who the 
poor and hungry are, focusing on 20 countries 
for which household survey data are available. 
The countries are found in various regions 
throughout the developing world, includ-
ing Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, East and 
Central Asia, and Latin America and the Carib-
bean (LAC). Sub-Saharan Africa is represented 
by nine countries: Burundi, Ethiopia, Ghana, 
Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sen-
egal, and Zambia. South Asia is represented 
by Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, 
which make up the large majority of  the 
region’s population. Laos, Timor-Leste, Viet-
nam, and Tajikistan represent East and Central 
Asia. Finally, Peru, Guatemala, and Nicaragua 
represent LAC. As will be seen below, the 
poverty and hunger situations in these coun-
tries fall along a spectrum from dire to quite 
low incidences. The countries chosen from 
the available datasets represent this spectrum 
within each major developing region.
 This chapter begins with a discussion of  
the indicators of  poverty and hunger that are 
employed, followed by a presentation of  the 
patterns of  poverty and hunger across the 
countries and by rural and urban areas within 
them. Next, we examine the correlations 
between national incidences of  poverty and 
hunger to get a sense of  how closely poverty 
and hunger overlap. Finally, the data are used to 
undertake a descriptive analysis that identifies 
some key characteristics of  the poor.  
3.1 DATA AND INDICATORS OF POVERTY AND 
HUNGER
The data employed in this analysis are from 
nationally representative household expenditure 
surveys conducted between 1994 and 2003. In 
the surveys, households are asked to report 
on all of  their expenditures on goods and 
services, which can then be used to estimate 
their incomes and calculate poverty rates. As 
part of  this process, they are asked to report on 
their acquisition of  foods from three sources: 
purchases, home production, and in-kind 
receipts. These data can then be used to calculate 
measures of  hunger. Appendix 3 describes the 
datasets and data collection methodology. A list 
of  the countries and years their surveys were 
conducted is presented in Table A3.1.
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 The poverty indicator employed here is 
the same as that used in Chapter 2. Using 
the appropriate cut-offs applied to each 
household’s total expenditures per capita, poor 
households are identified and classified into 
one of  three groups—subjacent poor, medial 
poor, and ultra poor—from which population 
group incidences can be calculated.
 Two types of  hunger indicators are 
employed, the first representing diet quantity 
and the second diet quality.12  The diet quantity 
indicators are based on the amount of  dietary 
energy in the foods acquired by households, 
with cut-offs used to classify those identified as 
hungry into three groups:
(1) subjacent hungry: acquiring 1,800-2,200 
kilocalories (kcals) per person per day;
(2) medial hungry: acquiring 1,600-1,800 
kcals per person per day; and
(3) ultra hungry: acquiring less than 1,600 
kcals per person per day.
 The groups are defined by progressively 
deeper and more life-threatening hunger 
associated with a deficiency of  dietary energy, 
which is arguably the most essential nutrient 
for survival, physical activity, and health. Note 
that the 2,200 kcal cut-off  roughly corresponds 
to what is known as the “average” energy 
requirement for light activity (such as sitting 
and standing) recommended by the Expert 
Consultation on Human Energy and Protein 
Requirements (FAO, WHO, and UNU 1985). 
It represents the average among people in the 
same age–sex groups regardless of  weight. 
The 1,800 kcal cut-off  identifies people who 
do not consume sufficient dietary energy to 
meet the “minimum” requirement for light 
activity as established by FAO (FAO 1996a). 
People whose energy consumption falls below 
this requirement cannot even meet the energy 
needs of  the lowest-weight person of  their 
same age and sex group. The 1,600 kcal cut-off  
was chosen to identify those suffering from very 
severe, life-threatening hunger.
 An indicator of  diet quality is included here 
in recognition of  the fact that it is possible 
for people to meet their energy requirement 
but not achieve full physical and intellectual 
potential due to deficiencies of  other nutrients, 
specifically protein and micronutrients such 
as iron, vitamin A, and iodine (Welch 2004). 
Indeed, it is increasingly recognized that 
Table 3.1 Selected Countries and Years of 
 Surveys 
 Year of survey
Sub-Saharan Africa 
 Burundi 1998
 Ethiopia 1999
 Ghana 1998
 Kenya 1997
 Malawi 1997
 Mozambique 1996
 Rwanda 2000
 Senegal 2001
 Zambia 1996
South Asia 
 Bangladesh 2000
 India 1999
 Pakistan 1998
 Sri Lanka 1999
East Asia 
 Lao PDR 2002
 Timor-Leste 2001
 Vietnam 1998
Central Asia 
 Tajikistan 2003
Latin America and the Caribbean 
 Guatemala 2000
 Nicaragua 2001
 Peru 1994
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inadequate diet quality, rather than insufficient 
energy consumption, is becoming the main 
dietary constraint facing poor populations (Ruel 
et al. 2003; Graham, Welch, and Bouis 2004).  
 The specific indicator employed here is 
diet diversity, which denotes how varied the 
food an individual consumes is. Research to 
date from both developed and developing 
countries consistently shows that diet diversity 
is a good indicator of  nutrient adequacy, that 
is, a diet that meets requirements for energy 
and all other essential nutrients (Ruel 2002). 
It is calculated for this report’s analysis by 
simply counting the number (out of  seven) 
of  nutritionally important food groups 
from which food is acquired over the survey 
reference period. The groups are: (1) cereals, 
roots, and tubers; (2) pulses and legumes; (3) 
dairy products; (4) meats, fish and seafood, 
and eggs; (5) oils and fats; (6) fruits; and (7) 
vegetables. The first group contains starchy 
staples that are the main source of  dietary 
energy. Groups 2–4 contain foods that are high 
in protein. Animal foods are also good sources 
of  micronutrients, including calcium, easily 
absorbable iron and zinc, and the fat-soluble 
vitamins A and D. The fifth group contains 
foods that may be good sources of  fat-soluble 
vitamins, and they assist with their absorption. 
Finally, fruits and vegetables are good sources 
of  micronutrients and fiber (Latham 1997). 
 There are currently no international 
recommendations for optimal food-group 
diversity and thus, for determining whether 
people have low-quality diets based only on 
the knowledge of  what foods they eat. Proper 
cut-offs must be based on further research that 
relates measures of  diet diversity to measures 
of  nutrient adequacy in specific populations 
(Arimond and Ruel 2004). Meanwhile, this 
study considers someone to have a low-quality 
diet if  he or she consumes food from fewer 
than five of  the seven food groups. 
3.2 INCIDENCE OF POVERTY
Table 3.2 reports the incidences of  poverty for 
the countries at the national level as well as for 
rural and urban areas. They are illustrated in 
Figure 3.1, in which countries are ranked by the 
incidence of  ultra poverty.13 As was described 
in Chapter 2, the highest incidences of  ultra 
FIGURE 3.1 National Incidences of Poverty for the Subjacent, Medial, and Ultra Poor
Figure 3.1—National Incidences of Poverty for the Subjacent, Medial, and Ultra Poor
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poverty are found in Sub-Saharan Africa. In 
four countries (three of  which are in Sub- 
Saharan Africa), the incidence of  ultra poverty 
is higher than the incidences of  subjacent and 
medial poverty combined: Zambia, Rwanda, 
Burundi, and Nicaragua.  
 The country with the highest overall rate 
of  poverty—an alarming 70 percent when 
all three groups are combined—is Rwanda. 
Almost one-third of  its population lives in 
ultra poverty. This extremely high incidence 
is not surprising: at the time of  its survey in 
2000, Rwanda was recovering from ethnically 
motivated civil wars accompanied by violence 
and displacements that completely devastated 
people’s livelihoods (UNDHA 1996). Zambia 
also has exceptionally high rates of  overall and 
ultra poverty, at 63 and 33 percent, respectively, 
which is partly due to the fact that it was recov-
ering from the effect of  a severe drought at the 
time of  its survey in 1996 (Frankenberger et a1. 
2003). Burundi’s overall and ultra poverty rates 
are also quite high, related to the same set of  
circumstances as Rwanda.
 Outside of  Sub-Saharan Africa, Bangla-
desh—which has the world’s highest popula-
tion density and recurrent natural disasters 
(FAO 2005)—and Nicaragua are the study 
countries with the highest overall poverty 
rates, at 50 and 53 percent, respectively. More 
than half  of  the poor in Bangladesh are subja-
cent poor, and only 4.1 percent are ultra poor. 
The group with the highest incidence in Nica-
ragua, in contrast, is the ultra poor, at almost 
a quarter of  the population. At the time of  its 
survey in 2001, Nicaragua was still in the pro-
cess of  reconstruction following its civil war 
and the economic collapse of  the 1980s. It was 
also recovering from multiple natural disas-
ters in the 1990s (Government of  Nicaragua 
2000).
 Turning next to rural–urban differences, the 
incidence of  poverty is higher in rural areas 
in all of  the study countries for which poverty 
data are available, despite a global trend toward 
an increase in the proportion of  poor in urban 
areas (Ravallion, Chen, and Sangraula 2007). 
This finding is illustrated in Figure 3.2, which 
FIGURE 3.2 Rural and Urban Incidences of Poverty 
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Figure 3.2—Rural and Urban Incidences of Poverty
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shows the incidence when all three poverty 
groups are combined, that is, the total popula-
tion living on less than $1 a day. The rural dis-
advantage is most pronounced in Rwanda, for 
which the overall poverty rate is 76 percent in 
rural areas but only 35 percent in urban areas. 
 The same pattern of  rural disadvantage is 
found for the poverty subgroups with very 
few exceptions, and in the few instances where 
urban poverty is greater than rural (for exam-
ple, in Nicaragua among the subjacent poor), 
the difference is not large (see Table 3.2). It 
is interesting to note that there is a tendency 
toward greater rural–urban differences as pov-
erty deepens, although this is not consistent 
across countries. The average percent differ-
ence between rural and urban poverty inci-
dences is 140 percent for the subjacent poor, 
165 percent for the medial poor, and 400 per-
cent for the ultra poor. 
3.3 INCIDENCE OF HUNGER
The Global Hunger Index data presented in 
Chapter 2 indicates that Sub-Saharan Africa 
and South Asia are the regions of  the world 
with the greatest hunger problems. When it 
comes to hunger associated with a deficiency 
of  food energy, the data in Table 3.3 bear this 
pattern out. Figure 3.3 illustrates the incidences 
of  food-energy deficiency across the countries 
for the three hunger groups, with the countries 
ranked by incidence of  ultra hunger.14    
 In Sub-Saharan Africa, the incidences of  
hunger for all three groups combined are 
particularly high (greater than 70 percent) for 
Ethiopia, Burundi, Zambia, and Malawi. All of  
these countries suffered from aggregate food 
deficits in the years of  their surveys. They 
experienced adverse climatic shocks or severe 
conflict-induced instability in the years lead-
ing up to their surveys, with long-term conse-
quences for both food supplies and the ability 
of  households to gain access to them (Smith, 
Alderman, and Aduayom 2006).
FIGURE 3.3 National Incidences of Hunger (Food-Energy Deficiency) for the Subjacent, Medial, 
 and Ultra Hungry
3
Figure 3.3—National Incidences of Hunger (food-energy deficiency) for the Subjacent, Medial, and
Ultra Hungry
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Figure 3.4—Rural and Urban Incidences of Hunger (food-energy deficiency)
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 The highest incidence is for Ethiopia (83 
percent), which experienced recurrent and 
devastating droughts in the decades leading up 
to its survey, as well as chronic political insta-
bility and refugee crises (Sharp, Devereaux, 
and Amare 2003). Burundi’s civil war severely 
disrupted food production, with obvious 
adverse consequences for people’s food secu-
rity (UNDHA 1996). Malawi and Zambia were 
still recovering from a devastating drought in 
1992-93 that led to major food shortages (Fran-
kenberger et al. 2003). 
 In South Asia, the overall prevalence of  
food-energy deficiency in the four study coun-
tries is quite close, ranging from 51 percent in 
Pakistan to 61 percent in Bangladesh. Given 
that all of  these countries had aggregate food 
surpluses at the time of  their surveys, these 
high incidences are mainly a problem of  the 
inability of  households to access available food. 
While economic and agricultural growth has 
fueled an increasing potential to meet the food 
needs of  populations, there have been some 
setbacks, especially with respect to agricul-
tural productivity growth. As in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, natural disasters, and conflict in the 
case of  Sri Lanka, have exacerbated the hunger 
situation (Smith and Wiesmann 2007).  
 When it comes to the depth of  hunger, it is 
in Sub-Saharan Africa that hunger associated 
with access to insufficient dietary energy is the 
most severe. For all nine Sub-Saharan African 
study countries, the incidence of  ultra hunger is 
above 25 percent (the highest among the three 
hunger groups) and it comprises the majority 
of  the hungry. In four countries—Burundi, 
Ethiopia, Malawi, and Zambia—more than 
half  of  the country’s entire population suffers 
from ultra hunger. 
 Incidences of  medial hunger are uniformly 
low among the South Asian countries. In Ban-
gladesh and India, the group with the high-
est incidence is the subjacent hungry, while 
in Pakistan and Sri Lanka the subjacent and 
ultra hungry incidences are roughly the same. 
Among the rest of  the study countries, Timor-
Leste and Nicaragua stand out as having rela-
tively high concentrations of  their hungry in 
the ultra hungry group.
 Given the rural disadvantage when it 
comes to poverty, we would expect rural 
rates of  food-energy deficiency to be higher 
than urban rates as well. However, despite 
higher incomes, urbanites in some instances 
may face greater challenges in gaining access 
to sufficient food than rural dwellers do. This 
is because urban households are dependent 
on commercial markets and often face sharp 
trade-offs among competing needs for their 
incomes (such as housing, health, and trans-
port), which can be very expensive in urban 
areas.15 Thus, urban–rural differences in the 
prevalence of  food-energy deficiency could 
theoretically go either way.  
 Figure 3.4 shows a mixed picture. Seven of  
the study countries have a substantially higher 
food-energy deficiency incidence in urban 
areas. In most of  the Asian study countries, 
there is a common urban disadvantage when 
it comes to food-energy deficiency. In five of  
the countries (all in Sub-Saharan Africa except 
Nicaragua), however, there is a substantial 
urban advantage.
 The possibility that these findings reflect 
measurement issues must be considered. For 
instance, the problems of  imputing the mon-
etary value of  housing in rural areas plague 
poverty estimates. In the case of  the hunger 
estimates, food eaten out of  the home, which 
occurs more frequently in urban areas, cannot 
be reliably measured in household expendi-
ture surveys (see Smith and Subandoro 2007). 
While these potential data issues prevent us 
from drawing any strong conclusions from 
these results, the possibility that hunger may 
be more prevalent in urban areas in some 
countries merits further research.
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FIGURE 3.4 Rural and Urban Incidences of Hunger (Food-Energy Deficiency)
FIGURE 3.5 National Incidences of Low Diet Quality
3
Figure 3.3—National Incidences of Hunger (food-energy deficiency) for the Subjacent, Medial, and
Ultra Hungry
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Figure 3.4—Rural and Urban Incidences of Hunger (food-energy deficiency)
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Note: The hunger incidences represent the sum of the incidences for the subjacent, medial, and ultra hungry.
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 Turning next to hunger associated with 
low diet quality, Laos in East Asia stands out 
as having the highest incidence at 61 percent 
(see Figure 3.5 and Table 3.3), followed closely 
by Mozambique at 60 percent. Malawi (47 
percent), Rwanda (46 percent), and Burundi (42 
percent) in Sub-Saharan Africa also have quite 
high incidences. It is interesting to note that in 
South Asia, for which food-energy deficiency 
is a major problem, low diet quality appears to 
affect very few people. The highest incidence 
of  low diet quality in South Asia is 11 percent 
in Sri Lanka. The incidences of  low diet quality 
are also quite small for the LAC countries. 
They are moderately high for Timor-Leste and 
Tajikistan.
 When it comes to rural–urban differences 
in diet quality, rural households have a clear 
disadvantage in all of  the study countries (see 
Figure 3.6). The rural disadvantage is strongest 
in Rwanda, where the rural incidence of  low 
diet quality is 51 percent but the urban incidence 
is a slight 3 percent. In addition to lower urban 
poverty in most countries, the rural disadvantage 
can be explained by the fact that urban areas 
have better access to a wider variety of  foods 
in close proximity. Rural households are more 
likely to rely on their own production or to live 
farther away from markets where a variety of  
foods can be purchased (Smith, Alderman, and 
Aduayom 2006).
3.4 CORRELATIONS BETWEEN POVERTY AND 
HUNGER
As was demonstrated in Chapter 2, the data 
in this section show that while poverty and 
hunger do overlap, they are not identical. The 
FIGURE 3.6 Rural and Urban Incidences of Low Diet Quality
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first column of  Table 3.4 reports national 
incidences of  hunger among all people clas-
sified as poor. In every country, the majority 
of  poor people are hungry. The overlap is par-
ticularly high in Sub-Saharan Africa, where 
more than 80 percent of  the poor are food-
energy deficient in all of  the study countries. 
This is consistent with the fact that poverty 
is the primary cause of  hunger. However, the 
fact that the incidences of  hunger among the 
poor are not all 100 percent points to the mea-
surement error inherent in these datasets, and 
also suggests that not all poor people are hun-
gry.16 Some are still able to meet their energy 
needs for an active, healthy life despite mea-
ger incomes. In some cases this may be due to 
relatively low food prices, possibly as a result 
of  food subsidies.  
 The second column of  Table 3.4 reports the 
incidences of  poverty among the hungry. Here 
we find a consistently weaker correspondence. 
Indeed, in Guatemala, less than 10 percent of  
the food-energy deficient can be classified as 
poor. This finding suggests that, even allowing 
for measurement error, it is possible that a 
person who is hungry is not necessarily so 
because she or he is poor. It has been noted 
that in some cases, households with ample 
income to purchase food may be prevented 
from accessing it due to insufficient food 
supply caused by such problems as market 
fragmentation, natural disasters, or conflict 
(Sen 1983). It should be kept in mind, however, 
that the results in Table 3.4 are dependent on 
the cut-offs chosen. Using the definition of  
2,200 calories as hungry, the data show that 
while nearly all those living on less than $1 a 
day are hungry, those who are hungry may 
live on more than $1 a day (especially in some 
countries). Hunger defined in this way may 
thus be a broader measure of  deprivation than 
poverty at a $1 a day. Households that are not 
classified as poor by the dollar-a-day cut-off  
may still face tight income constraints, and thus 
trade-offs among competing needs, given the 
cost of  living where they reside. Households 
in this situation may not have enough to eat 
because their income is primarily devoted 
to meeting other basic needs such as health, 
education, transportation, and housing. They 
may also be choosing to temporarily forgo 
food consumption in the short term in order 
to preserve their productive assets, including 
TABLE 3.4    Incidence of Hunger among the 
Poor, and of Poverty among the Hungry
 Incidence of  Incidence of
 Hunger among Poverty among
Countries the Poor the Hungry
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Burundi 98.9 63.0 
Ghana 85.7 44.3 
Kenya 97.4 31.7 
Malawi 92.4 50.6 
Mozambique 89.6 62.8 
Rwanda 84.4 84.6 
Senegal 86.5 34.1 
Zambia 83.1 70.9 
South Asia   
Bangladesh 73.5 59.9 
India 86.9 46.3 
Pakistan 90.6 19.0 
Sri Lanka 98.8 10.3 
East and Central Asia   
Timor-Leste 98.7 17.3 
Tajikistan 71.6 44.8 
Latin America and the Caribbean   
Nicaragua 56.9 86.3 
Guatemala 89.5 8.6 
––––
NOTE: The poverty and hunger incidences are defined 
to be the sum of  the incidences for the subjacent, 
medial, and ultra poor and hungry.
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the education of  their children, in the long 
term (Hoddinott 2006).
 Providing further insight into the extent to 
which the hungry and poor overlap, Table 3.5 
reports on the statistical correlations between 
national incidences of  poverty and hunger 
across the 16 countries for which data are avail-
able for both. For overall poverty and hunger 
(with the three subgroups combined) at the 
national level the correlation between poverty 
and hunger is 0.63. Interestingly, when exam-
ining the subjacent, medial, and ultra groups, 
the correlations between poverty and hunger 
are relatively high and statistically significant 
only for the ultra poor and hungry.   
 The bottom row of  Table 3.5 reports the 
correlations between the incidence of  poverty 
(all subgroups combined) and the incidence 
of  low diet quality. Here we find a weakly 
positive correlation of  0.43.
 The results of  the above analysis suggest 
that policies and programs aimed at alleviating 
poverty measured only by $1 a day may not 
have such a great impact on hunger (including 
both dietary energy deficiency and low diet 
quality) in every case.
3.5 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POOREST AND 
HUNGRY
This section provides information on who the 
poorest and hungry are by presenting profiles 
of  poor households in 15 of  these countries.17 
The previous section suggests this group is also, 
by and large, hungry (although by using the 
cut-off  of  2,200 calories, this group does not 
include all hungry households). We examine 
some key characteristics of  households living 
on less than $1 a day. For 10 of  the 15 countries 
in which the incidence of  ultra poverty was 
relatively high, we go further in examining 
some of  the characteristics, and compare those 
living in ultra poverty to those living on just 
less than $1 a day in subjacent poverty.18 The 
characteristics are limited to those that can to 
some extent be compared across countries. 
We first look at how poor households spend 
their money. We then examine differences 
in demographic variables (such as whether 
or not poor households are more likely to 
be headed by women or to have elderly or 
children), schooling, and the ownership status 
of  some selected assets. Access to electricity is 
TABLE 3.5    Correlations among Incidences of Poverty and Hunger
 National
 All of the Subjacent Medial Ultra
Type of hungry Poor Poor Poor Poor
All of  the hungry 0.63***   
Subjacent hungry  0.35  
Medial hungry   0.11 
Ultra hungry    0.63***
Low diet quality 0.42    
––––
NOTE: The poverty and hunger incidences are defined to be the sum of  the incidences for the subjacent, medial, 
and ultra poor and hungry.
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considered as a proxy for the extent to which 
these households are connected to transport 
and communications infrastructure and the 
access to markets and services this brings. 
The incidence of  poverty among excluded 
groups in three countries (indigenous peoples 
in Guatemala and Peru and scheduled castes 
and tribes in India) and among the mainstream 
majority is also compared.
Food and Nonfood Budget Shares
Appendix Tables A4.1a to A4.1e present, 
respectively, the budget shares of  households 
living below and above the dollar-a-day pov-
erty line, and households living in subjacent, 
medial, and ultra poverty. A detailed compari-
son and enlightening discussion of  budget 
shares of  those living on more than and less 
than $1 a day in many developing countries 
can be found in Banerjee and Duflo (forthcom-
ing). In general, poorer households and house-
holds living in rural areas spend a relatively 
higher proportion of  their budget on food 
but, perhaps surprisingly, the differences are 
not large. Food budget shares in Sub-Saharan 
African countries are higher than in countries 
in other regions; among the poor, food bud-
get share at the national level ranges from 67 
percent in Ghana to as high as 86 percent in 
Rwanda. In contrast, Guatemalan households 
living on less than $1 a day allocate 50 percent 
of  their budget to acquiring food. 
 Poor households spend very little on edu-
cation, especially in our sample of  countries 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. The poor in Vietnam, 
Nicaragua, and Tajikistan allocate a relatively 
higher percentage of  their budget to educa-
tion. One of  the reasons for the low level of  
spending on education is that the poor usually 
attend public or other schools (such as NGO-
run schools) that do not charge a fee (Banerjee 
and Duflo, forthcoming).
 Interestingly, expenditures on fuel represent 
the second highest share of  budget among 
both rural and urban poor in South Asia (Ban-
gladesh, India, and Pakistan). The poor in 
South Asia also spend more on clothing (the 
third highest budget share) than do the poor 
in other countries included in this study. Hous-
ing costs represent the second highest budget 
share for the poor in all three sample countries 
in Latin America and in Tajikistan. 
 We have noted in section 3.3 that one of  
the reasons for lower energy consumption by 
urban dwellers compared to their rural coun-
terparts could be that the budget share for 
housing for the urbanites is likely to be higher 
than for those living in rural areas. Indeed, 
the budget share for housing is considerably 
higher for the urban poor than for the rural 
poor in 13 of  the 15 case-study countries; Nica-
ragua and Tajikistan are the exceptions. 
 Column 5 in Tables 1a to 1e presents expen-
ditures on health care across these countries. 
Few patterns are observed between spending 
on health and poverty; spending increases with 
poverty in Burundi and Vietnam, but falls or 
does not change with poverty in other coun-
tries. This is a potentially worrisome finding 
as poverty assessments for these countries 
have repeatedly found that ill-health is more 
prevalent among the poor. For example, in 
Bangladesh, serious illness, accidents, or death 
occurred in 43-48 percent of  poor households 
compared to 29 percent of  households classi-
fied as non-poor (Kabeer 2002). In Vietnam, 
long-term illness was repeatedly mentioned 
in the participatory poverty assessment as a 
defining characteristic of  poor families, with 
phrases such as “ill health,” “chronic disease,” 
and “becoming indebted to pay medical costs” 
being mentioned in all research sites (World 
Bank 2004, p. 37). And in Guatemala the prev-
alence of  diarrhea among children is higher 
among those in the poorer quintiles (World 
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Bank 2003b). The finding that poorer house-
holds spend no more on health suggests that 
the poorest spend less on health care per need 
than wealthier households. Section 4.4 notes 
the pre-eminent importance of  health shocks 
in causing and maintaining poverty, with as 
many as 74 percent of  households in one study 
tracing their fall into poverty to unexpected 
ill-health.
Women, Elderly, and Children
We present the patterns of  demographic com-
position and female headship of  households 
living below and above the dollar-a-day pov-
erty line (Appendix Table A4.2), and for those 
living in subjacent, medial, and ultra poverty 
(Appendix Table A4.3). 
 First, we briefly note from the tables that 
larger households tend to be poorer than 
smaller households (with the exception of  
Bangladesh) and we also note that the poorest 
households tend to have higher dependency 
ratios (the number of  household members of  
non-working age—children aged 0 to 14 years 
and elderly aged 60 years and over—that have 
to be supported by the household’s working 
members). While intuitively we might expect 
that households with many to feed and fewer 
able-bodied adults will be poorer, caution is 
required in assuming this from the data too 
readily. Measurements of  both poverty and 
hunger do not take into account the lower 
consumption requirements of  children or 
those who are inactive, nor are they able to 
allow for any advantages from sharing pub-
lic goods that larger households may enjoy. 
Concluding from these numbers (and from 
the many other studies in which poverty and 
hunger are calculated in the same way) that 
poorer households are larger or have higher 
dependency ratios can thus be erroneous. 
 One study on Mozambique takes into 
account these two factors and finds that there 
is an association between household size and 
poverty: larger households are found to be 
poorer (Simler et al. 2004). However, the asso-
ciation does not imply a causal link between 
household size and poverty since there are 
complex, dynamic links between demographic 
variables and poverty that prevent us from 
drawing conclusions from this.
 So, is it possible to say anything about 
whether, in fact, the elderly or children are 
more likely to be poor? Although it is not ana-
lyzed here, it has been suggested elsewhere 
that poverty rates among the elderly are par-
ticularly high. A study on aging and poverty in 
Africa found that, although few elderly live on 
their own, the depth of  poverty among elderly 
when they do was found to be much higher 
than the average (measured by the poverty gap 
ratio), especially in rural areas (Kakwani and 
Subbarao 2005). Although the elderly are not 
always the poorest—for example, the elderly 
were not found to be poorer in Mozambique 
(Simler et al 2004)—they are often poor, and 
poor in many dimensions: “It is easy to iden-
tify the house of  an older person, as it is often 
dilapidated and of  poor quality” (HelpAge 
International 2003). 
 In a number of  countries considered in this 
report, children were found to be dispropor-
tionately more likely to belong to poor house-
holds, as evidenced by higher poverty rates 
among children in many countries. For exam-
ple, in Vietnam children are 1.4 to 1.75 times 
more likely than adults to be poor (World Bank 
2004). However, these studies do not control 
for the various factors noted above, and it is 
not clear that this relationship holds when 
these factors are taken into consideration. 
 Nonetheless, there are groups of  children 
who are particularly vulnerable to poverty. 
These groups include orphans and street 
children. A high incidence of  disease and poor 
access to health services makes orphanhood a 
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common phenomenon in many countries. The 
presence of  conflict and the high incidence of  
HIV/AIDS make orphanhood even more likely. 
Current global figures estimate that 16 million 
children under 15 have already lost either one 
or both parents to HIV/AIDS and that another 
40 million children will lose their parents within 
the next 10 years.19  
 In Rwanda, the prevalence of  orphanhood 
after the genocide resulted in many orphaned 
children forming their own families. In 1997, 
there were approximately 85,000 child-headed 
households with an average family size of  4-5 
children. According to surveys conducted by 
Save the Children in 1995, 70 percent of  these 
households were headed by girls and only 15 
of  these households had any regular income. 
These households formed one of  the poorest 
sections of  society by any measure. In Timor-
Leste, the long history of  conflict has resulted 
in 1 in 12 children losing their father. Children 
who have lost their father are more likely to 
be poor than those who have not (World Bank 
2003c).
 Poverty in childhood is much more likely to 
have long-term impacts on the future poverty 
of  that child, as is suggested in the following 
section on education and is further discussed 
in Chapter 4.
 We turn now to the question of  whether 
the poorest are more likely to be women, 
and look first at whether the prevalence of  
poverty—and ultra poverty—is higher among 
female-headed households.
 Figure 3.7 shows that, in general, female-
headed households are more prevalent in 
Sub-Saharan African countries, ranging from 
19 percent among households living on less 
than $1 a day in Mozambique to 34 percent 
in Rwanda. In Asian countries, Sri Lanka has 
the highest proportion (22 percent) of  female-
headed poor households, but in Pakistan and 
Bangladesh, only 5-6 percent are female-
headed. In Latin America, 25 percent of  
poor households in Nicaragua are headed by 
women, as compared to only 1 percent of  poor 
households in Guatemala. Countries with a 
history of  civil conflict, such as Rwanda and 
Sri Lanka, tend to have higher proportions of  
female-headed households. 
 A comparison of  households above and 
below the dollar-a-day poverty line reveals 
that higher proportions of  poor households 
are headed by women in f ive of  seven 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and in Sri 
Lanka (Figure 3.7). In other countries in Asia 
and Latin America, the proportion of  female-
headed households is lower among poorer 
households.
 When looking below the dollar-a-day line 
for the subset of  10 countries, we observe 
a more similar relationship between ultra 
poverty and female-headed households in Sub-
Saharan Africa and Asia (Figure 3.8). In five 
of  six Sub-Saharan African countries (Ghana 
being the only exception) and in all three Asian 
countries, female-headed households are more 
likely to be found living in ultra poverty than 
in subjacent poverty. For these three Asian 
countries (Bangladesh, India, and Vietnam), 
the relationship between poverty and female-
headship is thus reversed when disaggregating 
below the dollar-a-day line. A comparison of  
those living in ultra poverty with those living on 
more than $1 a day shows that households in ultra 
poverty in these three countries are more likely 
to be female headed. The data from Nicaragua 
suggest that in Latin America, the pattern is not 
similarly reversed when disaggregating below 
$1 a day: ultra poor households are even less 
likely to be female headed.
 The tendency of  female-headed households 
to have higher numbers of  children who have 
lower consumption requirements might 
again lead to an overestimation of  poverty 
among female-headed households. However, a 
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FIGURE 3.7 Proportion of Female-Headed Households: Living on More Than and Less Than $1 
 a Day (percent)
FIGURE 3.8 Proportion of Female-Headed Households: Living in Subjacent and Ultra Poverty
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Education
It is hard to overemphasize the importance 
of  education for improving the welfare of  
individuals. Education has been shown to have 
significant positive impacts on agricultural 
productivity, employment, access to credit, use 
of  government services, and own health and 
child health and education outcomes (section 
4.6). In the developing world, providing 
universal primary education connotes a 
great opportunity to reduce poverty and to 
promote economic growth. Quality primary 
education equips children from poor families 
with literacy, numeracy, and basic problem-
solving skills and enables them to move out 
of  poverty. In many developing countries, 
poverty has kept generations of  families from 
sending their children to school, and without 
education, their children’s future will be a 
distressing echo of  their own. Investment in 
education helps reduce the intergenerational 
transmission of  poverty (see section 4.5). 
 Here we try to answer the question of  
whether the poor are less likely to be educated. 
We examine how the educational attainment 
of  adults and investments in children’s 
education vary among those living above and 
below the dollar-a-day line, and between those 
in subjacent and ultra poverty. Full tables on 
adult educational attainment and investments 
in children’s education (by males and females 
and rural and urban areas) are provided in 
Appendix Tables A4.4 to A4.7.
 Figure 3.9 and Figure 3.10 show the pro-
portion of  adult males and females above and 
below the dollar-a-day poverty line who have no 
schooling. The proportion of  those educated 
varies from country to country, but it is clear 
that in every part of  the world, and for both 
men and women, poor adults are less likely to 
be educated than those living on more than 
careful study of  differences between male- and 
female-headed households across 10 countries 
using IFPRI datasets (and two LSMS surveys) 
showed that taking this into account made very 
little difference in comparisons between male- 
and female-headed households (Quisumbing, 
Haddad, and Pena 2001). If  anything, taking this 
into account increased the number of  countries 
in which female-headed households were found 
to be poorer: they were poorer in 8 of  the 10 
countries using the dollar-a-day poverty line. 
However, in each estimation method only two 
or three countries had differences big enough to 
be significantly different. This is worth bearing 
in mind since for some countries presented here 
the differences are also small and may not be 
significant. 
 We conclude that there is some evidence that 
is consistent with the hypothesis that female-
headed households are overrepresented among 
the ultra poor. Why female-headed households 
may be poorer is considered in Chapter 4. Access 
to assets and resources may be one part of  the 
explanation. 
 Examining only differences between male- 
and female-headed households hides the fact 
that within households headed by men, the 
welfare of  women and girls is often lower than 
that of  their male family members. While 
empirical evidence on this is more limited, 
the same study of  IFPRI datasets found that 
at the individual level, women were poorer 
than men in 6 of  the 10 countries considered, 
and were significantly so for some measure of  
poverty in Ghana, Madagascar, and Bangladesh 
(Quisumbing, Haddad, and Pena 2001). 
Additionally, studies in South Asia show that 
within households, women receive significantly 
less food and sometimes less high-quality food 
such as meat and eggs (Ahmed 2000a, Haddad 
et al. 1996, del Ninno et al. 2001). 
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FIGURE 3.10 Proportion of Adult Females (Aged 18 and over) with No Schooling: Living on More 
 Than and Less Than $1 a Day (percent)
FIGURE 3.9 Proportion of Adult Males (Aged 18 and over) with No Schooling: Living on More  
  Than and Less Than $1 a Day (percent)
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FIGURE 3.12 Proportion of Adult Females (Aged 18 and over) with No Schooling:  Living in  
 Subjacent and Ultra Poverty
FIGURE 3.11 Proportion of Adult Males (Aged 18 and over) with No Schooling:  Living in  
 Subjacent and Ultra Poverty
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$1 a day. And for many countries, the gap is 
considerable. This is especially so in South 
Asia and Latin America (the proportion of  
adult males without schooling living on less 
than $1 a day is almost twice the proportion of  
adult males without schooling living on more 
than $1 a day in Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, 
Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Peru), but the gap 
is also considerable in Malawi, Ghana, Rwanda, 
and Zambia. A comparison of  the numbers in 
Figure 3.9 and Figure 3.10 reveals that women 
are much more educationally disadvantaged 
than men. In Pakistan, 93 percent of  women 
and 64 percent of  men from poor families never 
attended school. Although most adult men 
and women among the poor never attended 
school in Bangladesh, the gender gap there 
is considerably smaller than that in India and 
Pakistan. 
 Looking below the dollar-a-day poverty line, 
we see the same pattern. Unschooled women 
and men are much more likely to experience 
ultra poverty than subjacent poverty (Figures 
3.11-3.12). Again, this is true in all countries 
except Mozambique. The differences in 
educational attainment between the ultra 
poor and those above the dollar-a-day line are 
large in all countries. With the exception of  
Mozambique and Burundi, the proportion of  
adult males without schooling is almost double 
or more among the ultra poor than the non-
poor. In Vietnam and Nicaragua, adult males 
living in ultra poverty are three times more 
likely to be uneducated than those living on 
more than $1 a day. The data overwhelmingly 
show that the poorest are the least educated.
 Given the relationship between poverty and 
education, investments in children’s schooling 
may determine whether or not they will be 
poor in the future. Figure 3.13 presents national 
net enrollment rates for primary school-age 
children whose family members live on less 
than and more than $1 a day per person.20 In 
all study countries, the evidence is the same: 
children from poorer families are less likely to 
go to school. Figure 3.14 presents the national 
net enrollment rates for primary school-age 
children living in subjacent and ultra poverty, 
FIGURE 3.13 Net Primary School Enrollment Rates:  Living on Less Than and More Than  
 $1 a Day
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and with the exception of  Malawi, a similar 
pattern is observed. The poorest are the least 
able to invest in the education of  their children. 
In India, there is a 33 percentage-point gap 
between children living in ultra poverty and 
children living on more than $1 a day. In Vietnam, 
the gap is 30 percentage points, and in Ghana 
and Burundi it is 28 and 24 percentage points, 
respectively. Some of  constraints that limit 
investments in education by poorer households 
are considered in Chapter 4. 
 However, it is important to note that there 
is considerable variation in net enrollment 
rates across countries—for children from 
poor families, it ranges from only 35 percent in 
Pakistan to as high as 92 percent in Sri Lanka. 
Enrollment rates are low in Pakistan despite 
the country’s relatively low dollar-a-day 
poverty rate (11 percent). In contrast, although 
Bangladesh has a dollar-a-day poverty rate of  50 
percent, the enrollment rate for children from 
poor families is much higher (88 percent). Sri 
Lanka has the lowest poverty rate (6 percent) 
and the highest enrollment rate among the 
countries. 
 We have seen in section 3.2 that among 
the 20 case-study countries, Guatemala has 
the lowest dollar-a-day poverty rate (only 
4 percent). Even so, 55 percent of  primary 
school-age children in the country do not go 
to school. Guatemala has a high incidence 
of  child labor. Many children do not attend 
school because they work, mainly on coffee 
and sugar plantations. Further, there are more 
than twice as many non-indigenous children as 
indigenous children enrolled in school (World 
Bank 2003b).  
 Education for girls has social and economic 
benefits for individuals and for society as a 
whole. While the enrollment rate for the poor 
is lower for girls than for boys in most of  the 
case-study countries, girls overtake boys in 
Bangladesh, Malawi, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, 
and Tajikistan. The gap in the enrollment rate 
between boys and girls is greatest in Pakistan—
71 percent of  girls aged 6 to 11 from poor fami-
FIGURE 3.14 Net Primary School Enrollment Rates: Living in Subjacent and Ultra Poverty 
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lies do not go to school compared to 58 percent 
of  boys in the same age group who do not go 
to school (see Appendix Table A4.6).
Landlessness in Rural Areas
The ownership or control of  productive assets 
is an important indicator of  livelihood because 
assets generate income. Land is the vital pro-
ductive asset in a rural economy. We would 
thus expect access to land and the opportunity 
to undertake agricultural cultivation to have 
an important bearing on the well-being of  
rural households in the developing world, and 
consequently the association between poverty 
and landlessness to be high. As land markets 
are undeveloped in most developing countries, 
inheritance is the main mechanism through 
which land ownership changes hands (see sec-
tion 4.7). In some countries, rural households 
have acquired land as a result of  government 
land-reform policies.
 Appendix Tables A4.8 and A4.9 provide 
detailed information on cultivable land owner-
ship in 12 of  the 20 countries above and below 
the dollar-a-day poverty line and among those 
in subjacent, medial, and ultra poverty.21 Figure 
3.15 shows the proportion of  landless among 
those above and below the dollar-a-day line, 
and Figure 3.16 depicts the incidence of  land-
lessness among those in subjacent and ultra 
poverty. Of  the 12 countries, Pakistan has the 
highest incidence of  landlessness—77 percent 
of  the poor own no land. The rate is 67 percent 
in Ghana and 58 percent in Bangladesh. We 
do not observe a uniform pattern of  higher 
landlessness among the poor, since the rela-
tionship varies between Sub-Saharan Africa, 
Latin America, and Asia. 
 In all parts of  Asia, those who are land-
less are the poorest. Rates of  landlessness are 
higher among those living on less than $1 a day, 
and the incidence of  landlessness increases for 
those living well below the dollar-a-day line in 
ultra poverty. Nearly 80 percent of  the ultra 
poor in rural Bangladesh do not own land. 
In rural Bangladesh, landless laborers often 
also lack draft animals and agricultural imple-
ments, meaning they can seldom work as 
sharecroppers and must depend upon wages 
for livelihood. 
FIGURE 3.15 Ownership of Cultivatable Land in Rural Areas: Living on More Than and Less Than 
 $1 a Day
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 Tajikistan has embarked on an ambitious 
program of  agricultural land reform that 
involves passing land-use rights from state to 
farmers. However, many farmers are not yet 
aware of  their rights under the new reform. 
Moreover, when land was redistributed after 
Tajikistan’s independence, one of  the criteria 
for receiving land in many areas of  the country 
was the availability of  male productive labor in 
the household. This resulted in female-headed 
households and households with elderly and 
disabled people receiving less land, causing 
further persistence of  poverty (World Bank 
2005b). 
 In Vietnam, while the distribution of  land 
to rural households was remarkably egalitar-
ian, a market for land transactions is gradually 
emerging. The development of  a land market 
seemingly leads to a gradual concentration 
of  land ownership, and consequently, increas-
ing landlessness (Ravallion and van de Walle 
2001). 
 In Sub-Saharan Africa, with the exception 
of  Ghana, the incidence of  landlessness is 
much lower, and the link between poverty and 
landlessness is also weak. Little difference was 
found between the incidence of  landlessness 
among poorer and less poor households, and 
in some cases the reverse pattern was found. 
This corresponds to the findings of  other 
studies that in Sub-Saharan Africa, the poorest 
often own some land (but not enough) and 
lack access to other key assets and markets, 
such as credit markets (noted in Lanjouw, 
2007). Also it may reflect the fact that where 
productivity of  land varies within a region, 
the key question is not just how much land is 
owned, but also the quality of  the land. 
 Although the incidence of  landlessness is 
high in Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Peru, it was 
actually found to be higher among those who 
live on more than $1 a day than among those 
living on less than $1 a day. Also, in Nicaragua 
those living in ultra poverty were less likely 
FIGURE 3.16 Ownership of Cultivatable Land in Rural Areas: Living in Subjacent and  
 Ultra Poverty 
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to be landless than those living just below the 
dollar-a-day line. This suggests that in Latin 
America, the poorest are more likely to be 
self-employed cultivators than the non-poor, 
perhaps lacking employment opportunities 
in non-agricultural sectors. However, returns 
to skilled labor and capital are probably 
higher than returns to land; therefore, people 
move out of  agriculture with higher levels of  
economic development.  
Remoteness, Access to Electricity, and 
Ownership of Radio and Television
Access to electricity is a composite indicator 
of  development at the national, community, 
and household levels. In addition to being an 
indicator of  wealth, an electricity connection 
also indicates the extent to which a household 
is “connected” in a broader sense to roads, 
markets, and communications infrastructure 
(information technology in particular), and 
the resulting income-earning opportunities 
and public services. As noted in section 3.2, 
the prevalence of  poverty is higher in rural 
areas, and many of  the World Bank Poverty 
Assessments for the countries we consider 
also indicate that the poorest and most-food-
insecure households are located furthest from 
roads, markets, schools, and health services.  
 For example, the incidence of  extreme 
poverty in Nicaragua is 20 percent higher in 
the central rural region, a region where people 
have to travel twice as far to reach the closest 
healthcare service and primary school (World 
Bank 2003a). In Zambia, the prevalence and 
severity of  poverty is lower in provinces that 
are close to the rail line in the center of  the 
country, and the poor are more likely to be 
located more than 20 km from the nearest 
market than the non-poor are (World Bank 
1994). In Laos, poverty is lower in villages 
with roads than in those without (World Bank 
2006b), and poverty maps for Vietnam show 
that the incidence of  poverty is highest in the 
remote areas of  the northeast and northwest 
regions, the upland areas of  the north central 
coast, and the northern part of  the central 
highlands (Minot, Baulch, and Epprecht 2006). 
To some extent, examining the relationship 
FIGURE 3.17 Households with Electricity: Living on Less Than and More Than $1 a Day
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between electricity connections and poverty 
allows us to further consider the relationship 
between poverty and remoteness.
 Appendix Tables A4.10 and A4.11 provide 
data on households with electricity, and 
Figures 3.17 and 3.18 depict the proportion 
of  households with electricity that are 
below and above the dollar-a-day poverty 
line, and that are in subjacent and ultra 
poverty, respectively.22 The rate of  access to 
electricity for the poor varies extremely across 
countries—from virtually universal access in 
Tajikistan to almost non-existence (1 percent 
of  households) in Mozambique. However, 
consistently across countries, households 
living on less than $1 a day have considerably 
lower access to electricity than those living on 
more than $1 a day, and those living on much 
less than $1 a day in ultra poverty are even 
less likely to be connected. Disaggregating 
households on less than $1 a day reveals that 
households living in ultra poverty are on 
average four times less likely to be connected 
to electricity than households living above the 
dollar-a-day line. Households in Rwanda and 
Bangladesh are 13 and 7 times more likely to 
be unconnected, respectively. In rural areas of  
Sub-Saharan Africa, the proportion of  ultra 
poor households with electricity connections 
approaches zero.
 To the extent that access to electricity is 
a proxy for access to roads and markets, this 
suggests that the poorest households are often 
the most remote, which is consistent with 
the poverty profiles in World Bank country 
poverty assessments. 
 At the household level, access to electricity 
leads to the use of  radio, television, and 
other appliances. Besides being used for 
entertainment, radio and television are major 
sources of  information for the poor, particularly 
for illiterate people. Developing-country 
governments use radio and television as the 
most effective forms of  media to inform citizens 
of  improved agricultural practices and crop 
prices, health and hygiene, and interventions 
for poverty reduction such as social protection 
and safety-net programs, among others. 
 As expected, fewer households below the 
dollar-a-day poverty line own radios and 
televisions than do those living above the line. 
However, the rate of  ownership varies widely 
FIGURE 3.18 Households with Electricity: Living in Subjacent and Ultra Poverty 
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across countries, between rural and urban 
areas, and between the two categories (radio 
and television). Except in urban Ghana, hardly 
any poor households in our sample of  Sub-
Saharan countries own a television (Appendix 
Tables A4.10 and A4.11). 
3.6 ETHNICITY AND EXCLUDED GROUPS
In each of  the 20 countries for which we have 
household-level data, there are some groups, 
considered separate from the majority, that 
have a consistently higher prevalence of  
poverty and hunger. 
 In Laos and Vietnam, ethnic minorities 
(many of  whom reside in upland areas) 
are more likely to experience poverty and 
hunger. For example, in Laos the Mon-
Khmer are more likely to experience poverty 
than the majority Lao (54 percent prevalence 
of  poverty compared to 25 percent), and 
in Vietnam, the incidence of  poverty is 42 
percent among ethnic minorities compared to 
6.5 percent among Kinh and Chinese (World 
Bank 2004, 2006b). There is a regional and 
ethnic dimension to poverty within Central 
Asia also. In Tajikistan, provinces with high 
proportions of  ethnic groups distinct from 
the Tajik majority experience much higher 
poverty rates: the poverty rate is twice the 
national average in the GBAO province, where 
the ethnicity and religion of  the people differ 
from the Tajik majority (World Bank 2005b).
 Indigenous peoples represent about one-
tenth of  Latin America’s population and 
experience higher poverty than other groups. 
In Peru, the incidence of  poverty is twice as 
high among indigenous groups as compared 
to non-indigenous groups, and in Guatemala 
stunting is more than twice as widespread 
among indigenous children as compared to 
non-indigenous children.
 In South Asia, deprivation is also 
characterized by ethnic bias. In Bangladesh, 
poverty and deprivation are substantially 
higher among the ethnic minority who 
populate the Chittagong Hill Tracts than 
among the mainstream population (World 
Bank 2002b). In India, scheduled castes and 
tribes consistently experience deprivation in 
a number of  dimensions. In Sri Lanka, the 
incidence of  poverty is highest among Indian 
Tamils. 
 In Africa, access to land and other resources 
depends on membership in groups of  
common descent, which results in strangers 
having difficulty in accessing resources and 
securing stable livelihoods. This is the case 
in Senegal—where refugees from Mauritania 
and the displaced from the Casamance are 
most likely to remain in poverty (World 
Bank 1995c)—and in the high vulnerability 
of  Malawian migrants in Zimbabwe (Kabeer 
2005). The role of  ethnicity in determining 
access to resources has been demonstrated 
by the genocide in Rwanda, and other ethnic 
tensions in the Great Lakes Region.
 The identif ication of  a household’s 
membership in an “excluded group” was not 
always possible from the household survey 
datasets. However, these groups could be 
identified in three countries—India, Peru, 
and Guatemala—and the following analysis 
focuses on those countries. These three 
countries represent two areas of  the world in 
which group status is reportedly important: 
Latin America and South Asia.
 Figure 3.19 shows that although indigenous 
groups make up 25 percent and 39 percent 
of  the population in Peru and Guatemala, 
respectively, they are overrepresented among 
the poor, and are increasingly so the further 
below the dollar-a-day poverty line one goes 
(particularly in Peru). Additionally, poor 
indigenous groups are often characterized 
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FIGURE 3.20 Proportion of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in National Population,  
 and Living in Subjacent, Medial, and Ultra Poverty: India
FIGURE 3.19 Proportion of Indigenous in National Population, and Living in Subjacent, Medial,  
 and Ultra Poverty: Guatemala and Peru
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by physical remoteness. For example, in 
Guatemala no indigenous groups living in 
ultra poverty are connected to electricity, 
compared to 57 percent of  the non-indigenous 
ultra poor and 74 percent of  the non-poor. In 
Peru, 11 percent of  indigenous groups living 
in ultra poverty are connected to electricity, 
compared to 21 percent of  the non-indigenous 
ultra poor and 78 percent of  the non-poor. This 
corresponds to other findings that show that 
indigenous peoples in Peru are concentrated 
mostly in the less accessible Andean and 
Amazonian regions, and that indigenous 
groups in Guatemala have less access to good 
roads (World Bank 2003b, 2005a). 
 In India, scheduled tribes and castes are 
also overrepresented among the ranks of  the 
poor, particularly among those poor living in 
ultra poverty (Figure 3.20). This is truer for 
scheduled tribes than for scheduled castes. 
Scheduled tribes comprise 9 percent of  the 
population but 25 percent of  the ultra poor, 
meaning that someone from a scheduled tribe 
is 2.5 times more likely to live in ultra poverty 
than someone who is not from a scheduled 
tribe. Those from scheduled castes are also 
more likely to experience poverty and are more 
likely to live in ultra poverty than those from 
other castes. The higher poverty rates among 
scheduled tribes may reflect the fact that they 
are more likely to live in remote hill stations 
than those from scheduled castes. It is consistent 
with the finding that during the 1990s, poverty 
rates among scheduled castes fell much faster 
than poverty rates among scheduled tribes 
(Thorat and Mahamallik 2005).
3.7 CHAPTER CONCLUSION
This chapter of  the report has used household 
survey data to take a closer look at patterns 
of  poverty and hunger across the countries, 
and within the countries’ rural and urban 
areas. It has shown that while poverty and 
hunger overlap, they are not identical. 
The information from household surveys 
is then used to examine some of  the key 
characteristics of  the poorest in different parts 
of  the developing world, especially those living 
in ultra poverty. The characteristics chosen 
represent those that are both important and 
measurable in some comparable way across 
countries and settings. Given data constraints, 
we are limited in what we have been able to 
say about the characteristics of  the poorest; 
however, we have established that the poorest 
are those from excluded groups, those living 
in remote areas with little education and few 
assets, and—in Asia—the landless. The next 
chapter considers some of  the reasons these 
characteristics prevail among the poorest and 
some of  the reasons those in ultra poverty 
become and stay poor.
In contrast to the thousands of  lives depicted in 
the figures and tables of  the previous chapters, 
we start this chapter by considering the life story 
of  one family in Bangladesh. A group of  IFPRI 
researchers visited Abdul and Ayesha Karim a 
number of  years ago and the Karims’ story is told 
in Box 4.1. Their story underscores the severity 
of  poverty and hunger and highlights some of  
the reasons their deprivation was worse than 
that of  others in their village. Remoteness from 
government services, sudden loss of  their land, 
distress sales of  other assets, and unemployment 
resulting from low productivity and hunger all 
contributed to the severity of  their situation.
 In the last few years, researchers have learned 
much about the causes of  persistent poverty and 
hunger in the lives of  Abdul, Ayesha, and others 
like them who are represented in the numbers 
in the previous pages. This chapter of  the report 
reviews what has been learned. It draws on the 
literature on the causes of  poverty and hunger 
and on the analysis of  the causes of  poverty and 
hunger in World Bank Poverty Assessments of  
the 20 countries considered in Chapter 3.
 The location of  a household—the country of  
residence and the location within a country—
is found to have a large impact on potential 
household welfare. Section 4.1 of  this chapter 
shows that a country’s growth experience and 
its ability to translate that growth into poverty 
reduction varies from country to country, 
affecting the probability that a household will 
experience poverty and hunger. A person’s 
country of  residence determines his or her 
access to services, infrastructure, and markets, 
and thus determines the return an individual 
can expect to get on his or her assets. Perhaps 
even more importantly than this, the ability of  
a country to secure peace for its citizens is an 
essential precursor to well-being. The disparity 
in the incidence of  poverty and hunger across 
countries presented in Chapters 2 and 3 attests 
to the importance of  regional and country 
characteristics in determining poverty and 
hunger, as does the fact that economic migrants 
are the fastest-growing group of  international 
migrants.23 Section 4.2 highlights the importance 
of  agroecological conditions and access to 
technologies, markets, and services in allowing 
households to live lives free of  poverty and 
hunger. 
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BOX 4.1    Causes of Poverty and Hunger in One Family
Abdul Karim, about 35, is the head of  a landless household. He lives with his wife, Ayesha, 
and their three children in Puthimari village of  Chilmari Thana, one of  the most distressed 
areas of  Bangladesh. Abdul’s household is among the many severely poor households in the 
village that were not covered by any government intervention program. The household was 
included in the control group of  IFPRI’s consumption and nutrition survey.
Abdul’s one-room house, with walls made of  kash (a tall, wild grass) and bamboo and a roof  of  
straw, is too small for his family. It is clear that the household is in subjacent poverty. The severity 
of  the family’s malnutrition is evident from their skeleton-like features.
IFPRI field investigators Zobair and Farzana interviewed Abdul and Ayesha. “You can see our 
miserable condition. Yet we are not included in any of  the government programs,” Abdul said 
bitterly. “It is true that most of  those who are getting rations are also poor, but none of  them 
are as needy as we are.”
“Two days ago, I worked on a neighbor’s land, weeding his radish field. He gave me 5 taka, 
and a meal of  rice and dal for the whole day’s work,” Abdul continued. “Yesterday, I went to 
him again, but he offered me only 3 taka and a meal. I accepted and worked from morning till 
evening.” The day IFPRI visited the Karims, nobody in the family could find any work. Abdul 
had spent his 8 taka to buy about a kilogram of  wheat, which Ayesha was frying in an earthen 
pot. “I soaked the wheat in salt water before frying,” she said. “The wheat becomes hard and 
brittle after frying. This fried wheat is all we have for today’s meal. From this, I have to save some 
for tomorrow also; we don’t have money to buy more wheat or rice. Nobody wants to hire me 
or my husband for work because we are so weak. But if  we can’t find work, then we can’t eat, 
and without eating we will become weaker.”
Abdul nodded. “She is right. Aswin and Kartik [months in the lean season] are the most difficult 
months. Many children in this area die during this time. They are so weak that even simple 
diseases kill them,” he said, looking at his own children. “But things will improve after a month 
during the aman rice harvest. Everybody will get work. Ayesha will parboil paddy and husk rice 
in farmers’ houses.”
“But what will happen to us next? The river will probably take away our house next year,” said 
Ayesha anxiously. “We were not this poor when we got married. We had some land, and we 
produced enough rice for our small family during that time. But one night, there was a big land 
erosion and the rakkushi [a legendary animal, like a dragon] river swallowed our land. Except 
this house, we have nothing left now. Last month, I sold my gold nose pin to a neighbor for one-
fourth the price my husband paid for it. With that money we bought some rice and wheat.”
Abdul sold a mango tree earlier in the month for only 100 taka. “The tree could easily fetch 500 
taka,” he said. “Big and sweet mangoes used to grow on that tree. But the man who bought the 
tree cut it for firewood because it could go into the river during the next flood. You see, the river 
is the cause of  all our misery,” Abdul concluded.
As the interview ended, Biplab, Abdul’s eight-year-old son, came running with a large and 
beautiful water hyacinth flower in his hand. He gave the flower to Farzana and said shyly, “Please 
come again.” Farzana had managed to hold her tears during the interview. She could not hold 
them any longer.
Source: Ahmed (2000b).
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 Against this backdrop of  institutions, 
technology, and infrastructure, there are 
causes of  persistent poverty and hunger 
that operate at the individual or group level 
(considered in Sections 4.3 to 4.10). Two 
themes underlie many of  these explanations: 
traps and exclusion. 
 The inability of  poor households to invest 
in the education and assets of  their children 
(see Section 4.5), the constrained access to 
credit for those with few assets (see Section 
4.7), and the lack of  productive labor of  the 
hungry (see Section 4.8) are all indicative 
of  the presence of  a trap in which poverty 
begets poverty and hunger begets hunger. In 
some cases, initial poverty and hunger does 
entrap, which contradicts an alternate view 
caricatured by Bowles, Durlauf, and Hoff  
(2006, p. 1) that “initial poverty typically 
does not entrap; only those who don’t make 
the effort remain in its clutches.” One of  the 
striking features of  the regional comparisons 
presented in Chapter 2 is the high numbers 
of  ultra poor in Sub-Saharan Africa and the 
slow improvement in reducing poverty in this 
region since 1990. This persistence of  poverty 
and hunger is consistent with the existence of  a 
poverty trap for very poor households.24 While 
some studies find little evidence of  poverty 
begetting poverty, a number of  studies at the 
individual and household level provide clear 
evidence that poverty and hunger do put into 
play mechanisms that cause their persistence, 
suggesting that for some, poverty does 
entrap.25 In these cases, poverty and hunger are 
inherited at birth, or result from unfortunate 
and unexpected events in the lifetime of  an 
individual that can persist for many years (see 
Sections 4.3 and 4.4).
 The systematic exclusion of  certain 
individuals from access to resources and 
markets based on their characteristics increases 
the propensity of  ethnic minorities, scheduled 
castes and tribes, women, and those who are 
sick and disabled to be poor. This tendency of  
certain groups to be excluded from institutions 
and markets that would allow them to improve 
their welfare changes only slowly over time and 
gives rise to persistent poverty and hunger.26 
These mechanisms are considered in Sections 
4.9 and 4.10.
4.1 SLOW GROWTH, INEQUALITY, AND UNREST
Growth and Inequality
Differences in average incomes between the 
poorest and richest countries in the world are 
immense and are directly attributable to the 
different growth experiences the countries have 
had since the industrial revolution, when the 
average incomes of  countries across the world 
were pretty constant.27 A number of  cross-
country studies concur that poverty reduction 
is more likely to take place in countries that 
experience economic growth.28 Chapter 2 
made clear that regions of  the world that have 
experienced the most poverty reduction in 
recent years are also the regions of  the world 
that have experienced the highest growth (East 
Asia and the Pacific and South Asia) and this 
is true on a country level as well. On average 
across countries, 1 percent of  growth will bring 
a 2-3 percent reduction in the number of  people 
living below the poverty line.29
 There are many factors that influence a 
country’s growth process, including resource 
endowments, institutions, access to markets, 
aid, terms of  trade, commodity dependence, 
and many other factors. Rodrik and others 
suggest that the quality of  institutions—
institutions ranging from the legal system 
and protection of  property rights to broader 
political institutions—is the most important 
determinant (Rodrik 2003). 
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 However, although growth is good for 
the poor, it has not been found to be equally 
good in all countries. Growth explains only a 
quarter of  the variation in reductions in poverty 
(Bourguignon 2003). The potential impact of  
1 percent of  growth on poverty reduction has 
been estimated to vary between 0 and 0.73 
percentage points across 14 countries (Klasen 
and Misselhorn 2006). 
 The level of  inequality in a country is one of  
the factors that affects the relationship between 
growth and inequality. Growth has been found 
to have less of  an impact on reducing poverty in 
countries where inequality is high. This means 
that in countries where inequality is high, not 
only do the poorest and hungry have the least 
share of  resources, they are also least likely to 
benefit from growth (Ravallion 2007). 
 The influence of  growth on poverty and 
hunger also depends on whether the type of  
growth that occurs benefits poorer or richer 
households more. Section 2.2 showed that 
while the ultra poor have benefited the least 
from increases in incomes during the past 15 
years, they did benefit at least a little in most 
regions of  the world, which allowed some 
reductions in ultra poverty to be made. Growth 
in sectors in which the poor and hungry 
reside benefits them the most, and Chapter 3 
showed that for much of  the developing world 
that means growth in the rural sectors of  the 
economy (such as agriculture).30
 Although reductions in inequality rarely 
occur in practice without concurrent growth, 
reductions in inequality (through growth that 
favors the poor more than the rich or through 
redistributive measures) can reduce poverty. 
This is indicated by rough estimates that show 
that reducing the level of  inequality in each 
region in the world by one standard deviation 
is enough to more than halve poverty in Sub-
Saharan Africa and almost halve poverty in 
Latin America.31 Some types of  inequality are 
more likely to result in persistent poverty and 
hunger than are others. For example, removing 
market restrictions that keep inequality low 
by compressing the labor-market returns to 
schooling may ultimately help households 
escape poverty. However, inequalities resulting 
from inequalities in education, exclusion of  
certain groups on grounds of  their ethnicity, 
or inequalities in access to credit and insurance 
make it hard for the welfare of  the poorest 
to improve.32 Good policy is crucial to both 
encouraging growth and reducing inequality. 
Unrest
Stable environments are also essential for 
helping households escape poverty and hunger. 
A third of  those living in absolute poverty in 
developing countries live in countries defined as 
“difficult environments” due to conflict or state 
collapse. Of  the 980 million people identified 
by Collier (2007) as living in 50 failing states, 
nearly three-quarters live in states that have 
recently been through, or are still in the midst 
of, a civil war (and 70 percent live in Africa).33 
Chapter 2 showed that most of  the large outliers 
with comparatively high Global Hunger 
Index (GHI) scores, especially in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, are countries that have experienced 
long-lasting wars in the past 15 years. And 
even this is an incomplete picture, since those 
countries most affected by conflict—such as 
Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq—are those 
without poverty and hunger estimates. Conflict 
impacts poverty and hunger both during the 
conflict and after it has ceased, as evidenced 
by the experience of  some of  the countries 
considered here that have recently experienced 
conflict (Rwanda, Mozambique, and Sri Lanka). 
Hunger is also sometimes used as a weapon 
when combatants cut off  food supplies with 
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the aim of  starving opposing populations into 
submission.34 
 The most direct impact of  conflict on well-
being is the loss of  human life. In addition to 
the immediate distress this causes, loss of  life 
can have a long-term impact on a household’s 
welfare because the loss of  able-bodied 
members limits the household’s earning ability 
and deprives children, the sick, and the elderly 
of  their caregivers. In northeastern Sri Lanka 
(where civil conflict has been present for the 
past two decades), 1 of  every 12 households 
reported that a family member was killed as a 
result of  the conflict. Those who are the poorest 
experienced even higher losses, with 1 of  every 
7 households reporting a member killed.35 In 
some cases, the poorest and most vulnerable 
are more likely to become combatants and 
risk loss of  life. Sometimes they are forcibly 
recruited, but in Sri Lanka the rural poor are 
reported to be more likely to serve in the armed 
forces due to a lack of  other opportunities to 
earn a living.36
 When people are compelled to leave their 
homes as a result of  conflict, they are cut off  
from their usual sources of  income and food 
and become very vulnerable. In refugee camps, 
they are frequently subject to overcrowding, 
poor sanitary conditions, and inadequate food 
supplies. Outbreaks of  micronutrient deficiency 
diseases rarely observed in populations in their 
normal environment have been frequently 
reported in refugee camps. This was the case, 
for example, among Mozambican refugees 
in Malawi in 1990.37 The living conditions in 
the camps facilitate the spread of  infectious 
diseases, including HIV infection, as was the 
case in Rwandan refugee camps set up as a 
result of  the genocide that displaced half  the 
Rwandan population.38 
 The disruption of  markets, roads, crops, 
livestock, and land that warfare brings also 
has an immediate and long-term impact on 
the incomes of  those in the affected areas.39 
Rwanda’s Participatory Poverty Assessment 
highlighted how the genocide had set in place 
a vicious cycle of  “low production, lack of  
seasonal savings, lack of  inputs in subsequent 
seasons, and increasing food insecurity.”40 The 
destruction of  livestock and the loss of  life 
during the genocide had long-term economic 
impacts. In Sri Lanka, there has been some 
compensation for asset loss resulting from the 
civil war, but those who have not benefited 
from this are the poorest households.41  
 Provision of  basic services is difficult during 
and after conflict when institutions are absent, 
many service providers are missing, and security 
cannot be guaranteed. Persistent poverty 
and hunger becomes more likely when basic 
services are absent. Schools are destroyed during 
conflict and teachers are killed, compromising 
the education of  a whole generation, especially 
in long-lasting civil wars.42 Healthcare services 
are also jeopardized. Deliberate destruction of  
healthcare facilities has been reported during 
conflicts in Mozambique, Liberia, and Sierra 
Leone, and more generally, healthcare systems 
suffer from a lack of  public funding, a lack of  
medical supplies, and personnel losses during 
times of  conflict.43 In Rwanda, most of  the 
trained workforce was killed or fled the country 
during the genocide.44
 The impact of  conflict on poverty and hunger 
in turn makes conflict more likely.45 Regression 
estimates suggest that halving the income of  a 
country doubles the risk of  civil war. This and 
the fact that conflict is also likely to reoccur—
half  of  all civil wars are post-conflict relapses—
generate a “conflict trap” in which countries 
embark on a downward spiral of  increasing 
impoverishment, hunger, and violence.46   
 Achieving peace, an equitable society, and 
economic growth are clearly important elements 
of  a poverty and hunger reduction strategy. The 
remainder of  this chapter examines the factors 
62   CHAPTER 4
that, given those broad conditions, have been 
shown to be important in determining whether 
a particular household in a given country will 
or will not experience poverty and hunger.
4.2 ADVERSE ECOLOGY AND REMOTENESS
In Chapter 3, we noted that locational variation 
in the prevalence of  poverty and hunger within 
countries can be just as striking as that between 
countries; it is estimated that 76 percent of  
those living on less than $1 a day live in rural 
areas,47 and the poorest are often located in 
certain geographic areas within countries: 
southwestern China, parts of  northeastern 
India, northwestern and southern rural areas of  
Bangladesh, northern Ghana, and the Andean 
and Amazonian regions of  Peru. 
 Extreme poverty in Peru, for example, is 
about six times higher in the Andes and more 
than four times higher in the Amazonian region 
than in the urban coastal areas.48 In Ghana, a 
participatory poverty assessment indicated 
that the depth of  poverty and vulnerability in 
the rural north is greater than in other rural 
areas, that serious food insecurity prevails for at 
least part of  the year for nearly all households 
in the region, and that, unlike in the rest of  
the country, access to food predominates in 
local views of  poverty.49 This section explores 
whether some of  these differences reflect the 
importance of  a person’s location in explaining 
his or her experience of  poverty and hunger. 
Adverse Ecology
The regional patterns of  poverty and hunger 
across the world and within countries show 
that the world’s most deprived are those located 
in geographically adverse zones. Areas such as 
deserts, savannah, mountains, and swamps are 
characterized by harsh living conditions and 
often low productivity and higher incidence of  
untreatable disease. Upon dividing countries 
into three categories—tropical, arid, and 
temperate—the variations in yields across 
agroclimatic zones are clear. Average cereal 
yield in 1995 was 18,051 kilograms per hectare 
(kg/ha) in tropical areas, 18,540 kg/ha in arid 
areas, and 37,288 kg/ha in temperate areas.50
 In adverse zones, the technologies available 
to increase productivity and fight the diseases 
that that affect humans, crops, and livestock 
lag behind the technologies that have been 
developed to control habitats in more 
temperate zones. For example, a study in West 
Africa showed that almost 100 percent of  the 
increase in per capita food output since 1960 
has come from an expansion of  harvest area 
as opposed to the use of  new technologies 
or farming methods.51 Some of  this results 
from a failure to adopt new methods when 
they exist, but to some extent it indicates little 
technological development. Of  the 1,223 new 
drugs marketed worldwide between 1975 and 
1996, only 13 were developed to treat tropical 
diseases.52 As a result of  low yields, greater risks 
of  disease, and a higher prevalence of  natural 
disasters, households located in less-favorable 
areas are more likely to be and remain poor.
 In Ethiopia, the poorest live at altitudes 
of  less than 1,800 meters or more than 2,400 
meters and food-insecure regions are those that 
experience both the lowest and most variable 
rates of  rainfall.53  In Senegal, rural poverty is 
concentrated in areas where land availability 
is low because of  population pressures, soil 
degradation, or saltwater intrusion.54 In 
Bangladesh, the most severe poverty exists 
in areas of  physical remoteness, areas that 
are prone to drought or flooding (such as the 
northwest), and the southern coastal region, 
which is vulnerable to cyclonic storms and 
high tidal waves.55 In Guatemala, the poorest 
areas are remote areas with limited agricultural 
potential.56
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 This pattern has been found in other coun-
tries, too. Other things being equal, house-
holds in rural mountainous areas in southern 
China are less likely to escape poverty than 
households in the hills, while households in 
the hills are less likely to escape poverty than 
households on the plains. This reflects the 
fact that natural conditions for agriculture in 
China tend to be better in the plains than in 
the mountains or hills.57
 The fact that the poorest live in these areas is 
not necessarily a coincidence; culturally deval-
ued and impoverished groups are frequently 
driven to inhabit less-favorable lands by the 
dominant ethnic group or wealthiest house-
holds.58 In Guatemala, for example, one impact 
of  the expropriation of  indigenous commu-
nal lands was to force indigenous peoples into 
marginal areas.59 Similarly in Peru, indigenous 
peoples are concentrated in the less-favorable 
Andean and Amazonian regions.60
Remoteness
Frequently, the poorest regions of  a country 
are not only ecologically disadvantaged, but 
are also the most remote, with the highest 
traveling time to the country’s capital and 
main economic centers. A consistent char-
acteristic of  poverty among the 20 countries 
considered in Chapter 3 is that the poorest 
and most food-insecure households are those 
located furthest from roads, markets, schools, 
and health services. 
 The cost of  buying or selling goods increases 
greatly for households located far from mar-
kets, so many households operate as subsis-
tence farmers, growing food to meet their 
own consumption needs. Barter trade with 
neighboring households is possible, but it lim-
its the types of  goods that can be bought and 
sold. In rural Laos, barter trade was found to 
account for as much as 80 percent of  trade in 
the remotest areas, and fell when villages had 
access to all-weather roads and were closer 
to major towns.61 In the poor rural west of  
Timor-Leste, the nearest everyday market is 
approximately 26 kilometers away, compared 
to about 1.5 kilometers in the better-off  rural 
east.62
 In Ethiopia, the poverty assessment finds that 
remote rural areas are more likely to be poorer 
than the national average. Areas with high food 
insecurity have on average greater distances to 
food markets (7.4 km compared with 6.0 km in 
food-secure zones) and all-weather roads (15.7 
km compared with 11.0 km in food-secure 
zones). Other things being equal, the increased 
distance to food markets, water, and transporta-
tion services lowers consumption. 
 In Bangladesh, poverty is severe in areas of  
physical remoteness, as indicated by the fact 
that seven rural districts are home to half  of  
the country’s severely stunted children (there 
are 64 districts in Bangladesh) while Dhaka is 
home to only 1 percent.63 Enhancing accessi-
bility by improving the surface of  roads was 
found to reduce daily transport costs by 36-38 
percent and fertilizer prices by 45-47 percent, 
and increase the average prices of  the five main 
crops sold by 3-5 percent. Per capita consump-
tion increased by 11 percent as a result.64
 Remoteness also reduces households’ access 
to public services. The poorest and hungry 
have the furthest to travel to reach basic 
education and health services. This increases 
the cost (and reduces the likelihood) of  the 
poorest receiving education and increases the 
likelihood that they will suffer diseases that go 
untreated. In Zambia, the poorest are located 
far from secondary schools and hospitals; 
more than 55 percent of  the poor stated that 
they did not access healthcare because it was 
too far away.65 In Malawi, only 42 percent 
of  the poorest households were within 5 
kilometers of  a health unit, as compared to 
71 percent of  the richest households.66 In 
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Nicaragua, the incidence of  extreme poverty 
is 20 percent higher in the central rural region. 
Only 9 percent of  the roads in this region are 
paved and residents have to travel twice as far 
as the average Nicaraguan household to reach 
the closest healthcare service and primary 
school. Additionally, about three-quarters of  
the population in this region does not have 
electricity and more than one-third lives 
without access to safe water. 
 There are different reasons for remoteness. 
Easy access to roads and markets is more dif-
ficult in mountainous areas than in lowland 
areas, and at the country level, landlocked 
countries or countries located the furthest 
distance from export markets are likely to 
have lower incomes and lower growth rates 
than countries with sea ports or those closer 
to markets.67 However, remoteness and lack of  
access to services can be the result not only of  
geographic factors, but also of  political deci-
sions. In the Dominican Republic, the dicta-
tor Rafael Trujillo avoided building any roads 
to villages in areas of  dissent, and in Camer-
oon, President Ahmadou Ahidjo refused to 
pave the roads between the capital, Douala, 
and Bafoussam in the heart of  the Bamileke 
region in order to limit the development of  the 
region and more generally, to limit southern 
economic power.68
4.3 SUDDEN AND UNEXPECTED EVENTS
A distinct characteristic of  countries with high 
poverty and hunger is the risk associated with 
everyday life. In Ethiopia alone, there were 
15 droughts (and famines) between 1978 and 
1998 that led to the displacement, injury, or 
death of  more than 1 million people. 
 Unexpected events that cause ill health, a 
loss of  assets, or a loss of  income (often col-
lectively referred to as shocks) play a large part 
in determining the fortunes of  many people in 
the developing world. A study exploring wel-
fare dynamics in rural Kenya and Madagascar 
found that every poor household interviewed 
could ultimately trace its poverty to an unex-
pected loss of  assets or health.69 Shocks play an 
important role in explaining poverty in South 
Asia, too. In 74 percent of  the households that 
had fallen into poverty in the Indian state of  
Andhra Pradesh, serious illness was discovered 
to be one of  the causes. 
 Unexpected events often hit harder once 
a household is already poor, ensuring that 
hunger and poverty remain persistent. In Peru, 
a third of  poor households are never able to 
recover from a natural disaster, about twice 
the proportion of  non-poor households.70 
In Pakistan and China, the consumption of  
households in the bottom income deciles 
fluctuated much more than the consumption 
of  households in the upper income deciles, 
suggesting they were less able to protect 
themselves against shocks. In Ethiopia, 
fluctuations in adult nutrition were found 
to be larger for women and individuals from 
poorer households.71
 In fact, the harsh blows these unexpected 
events inflict on the poorest is a distinguishing 
feature of  what it means to be poor, as was 
highlighted in Voices of  the Poor (Narayan-
Parker et al. 2000):72
 “The poor live at the whim and mercy of  
nature.” Kenya 1997 (p. 45)
 “In my family if  anyone becomes seriously 
ill, we know that we will lose him because we 
do not even have enough money for food so we 
cannot buy medicine.” Vietnam 1999 (p. 39)
 “If  you don’t have money today, your 
disease will take you to your grave.” Ghana 
1995 (p. 42)
 This is the nature of  poverty—wealthier, 
more socially connected households are better 
able to protect themselves against unexpected 
misfortunes than are poor households—thus, 
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These were also common risk-coping strate-
gies in Nicaragua.76 Sometimes parents cut 
back on their consumption to protect the 
consumption of  their children, but when the 
consumption of  children is also cut back, it can 
have long-term consequences.77 This was seen 
after the drought in Zimbabwe. Those who 
were children during the drought suffered 
malnutrition at a crucial age and as a conse-
quence had lower adult heights and poorer 
educational outcomes. The impact on lower 
earnings was estimated at about 7 percent of  
lifetime earnings.78 In a number of  circum-
stances, the consumption of  women and girls 
has been shown to be cut back before the con-
sumption of  male family members. Another 
drastic coping mechanism that parents often 
have to adopt is pulling children out of  school 
when hardship strikes.79 Both of  these coping 
mechanisms show that when hardship strikes 
at critical ages, the impact can be very long 
lasting. 
 While the types of  shocks that cause house-
holds to fall into and remain in poverty depend 
to some extent on the context, we see that 
more than any other shock, health shocks such 
as the long-term illness, disability, or death of  
an adult household member are large deter-
minants of  poverty. These are considered in 
further detail in the next section.
 There are also many examples for the 20 
countries considered here in which shocks due 
to weather or macroeconomic conditions have 
caused severe deprivation. The fact that these 
shocks affect a household and its neighbors 
simultaneously can contribute to the severity 
of  their impact. Droughts, floods, and sudden 
price decreases in crops commonly produced 
for sale (or conversely price increases in 
crops commonly bought for consumption) 
are all examples of  such shocks. In Pakistan, 
a signif icant proportion of  variation in 
expenditure is explained by weather shocks.80 
the fate of  poor households is more strongly 
bound to the events it experiences.
 Shocks have a permanent effect on house-
holds’ welfare, lasting long after the event itself. 
Although an unexpected event can rapidly 
change the fortunes of  a household, recovery 
tends to be gradual and often slow. Household 
incomes may take several years to recover from 
shocks and recovery is slower for the poor.73 In 
Ethiopia, the long-term impact of  the 1984–85 
famine was considered for households in six 
villages. The drought was found not only to 
influence the level of  poverty years later, but it 
also affected the rate at which the incomes of  
households that had been badly affected were 
improving many years later. Households at 
the 75th percentile of  consumption loss dur-
ing the 1984–85 famine experienced on aver-
age 16 percentage points less growth during 
the 1990s than those at the 25th percentile.74 
One reason for this slow increase in growth is 
that households sometimes have to sell their 
productive assets such as land and livestock in 
order to survive the hardship brought about by 
a shock (these are often referred to as distress 
sales, and in these cases the prices received are 
often much lower than their true value). This 
loss of  assets reduces the opportunities avail-
able to a household for earning income and 
causes households to change their behavior in 
ways that make persistent poverty and hunger 
more likely (as seen in Section 4.7). With other 
types of  shocks, such as ill-health or death of  
a family member, the household directly loses 
its ability to earn.
 In addition to selling assets, poor house-
holds often adopt other drastic coping mech-
anisms that can have long-term impacts. In 
the face of  reduced income or higher food 
prices and food scarcity, households often cut 
back on consumption. In Peru, one-fifth of  
poor households reduced consumption and 
another fifth reduced their savings/assets.75 
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In Nicaragua, decreases in the coffee price 
between 1998 and 2001 caused consumption 
to fall by 16 percent among coffee-producing 
households. Although net primary enrollment 
rates increased by 10 percent on average 
among rural households, they declined by 
more than 5 percent among coffee-producing 
households, suggesting that coffee-producing 
households were responding to the decline in 
prices by taking their children out of  school.81 
In Guatemala, coffee-producing households—
which comprise some of  the poorest 
households in the country—also reported 
responding to declines in the international 
coffee price by taking children out of  school 
so that they could work, as well as decreasing 
their consumption and using their savings.
4.4 ILL HEALTH AND DISABILITY
Health shocks such as HIV/AIDS, malaria, 
tuberculosis, disfigurement or loss of  limb, 
and leprosy can cause a household’s fortunes 
to change rapidly. Not only does a household 
have to pay for the sick member to receive 
treatment, it also loses the income that could 
have been earned in the future. In addition, for 
illnesses such as HIV/AIDS and physical and 
mental disabilities, the illness is often the basis 
for exclusion from society, village institutions, 
and public services. As this quote from Bar-
rett et al. (2006) shows, the impacts of  health 
shocks are far ranging: 
“Some adverse effects are direct, as when 
economically active household members 
fell ill and subsequently had to stop work-
ing or even died and their earnings were lost 
or their absence came at a critical time in 
the cropping cycle, causing them significant 
seasonal losses from which they have been 
unable to recover. Other effects respondents 
mentioned frequently are indirect, as when 
children had to be pulled out of  school for 
want of  school fees due to the high costs of  
treating illness or funeral expenses, or when 
the family lost productive draught power, 
manure or milk production when it had to 
undertake ritual slaughter of  livestock for 
a funeral.”82
 In villages in Kenya and Madagascar, health 
shocks causing the permanent injury, illness, 
or death of  an adult household member were 
the most frequently cited reasons for house-
holds falling into poverty.83 In one area of  
Kenya (Madzuu), health shocks were cited by 
nearly every household that was poor in 2002. 
In the Indian state of  Andhra Pradesh, 74 per-
cent of  households that had fallen into pov-
erty cited health and health-related expenses 
as being one of  the four main reasons. Further 
examining the experience of  these households 
through regression analysis, we see that house-
holds experienced declining fortunes when ill 
health occurred in combination with debt, 
offering some indication that one shock on 
its own will not cause a decline into poverty, 
but a shock at the wrong moment will.84 In 
Bangladesh, illness, accident, or death in the 
family was the most frequently reported crisis 
for all households, but particularly so among 
households that had fallen into poverty or 
stayed in poverty (43 percent and 48 percent, 
respectively, for these households compared to 
29 percent for households that were not poor 
during this period).85 In Vietnam, long-term 
illness and disease was repeatedly mentioned 
in the participatory poverty assessment as a 
defining characteristic of  poor families, with 
phrases such as “ill health,” “chronic disease,” 
and “becoming indebted to pay medical costs” 
being mentioned in all research sites.86
 When adults of  working age suffer from ill 
health and disability they become much less 
able to take on productive activities, especially 
the heavy-labor activities of  agriculture pro-
duction that are the province of  many poor 
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the lack of  productive labor in their house-
hold.90 Disabled children also suffer greater 
deprivation. In Tanzania, children with dis-
abilities have relatively low school attendance, 
such that by the age of  17, children with dis-
abilities have missed 4 years of  primary edu-
cation compared to 1.7 years among children 
without disabilities.91 In Nicaragua, there were 
also significantly lower school enrolment rates 
among disabled children.92
Elderly
As noted in Chapter 3, there are complex and 
dynamic links between demographic variables 
and poverty, but the higher reported incidence 
of  poverty and hunger among elderly people 
arises from their inability to work and their 
resultant reliance on others. The elderly are 
also frequently excluded: “institutional poli-
cies in all countries regularly discriminate 
against people on the grounds of  age, while 
popular opinion carries ingrained prejudices 
against older people and accepts the routine 
denial of  their basic rights.”93  
 In many countries with high poverty rates, 
care for the elderly is traditionally provided 
by the extended family, but this is not a per-
fect safety net, especially when the children of  
elderly people are too poor to support them 
or when adult children die from disease, as is 
increasingly the case with the spread of  HIV/
AIDS. 
 In Sub-Saharan Africa, more and more fami-
lies contain only the young and the old because 
HIV/AIDS causes high mortality among the 
adults on whom these family members have 
traditionally depended. In 20 of  28 countries in 
Africa and Latin America, more than one-fifth 
of  orphaned children were found to be living 
with their grandparents. This was the case 
for 40 percent of  orphaned children in South 
Africa and Uganda, and more than 50 percent 
in Zimbabwe.94 The financial burden of  being 
households. Ill health can also result in addi-
tional costs being incurred for medical advice 
and treatment. The impact of  ill health is often 
worse for poorer households on account of  
the fact that they are less likely to seek medical 
treatment even though their incidence of  dis-
ease is higher. In Guatemala, for example, only 
14 percent of  children in the lowest quintile 
with diarrhea or acute respiratory infection see 
a doctor compared to 56 percent of  children 
from families in the highest quintile.87 Despite 
more severe health problems and higher mal-
nutrition among the poorest in Vietnam, they 
are less likely to use health services or even 
treat themselves (34 percent of  the poorest 
quintile compared to 37 percent of  the rich-
est) and the average number of  health-service 
utilization visits per year is also lower (8 in the 
poorest quintile and 10 in the richest).88
Disability
Little evidence has been collected on the 
well-being of  households with disabled adult 
members, but a recent study on this issue in 
Uganda found that the incidence of  poverty 
was 15-44 percent higher in households with 
disabled heads. In urban areas, the probability 
of  poverty among people who live in a house-
hold with a disabled head was 60 percent 
higher than for those in a household with a 
non-disabled head.89 This confirms what has 
been found in qualitative studies. For example, 
participatory poverty assessments consistently 
found that the poorest of  the poor were those 
with no control over labor resources, such as 
the disabled.
 In many cases, physical and mental disability 
carries a stigma that is the basis for exclusion 
of  these groups, and is an additional source 
of  poverty and hunger. For example, when 
land was redistributed after Tajikistan’s inde-
pendence, those living in disabled households 
were less likely to receive land on account of  
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a primary caregiver again late in life can cause 
the elderly to sell assets or borrow money 
and can result in substantial poverty in these 
households. In Malawi, Uganda, and Zambia, 
the poverty rate among households contain-
ing only the elderly and children is 20 percent 
higher than the average. Other changes also 
limit the extent to which extended families 
are now able to provide and support for older 
people, including demographic changes that 
are contributing to the increasing aging of  the 
world population, urbanization, and the shift 
to nuclear families.
4.5 THE INHERITANCE OF POVERTY
Poverty and hunger are often passed on from 
one generation to another. When poverty is 
experienced in childhood, it is likely to have 
long-term impacts because it affects the health 
and education outcomes that bear on an indi-
vidual’s future earning potential. Assets such 
as land are also often difficult to acquire other 
than through inheritance, and as a result, a 
lack of  assets is another means by which pov-
erty is passed on from parent to child.
 Parental investments in their children 
determine the assets and educational attain-
ment children take with them into adult life. 
But the time and budget constraints that 
parents face limits the extent to which they 
can invest in their children and the extent to 
which they can invest in their children equally. 
When incomes are tight, time may need to 
be dedicated to work rather than child care. 
In a Ghanaian study, children said that one of  
the worst consequences of  poverty for them 
was the lack of  time their parents had to show 
them love or answer questions.95 When con-
sumption supplies are limited, children suffer 
nutrition shortfalls and those who have higher 
earning potential (boys) may be given more 
food than children who are less likely to earn 
so much (girls). Shortfalls in consumption and 
nutrition requirements have particularly large 
impacts on young children, affecting height 
and cognitive development. As a result, nutri-
tion shortfalls early in life have long-term 
impacts because they translate into lower 
adult heights, poorer educational outcomes, 
and consequently, lower adult earnings.96  
 When parents face both budget and credit 
constraints, they may not be able to invest 
in their children’s education as much as they 
might otherwise choose to.97 There is much 
empirical evidence from all parts of  the world 
that when parents face credit constraints, low 
levels of  income affect investments in educa-
tion;98 the tables presented in Chapter 3 show 
that to be true for the countries considered 
here. School fees can prevent children from 
attending school. A study in Zambia found 
that more than half  of  households whose chil-
dren had dropped out of  school cited an inabil-
ity to afford school fees as the main reason. In 
Pakistan, the cost of  schooling was often given 
as the reason for a child not going to school.99 
However, the cost of  going to school can be a 
deterrent even when education is free because 
the cost of  books, school uniforms, and trav-
eling to school can be prohibitively high. For 
households with very little income, the oppor-
tunity cost of  a child going to school when he 
or she could be undertaking productive work 
is also another reason many children do not 
progress beyond a few years of  primary edu-
cation. In Guatemala, about 500,000 children 
between the ages of  7 and 14 are employed and 
work about 30 hours a week, which seriously 
inhibits their ability to attend school.100 The 
experience of  Simon Aprianus Banamtuan, a 
13-year-old Indonesian boy, provides a clear 
example of  the dilemma faced by parents and 
children in this situation (see Box 4.2).
 Holding other things constant, children 
from low-income households have been shown 
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that the quality of  the schooling received by 
children of  poor parents is lower than that of  
other children in that they are more likely to 
go to public schools than to private schools 
and poor parents are often illiterate them-
selves and less able to determine how much 
their children are learning. A survey in India 
indicated that poor parents are less able to 
know whether their school-age children can 
read than richer parents.104 
 When parents own little land they can give 
very little land to their children. There is less 
empirical evidence on this given a lack of  
longitudinal data, but one study undertaken 
in the Philippines shows that parents who 
were credit constrained 20 years previously 
made significantly lower transfers of  land 
and non-land assets to children.105 One of  the 
to be less likely to complete as many years of  
school as children from higher income house-
holds in Peru, Malaysia, Brazil, and Indonesia, 
and in Peru and Vietnam, children from house-
holds with lower income and fewer holdings 
of  durable goods are more likely to fall behind 
in school.101 Perhaps the clearest example of  
the direct link between household income and 
child education comes from studies in Brazil 
and India, which found that when poor house-
holds experienced sudden and unexpected falls 
in their income, children spent less time in 
school or were withdrawn from school alto-
gether.102 Being in a household with more sib-
lings also reduces resources available for each 
child; a study in Bolivia and Guatemala found 
that children with more siblings in the house 
are more likely to repeat grades.103 It is likely 
BOX 4.2    The Cost of Education
“Simon Aprianus Banamtuan is 13 years old. As a student at an SD (primary school), he was 
always at the top of  his class. His favorite subject is mathematics. “On my report card, I always 
received the top grade for mathematics,” he says calmly. But his prowess is not limited to 
mathematics; he excels in all subjects, as shown by his Final School Exam (UAS), which placed 
him second in overall ranking at his school. But after completing his sixth-grade exam in 2004, 
Simon did not continue on to SMP ( junior secondary school). His parents could not afford the 
entrance fee and the annual tuition fees. Despite there being an SMP not far from Simon’s house 
and three other SMPs in the local district, Simon’s family cannot make use of  them. Instead of  
going to school, Simon now helps his neighbor by scaling his coconut trees to collect coconuts. 
For every10 coconuts he collects, Simon is given four. Since he usually collects 20 coconuts, 
this means he gets to keep 8. After gathering the coconuts, he accompanies his neighbor to the 
market to help sell them. If  he manages to sell all 8 of  his own coconuts at the market, Simon 
should receive a total of  Rp 4,000, or Rp 500 for each coconut. … Although Simon is keen to 
continue his education, the topic of  school is never discussed. But his father is already clearly 
aware of  it: with obvious pride, Jonathan highlights the awards his son has achieved at school. 
He concedes that if  Simon were to continue his education, his future would be brighter. With 
a hint of  bitterness in his voice, Jonathan says that putting his bright, hardworking son through 
school is just a pipe-dream when the reality is that Simon is needed for work, no matter how 
modest his contribution.”
Source: World Bank 2007b, pp. 80-81.
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ways in which parents give assets to children 
is by giving them assets at marriage. A study 
examining this issue in Ethiopia found that the 
correlation between parental wealth and child 
wealth at marriage is high.106 Also, importantly, 
the assets and education a child is able to take 
into a marriage often influences the choice 
of  partner, with the poor marrying the poor 
and the rich marrying the rich. The pairing 
of  prospective partners in this way reinforces 
the passing of  asset inequalities from one 
generation to the next.
 The impact of  parental income on invest-
ments in children in these ways causes poverty 
to be passed on from generation to generation 
since adults who were nutritionally deprived 
while young attain less, adults without edu-
cation are more likely to be poor, and adults 
without land are more likely to face hunger.
Orphanhood
Although having poor parents increases a 
child’s vulnerability to poverty and hunger in 
later life, some of  the most vulnerable children 
are those who have lost one or both of  their 
parents. As well as being a distressing and trau-
matic experience in the life of  a child, the loss 
of  a parent also signifies the loss of  a breadwin-
ner in the household and sometimes a house-
hold dissolves as a result. A number of  studies 
have shown that orphanhood can result not 
only in lower current consumption, but also 
stunting and reduced educational attainment, 
which causes the impact of  orphanhood to last 
well into adult life. Stunting among orphans 
was observed in Tanzania and Uganda.107 In 
Tanzania, orphans and foster children between 
the ages of  13 and 17 had significantly lower 
enrollment rates than children living with both 
their parents; in Rwanda, orphans were about 
20 percent less likely to be enrolled in school 
than non-orphans by age 15.108 An analysis of  
data on orphans in 10 African countries found 
orphans were less likely to be in school than 
the non-orphans with whom they lived.109
 Existing datasets often make it difficult to 
fully attribute lower health and education out-
comes to the impact of  orphanhood rather 
than to other unobservable causes. However, a 
recent study undertaken in northern Tanzania 
that traced and surveyed children over 14 years 
found substantial impacts of  orphanhood on 
height and educational attainment, indicating 
that orphanhood not only reduces the wel-
fare of  a child but increases the likelihood of  
poverty and hunger in adult life also. Almost 
one-quarter of  the children interviewed had 
lost one or both parents in this 14-year period. 
Those who lost their mother were less likely 
to survive and when they did, they suffered a 
permanent height deficit of  2 centimeters and 
a persistent loss of  one year of  total years of  
education. In general, those children who lost 
their father did not suffer as much, but this 
was partly because they often did not live in 
the same household as their father before he 
died. Those children who did live in the same 
household as their father before their father 
died had two-thirds less schooling by adult-
hood as a result of  his death.110
 Orphaned children are also vulnerable to 
the risk of  abuse, neglect, and exploitation. 
Teenage female orphans seem particularly 
at risk. The lack of  parental protection often 
leads to a violation of  rights to assets and prop-
erty grabbing by others.111 This means that 
orphaned children have fewer assets at adult-
hood than adults who were not orphans, and 
experience the increased chance of  poverty 
and hunger that this implies. Orphanhood can 
often result in a life on the streets. Children on 
the streets have extremely low welfare, receive 
much less education, and are more exposed to 
health risks and prostitution, drug abuse, HIV 
infection, and crime.112  
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fication of  household income is important in 
escaping poverty and hunger and yet, unedu-
cated households are found to be less able to 
diversify. In Vietnam, households whose heads 
have higher education consume 28 percent 
more than those without, other things being 
equal. Correspondingly, the higher education 
of  the spouse of  the household head increases 
consumption by 43 percent.116
 However, the importance of  the contextual 
setting in determining the impact of  low levels 
of  education as a cause of  poverty and hunger 
cannot be overstated. In situations where there 
are low returns to education, receiving higher 
levels of  education may not help. In rural Paki-
stan, the relationship between education and 
higher income is insignificant, and in Bangla-
desh, education in the past has had a greater 
impact on reducing poverty and hunger in 
urban areas than in rural areas, predominantly 
because of  greater labor market opportuni-
ties and returns to education in urban Ban-
gladesh.117 Additionally, when discrimination 
is present—such as discrimination against girls 
or discrimination against ethnic groups and 
indigenous peoples—the ability of  education 
to improve welfare among those already disad-
vantaged in labor markets and social structures 
is limited. For instance, comparing households 
with higher secondary education and above 
in India shows that households from sched-
uled castes are more than twice as likely to 
be poor than non-scheduled households, and 
households from scheduled tribes are one and 
a half  times more likely to be poor than non-
scheduled households.118 In Guatemala, analy-
sis suggests that by relying on improvements 
in education alone, a Ladino woman would 
need 15 years of  schooling to escape poverty, 
while an indigenous woman would require 23 
years.119 
4.6 LACk OF EDUCATION AND SkILLS
Education improves welfare and reduces the 
likelihood of  experiencing poverty and hunger 
in a variety of  ways: 
Education can offer a means to get a bet-
ter-paying, safer job; to understand the 
instructions on a bag of  fertilizer or bottle 
of  medicine; to follow price trends in the 
newspapers and keep accounts; to extend 
one’s social network into those who influ-
ence policy; and to garner respect in one’s 
own household and community.113  
 Empirically, education has been shown to 
have significant positive impacts on agricul-
tural productivity, engaging in off-farm self-
employment, getting a job, overall income, 
accessing credit, size of  social network, politi-
cal participation, using government services, 
own health, and child health outcomes. As a 
result of  a lack of  skills, the poor are often 
found in employment that does not require the 
high levels of  specialized competence that take 
a long time to acquire.114 Education also has an 
intrinsic value separate from whether or not it 
is a means by which people can increase their 
income. It is a fundamental part of  increased 
capabilities.
 Chapter 3 showed not only that children in 
poor and hungry families are less likely to go to 
school, but also that adults in poor families are 
less educated. Further analysis shows that this 
relationship between the education of  adults 
and poverty persists even when controlling 
for other household characteristics. In Ethio-
pia, regression analysis shows that the poor-
est are those who have less education: other 
things being equal, an extra year of  schooling 
increases consumption by 1.6 percent for men 
and 2 percent for women.115 In Peru, diversi-
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4.7 ASSET POVERTY TRAPS
The tables in Chapter 3 clearly show that the 
poorest and hungry have fewer assets than bet-
ter-off  households. Given that asset levels are 
in many ways a different indicator of  poverty, 
it is not surprising that we find that the poor-
est are those with less land, fewer livestock, 
less production and transport equipment, and 
less consumer durables. This section considers 
how a lack of  assets can cause households to 
be persistently trapped in poverty and hunger. 
Owning few assets is a cause of  initial and per-
sistent poverty. We start by understanding the 
reasons for lack of  access to land among poor 
households.
Landlessness
While factors such as a household’s sociopolit-
ical setting and the geographical environment 
determine the assets it most benefits from 
holding, for many of  the world’s poorest and 
hungry, being assetless is synonymous with 
being landless. Historically and currently, land 
plays a major role in the livelihoods of  the vast 
majority of  rural households. Where produc-
tivity of  land varies within a region, the key 
question is not just how much land is owned, 
but also the quality of  the land. In the coun-
tries considered in Chapter 3, it is clear that 
land ownership rates are always lower for the 
poor. This is particularly the case for the poor-
est in Asia. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the poorest 
often own some land—but not enough—and 
lack access to other key assets.120 In Pakistan, 
75 percent of  the poor do not have any land of  
their own, and regression analysis shows land 
to be most important in reducing chronic pov-
erty.121 Regression analysis has also found that 
in Malawi, a household must have at least 0.54 
hectares to generate the income necessary to 
reach the 40th percentile income cut-off, yet 
few of  the poorest own that amount.122 
 The history of  land rights is in many respects 
context specific and often complex, but in gen-
eral there has been a move from communal 
patterns of  land holding to more individualistic 
private property rights. However, access to land 
often comes through community membership 
rather than through the market. This was even 
found to be the case in recent land privatiza-
tion efforts in Tajikistan in central Asia. Dur-
ing privatization, members of  local governing 
clans helped themselves and their relatives gain 
access to land and assets, or gave more favor-
able leases to clan members.123 In many coun-
tries across the world, land ownership rights 
are not given or transferred to women, which 
is a major source of  the prevalence of  poverty 
and hunger among women.124  
 In rural areas, little land is bought and sold, 
and land rental markets are weak.125 Evidence 
from Africa suggests there are few economies 
of  scale in crop production; rather, small fam-
ily farms have been found to be more efficient 
than large ones. However, poor households 
rarely buy bits of  land from larger farmers 
and if  anything, the sales of  land that are most 
commonly observed are distress sales made by 
poor farmers to large farmers in times of  hard-
ship. And most land is passed from one owner 
to another through inheritance. The inability 
of  poor households to acquire land can be 
explained by their lack of  access to credit and 
savings, the insurance value to large farmers 
of  holding land, and the power large landlords 
enjoy when they choose not to sell land. These 
explanations are considered further in the next 
two subsections.
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Access to Credit and Asset Poverty Traps
Empirical studies have shown that optimal 
behavior and welfare dynamics change once a 
household falls below a certain level of  assets, 
causing households to be engaged in behavior 
that traps them in poverty. We consider why 
this is the case in order to understand some of  
the means by which poverty can entrap. 
 When credit markets are limited, lenders 
usually require collateral (often in the form of  
land) from their borrowers. The poor lack land 
or other assets for collateral so are unable to 
take these loans, and lacking these loans they 
are often left in low-income activities that 
require little initial investment. The type of  
investment that high-return activities require 
is often large and indivisible, for example, 
improved cows for zero-grazing dairy 
production, irrigation for fruit production, 
or motorized vehicles for trading operations. 
In a cross-country study of  the economic 
activities of  the poor, Banerjee and Duflo 
show that many of  the poor are engaged as 
entrepreneurs, they undertake many different 
types of  activities (usually those with low start-
up costs in terms of  capital or acquisition of  
skills), and they undertake those activities on a 
small scale.126 Studies in Senegal have found that 
the “distinguishing characteristic of  economic 
activity of  poor households is not the sector of  
activity, but the lack of  capital with which the 
activity is performed.”127 Participatory poverty 
assessments in southern Ghana similarly 
pointed to a lack of  access to capital as an 
impediment to improvements in well-being.128 
Measuring access to credit is difficult, but an 
indication of  credit constraints is given by the 
fact that poor households are less likely than 
non-poor households to be granted loans (as is 
the case in Malawi, Nicaragua, and Peru).129 
 Sometimes loans are available to poor 
households, but without collateral the interest 
rates are much higher than elsewhere, making 
it difficult for the poor to pay back the loans. 
Those living on less than $1 a day in the Indian 
city of  Udaipur were found to pay 3.84 percent 
interest per month on average compared to 
3.13 percent among households living on 
$1–2 a day. Furthermore, interest rates from 
informal sources were lower by 0.40 percent 
per month for each additional hectare of  land 
owned.130 
 When poor households are excluded from 
financial markets, the only option they have 
is to slowly accumulate savings. This slow 
accumulation strategy requires substantial 
short-term sacrifices for little immediate gain 
on the part of  the households that already have 
very low consumption, since it is only when 
they have accumulated enough savings that 
they are able to invest in indivisible assets and 
enter into new activities with higher returns. 
For many of  these households, using some of  
their precious few resources to save for very 
little immediate reward is just too difficult, and 
as a result, savings rates are often lower among 
the poor.131 For example, poor households 
are three times less likely to save in Peru.132 
Without interventions to aid savings or access 
to credit, the very poverty of  the poor prevents 
them from accessing credit markets or being 
able to save. As a result, they are often unable 
to take advantage of  economic opportunities 
that may exist for their wealthier neighbors. In 
the face of  poverty, opportunity proves not to 
be enough.
 Empirical evidence of  this type of  asset-
based poverty trap has been found among very 
poor households in Africa. Those with low 
asset levels in Kenya were found to be unable 
to “surmount liquidity barriers to entry into or 
expansion of  skilled non-farm activities and so 
remain trapped in lower return … livelihood 
strategies” (Barrett, Bezuneh, and Aboud 
2001, p. 15). In less-favored areas in Kenya 
and Madagascar, increasing returns to assets 
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(consistent with the presence of  indivisible, 
highly remunerative investments) were found 
for households above rather than below the 
poverty line. In southern Ethiopia, poverty 
traps in livestock wealth were found to exist 
for pastoralists.133  Evidence of  asset-based 
poverty traps is also found in South Africa.134  
 Lack of  access to credit can also result in 
another means by which low levels of  assets 
cause poverty to endure. When households 
do not have access to credit or insurance mar-
kets, they are forced to insure themselves, 
often at considerable cost. One way for poor 
households to insure themselves is to limit 
their exposure to risk. The anticipation that 
something bad will happen for which one is 
unprepared can in this way change the type 
of  earnings activities undertaken or the way 
assets are kept. For example, households may 
pass up a profitable opportunity that is consid-
ered too risky, diversify the types of  economic 
activities pursued, or keep assets (as much as 
possible) in easily disposable forms. By limit-
ing exposure to risk through these strategies, 
the poor tend to lower their average income, 
which reinforces long-run poverty.135 
 In Tanzania, households with few live-
stock were found to be more likely to grow 
low-risk, low-return potatoes than wealthier 
households. A shift into low-risk, low-return 
crops resulted in 20 percent lower incomes 
per unit of  land for households in the lowest 
quintile compared to the richest quintile.136 
In India, households with lower levels of  
wealth are more likely to engage in low-risk, 
low-return activities, and more likely to hold 
low-risk, low-return assets and make invest-
ments that are more readily liquidatable.137 As 
a result of  undertaking less risky strategies, 
poorer households were indeed found to have 
less volatile incomes than richer households 
in northern Kenya.138 Together, these studies 
suggest that the incomes of  the poor could be 
25-50 percent higher on average if  they had 
the same protection against shocks as those 
with high asset levels.139  
 If  asset-based poverty traps are present, we 
would expect to see households stubbornly 
holding onto assets at all costs to prevent them-
selves from falling beneath critical asset levels 
as much as possible. This is indeed what has 
been found. In Zimbabwe, those with fewer 
than two oxen tend to allow their consump-
tion to fluctuate up and down in order to hold 
onto their assets, while those with more than 
two oxen sell the additional oxen in times of  
need to keep consumption constant.140 In Ethi-
opia following the 1998 drought, the richest 
households sold their assets to ensure mini-
mum consumption while poorer households 
stubbornly held onto their livestock, allowing 
consumption to fall.141  
The Social Power of Assets as a Poverty Trap
In addition to being excluded from credit 
markets, asset-poor households are often 
more likely to be excluded from various social 
networks that bestow resource advantages. 
While exclusion from political power can 
occur on the grounds of  ethnicity, gender, or 
other prejudices (discussed below), it can also 
result from a lack of  asset ownership. Large 
landholdings can give their owners special 
social status or political power.142 According 
to Barrett and Foster (2007), “The most needy 
households, for example, may not have the 
same access to income smoothing or infor-
mation networks as do better off  households. 
Endogenous social arrangements can cause 
and perpetuate exclusionary mechanisms 
associated with persistent poverty.”143 In Tan-
zania, poorer households tend to have fewer 
people to turn to in times of  need, and can 
only turn to other poor households, not richer 
households.144  
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 As Shepherd (2007, p. 16) states, “political 
participation in some contexts can be more 
open to the ‘assetted,’ as assets act as status sig-
nals that grant ‘permission’ to speak in public.” 
This has been found to be the case in a number 
of  different settings. In Jamaica, wealthier and 
better-networked individuals dominated deci-
sionmaking in participatory processes, and 
similar patterns have been found in Malawi, 
Nicaragua, and Zambia.145 This is not necessar-
ily true in all contexts; in India, for example, 
it is the most disadvantaged groups that are 
likely to attend local meetings.146  
4.8 THE HUNGER TRAP
Hunger itself  has its own dynamic. When an 
individual is severely malnourished, the lack of  
energy and the ill health it brings can entrap. 
This “hunger trap” is described by Dasgupta 
(1997):  
The picture of  begging is one of  behav-
ioural adaptation with a vengeance. The 
account tells us that emaciated beggars are 
not lazy: they have to husband their pre-
carious hold on energy. As we have seen, 
even the timeless model makes sense of  
these matters by showing how low energy 
intake, undernourishment, and behavioural 
adaptation that takes the form of  lethargy, 
can all be regarded as being endogenously 
determined … 500 million people in Asia, 
Africa and Latin America are undernour-
ished … The nutrition-productivity model 
I have sketched here offers an account of  
how this could have come about. More 
importantly, it offers an account of  how it 
persists. (p. 30)
 Evidence from a number of  countries is 
found to be consistent with this hypothesis. 
In Colombia, height, weight, and lean body 
mass were found to be significantly correlated 
with the daily tonnage of  sugarcane delivered 
by sugarcane cutters and loaders. The stature 
of  Guatemalan laborers was found to be posi-
tively correlated with the quantity of  coffee 
beans picked per day, the amount of  sugarcane 
cut and loaded, and the time taken to weed a 
given area. In Brazil, height was found to have 
a strong and positive effect on market wages. 
In Sierra Leone, energy intake was found to 
have a positive effect on productivity up to 
about 5,300 kcal per day: a worker that con-
sumed 5,200 kcal per day was twice as produc-
tive as one who consumed 1,500 kcal per day. 
 As indicated above, hunger has a particularly 
long-term impact on maintaining poverty when 
its victims are the young and children. Those 
who are hungry when young are likely to be 
poorer for longer. As Dasgupta (1997) stated: 
Mild to moderately wasted pre-school chil-
dren under free-living conditions have been 
observed to spend more time in sedentary 
and light activities than their healthy coun-
terparts. They have been found to rest lon-
ger and to play more often in a horizontal 
position … Little children by the wayside 
no more consciously husband their pre-
cious hold on energy than bicyclists solve 
differential equations in order to maintain 
balance. (pp. 20-1)
4.9 GENDER DISCRIMINATION
Tentative evidence that women are more 
likely to suffer poverty and hunger than men 
was presented in Chapter 3. For countries in 
Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, there was some 
evidence that female-headed households are 
likely to be poorer. This is the case for a num-
ber of  reasons discussed in this chapter of  the 
report: women are less likely to be educated, 
have less ownership rights over land,147 are 
more likely to suffer from HIV/AIDS, and are 
more likely to be discriminated against in the 
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provision of  services and access to markets. 
In Malawi, female-headed households were 
poorer than other households and they also 
owned less land, had less access to credit mar-
kets, and owned fewer productive assets than 
other households.148 In some cases, the reason 
women are disadvantaged is because they have 
less access to assets and resources, not because 
of  other additional effects of  gender. In Ethio-
pia, for example, female-headed households 
were found to be no poorer than households 
headed by males with similar demographic 
features, the same level of  education, and the 
same access to land.149  
 However, female-headed households are 
a heterogeneous group comprising married 
women whose husbands have migrated, wid-
owed women, and single or divorced women. 
The vulnerability of  each of  these types of  
female-headed households to poverty and 
hunger is not necessarily the same. For exam-
ple, while female headship was not on its own 
related to poverty in the Ghanaian participa-
tory poverty assessment, the combination of  
age, widowhood, and lack of  adult children 
was frequently seen as being associated with 
chronic vulnerability.150 Also, in Vietnam’s par-
ticipatory poverty assessment, women who 
had been divorced or deserted by their hus-
bands were noted as particularly vulnerable in 
a number of  sites.151 In Malawi, the incidence 
of  poverty is similar for single, divorced, and 
widowed women, but it is lower for married 
female household heads.152    
 Examining only the differences between 
male- and female-headed households hides the 
fact that within households headed by men, 
the welfare of  women and girls is often lower 
than that of  their male family members. While 
empirical evidence on this is limited, an IFPRI 
data study (noted in Chapter 3) found that at 
the individual level, women were poorer than 
men in 6 of  10 countries and significantly 
poorer in Ghana and Bangladesh. In a number 
of  countries, statistics suggest that parents are 
less likely to invest in the schooling of  their 
girls (although Appendix Tables A4.6 and A4.7 
show that this is not universally the case). 
For example, there is substantial evidence of  
greater investment in boys’ education than in 
girls’ education in South Asia.153 This is con-
firmed by the fact that the enrolment rate is as 
low as 21 percent for girls from poor families 
in rural Pakistan (compared to 38 percent for 
boys).154 Micro-level studies in South Asia also 
show that women receive significantly less 
provision of  medical care.155  
 The IFPRI study noted that cultural prac-
tices are a strong determinant of  whether or 
not women are poorer than men. In Burkina 
Faso, for example, women who are subjected 
to onerous cultural practices and girls who 
have dropped out of  school were identified 
as groups highly vulnerable to poverty.156 In 
Ethiopia, the strength of  traditional norms 
in impacting beliefs is seen in the fact that 85 
percent of  women in Ethiopia believe that a 
husband is justified in beating his wife for at 
least one of  the following reasons: burning 
food, arguing with him, going out without 
telling him, neglecting the children, or refus-
ing sexual relations. The disempowerment 
of  women not only impacts the well-being 
of  these women themselves, it is also highly 
correlated with the development outcomes of  
their children. The under-five mortality rate 
for children of  women who did not accept any 
of  the given reasons as justification for abuse 
was 154 out of  1,000 live births, but was more 
than 192 for children of  women who accepted 
at least one reason—representing an increase 
of  almost 40 more children per 1,000 live 
births.157
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4.10 GROUP IDENTITY AND DISCRIMINATION
Although individual experiences and behav-
ior are important in explaining why poverty 
persists, an explanation based on these reasons 
alone misses out on much of  what causes pov-
erty: the deliberate exclusion (current or his-
torical) of  particular groups of  people from 
participating in the opportunities for better-
ment available to the society as a whole. There 
are relational features of  deprivation. The 
Chronic Poverty Research Centre eloquently 
states this problem: 
The chronically poor are those trapped in 
unequal social relations that are so unjust 
that there is no or very limited opportunity 
for upwards social and economic mobility, 
such that they experience persistently high 
levels of  poverty. These may be at national 
or international level, but in some cases are 
at local, community level, and may even be 
found within households.158 
 In the countries studied in Chapter 3, there 
are some groups considered separate from the 
majority that were found to have a consistently 
higher prevalence of  poverty and hunger: eth-
nic minorities in Southeast Asia, hill tribes and 
scheduled castes in South Asia, indigenous 
groups in Latin America, and pastoralists and 
strangers in Sub-Saharan Africa.
 The higher deprivation of  one group vis-à-
vis another is often the result of  identity-based 
forms of  disadvantage. These differences can 
often be explained by a political exercise of  
power by one group to exclude (or include 
on adverse terms) another, either legally or 
in reality, through the continued influence of  
processes of  historical exclusion. This cause 
of  poverty is one that is difficult to overcome, 
since elites may not want the change necessary 
to bring about an end to this cause of  poverty.
Identity and the Return to Assets
As the discussion on landlessness highlighted, 
identity can determine access to assets. Addi-
tionally, some groups of  the poor find it harder 
to receive adequate returns to their assets 
(labor, land) and the goods they sell. This 
means that even when two groups own the 
same amount of  assets, one group will still 
earn a lower income. While this may some-
times reflect individual differences, when it 
is systematically experienced by distinct dis-
advantaged groups it is likely to be a conse-
quence of  their socially excluded status.159 
 Unequal asset ownership explains a large 
part of  the higher incidence of  poverty among 
ethnic groups in Laos. The Lao majority have 
more land (and irrigation) than other eth-
nic groups and have a higher value of  agri-
cultural assets (average of  4.5 million kip in 
rural areas compared to 2-3.8 million kip for 
ethnic minorities). However, even controlling 
for asset endowments and village infrastruc-
ture, the Mon-Khmer remain poorer than the 
Lao.160 In Vietnam, the per capita expenditures 
of  ethnic minorities are 14 percent lower 
than those of  Kinh or Chinese, even hold-
ing family size, asset ownership, education, 
and location constant.161 Similarly, although 
the differences between indigenous and non-
indigenous households result from differences 
in the endowments of  both groups, analysis 
finds that holding asset endowments constant, 
indigenous households are still 11 percent 
more likely to be poor than non-indigenous 
households in Peru, and 14 percent more likely 
to be poor in Guatemala.162 Regression esti-
mates show a 42 percent gap in labor earn-
ings between indigenous and non-indigenous 
males in Guatemala that cannot be explained 
by productive characteristics.163 
 In India, regression analysis has also shown 
that households from scheduled castes (SCs) 
are being rewarded less than their counter-
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parts in non-scheduled households for similar 
jobs. Despite affirmative action taken by the 
government of  India to ensure the rights of  
the SCs and the scheduled tribes (STs), the 
discrimination against these groups continues 
in many subtle ways throughout the country. 
For example, most SC/STs live in the village 
outskirts and are not permitted within the 
village communities beyond a certain time of  
the day. It was estimated that for SC house-
holds, 36 percent of  the probability of  being 
in the bottom income quintile came from a 
“discrimination factor;” for ST households it 
was 53 percent.164  
Utilization of Services 
Access to public services such as health, edu-
cation, and transfers is important in reducing 
the likelihood of  poverty and hunger. How-
ever, different groups often have very different 
access to services. For example, many urban 
migrants are often excluded from public ser-
vices in cities as a result of  being unregistered. 
Even when access is constant, discrimination 
at the point of  delivery often results in certain 
groups utilizing these services less. 
 In Guatemala, indigenous children are less 
than half  as likely to be enrolled in school as 
non-indigenous children, and a higher share of  
indigenous children report not having school 
books.165 In Laos, it takes the Mon-Khmer three 
hours to travel to the nearest pharmacy com-
pared to only one hour for the Lao, and even 
longer for other ethnic groups (4-6 hours). Net 
primary enrolment rates are 76 percent among 
the Lao, compared to 49 percent among the 
Mon-Khmer (and even less among the other 
ethnic groups). 
 The following story from the state of  Mad-
hya Pradesh in India provides a clear example 
of  how different groups can have very differ-
ent real access to basic services: 
If  you go to primary school in Jabuya, the 
demographic division will be honestly 
reflected in class one: 85 percent will be trib-
als and 15 percent will be non-tribals. By the 
time you get to high school, the percentage 
is exactly reversed … Dalit girls drop out 
because of  child labor and acute poverty 
but also because of  the torture inflicted on 
them by fellow students. These girls tend 
to be bhangis, the ones who clean latrines 
and you don’t need to be an expert on caste 
to know who the bhangi girls are because 
they are not allowed to sit with the rest of  
the class. They sit in the corner, near the 
door, where the shoes of  the other students 
are kept. They are not allowed to sit on the 
pattis that other rural children sit on, they 
have their own sacks. When the girl enters 
the class, all the other children mock them 
and start singing “Bhangi aye hain” (the 
latrine-cleaner has come). The girl bursts 
into tears and runs away and refuses to go 
back to school.166   
 Access to political representation and social 
networks that help fill in for missing markets is 
also often heavily determined by group mem-
bership. In Peru, indigenous people have little 
political voice and as a result, while there has 
been general social progress over time, wage 
earners have more social protection than 
indigenous populations in rural areas. 
Aspirations and Perceptions
More subtly, group membership can have a 
measurable impact on individual welfare by 
determining role models and peer groups. Suc-
cessful role models of  those with like identi-
ties are important in determining aspirations. 
Peer groups have an impact by reinforcing lan-
guage or behavior that is different from that 
of  actors with power (such as employers and 
law enforcers) and that is perceived as deviant, 
dysfunctional, or unproductive.167 By influenc-
ing both perceptions of  others and aspirations, 
the group an individual belongs to can exert 
a strong influence on educational attainment, 
occupational choice, employment, and protec-
tion by the law, even when no explicit discrimi-
natory behavior has taken place. Role models 
have been shown to be important in encourag-
ing adoption of  income-improving livelihoods 
in Ghana.168 
 The power of  a history of  discrimination 
and deprivation is highlighted in the follow-
ing examples from India and Peru. In Uttar 
Pradesh, a recent study of  Indian castes 
showed how a history of  social and legal dis-
abilities may have persistent effects on an indi-
vidual’s earnings through the impact of  group 
membership on expectations. When caste was 
hidden, low-caste and high-caste students per-
formed equally well on tests, but when caste 
was announced, low-caste groups performed 
less well by 23 percentage points. This was not 
because of  lower self-confidence on the part 
of  lower-caste students, but because low-caste 
children anticipated that when their caste was 
known, they would be treated prejudicially.169 
In Peru, the history of  deprivation causes those 
households who are most excluded not to per-
ceive it. Despite the huge gap in monetary pov-
erty between indigenous and non-indigenous 
groups in Peru, only 22 percent of  indigenous 
households said they considered their house-
hold to be poor compared to 23 percent of  
non-indigenous households.170 
4.11 CHAPTER CONCLUSION
In this chapter we have considered some of  
the causes of  persistent poverty and hunger 
found in numerous analyses, focusing mainly 
on the countries considered in Chapter 3. Sec-
tions 4.1 and 4.2 underlined the importance of  
the location of  a household in determining its 
likelihood of  experiencing poverty and hun-
ger. Unexpected events in the life of  a house-
hold—particularly health shocks—and lack of  
educational investments and assets passed on 
from previous generations of  poverty were 
then shown to be a significant determinant. 
The last six sections of  this review showed 
how group identity and the health, educa-
tional, and asset endowments of  households 
can have persistent impacts on poverty by 
limiting their access to opportunities, credit, 
markets, services, and hope. Together, these 
sections suggest that interventions to address 
exclusion of  groups, child malnutrition, lack 
of  education, and low assets are essential to 
help the poorest move out of  poverty.
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In this report we have sought to answer two 
crucial questions—who are the world’s poor-
est and hungry, and why do poverty and hun-
ger persist?—by identifying the regions of  
the world in which deprivation is most severe 
and noting where progress has been achieved, 
examining the characteristics of  the extremely 
poor and hungry, and reviewing the causes of  
deprivation and its persistence. The overall 
goal of  this research is to strengthen the empir-
ical basis upon which policymakers can make 
informed policy choices for reducing hunger 
and extreme poverty. 
5.1 REGIONS OF DEPRIVATION
Disaggregating those living on less than $1 a 
day into three groups according to their loca-
tion below the dollar-a-day poverty line allowed 
us to consider the severity of  poverty. Those in 
subjacent poverty live on just less than $1 a day 
(between $0.75 and $1), those in ultra poverty 
live well below $1 day (on less than $0.50), and 
those in medial poverty are in between (liv-
ing on between $0.50 and $0.75). Using this 
disaggregation, we have shown that many of  
the world’s 1 billion extremely poor people live 
in ultra poverty, and that progress in reducing 
poverty among this group has been slow. 
 While South Asia accounts for most of  the 
developing world’s subjacent and medial poor, 
Sub-Saharan Africa is home to three-quarters 
of  all ultra poor—121 million people in Sub-
Saharan Africa lived on less than a meager $0.50 
a day in 2004. Although the Latin America and 
Caribbean region’s share of  dollar-a-day pov-
erty is relatively small, its share increases with 
the depth of  poverty. 
 Progress against poverty has been slowest 
in regions where poverty is most severe. The 
decline in the global poverty rate has been 
largely driven by East Asia and the Pacific, 
aided by South Asia. Indeed, East Asia and 
the Pacific have overachieved the Millennium 
Development Goal of  halving poverty by 2015; 
between 1990 and 2004, the dollar-a-day pov-
erty rate in the region fell from 29.8 percent to 
9.1 percent. However, poverty rates stagnated 
in Sub-Saharan Africa (falling from 46.8 per-
cent to 41.1 percent) and Latin America and 
the Caribbean (10.2 percent to 8.6 percent). 
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 Overall, developing countries experienced 
larger reductions in subjacent and medial 
poverty than in ultra poverty. Disaggregating 
further, it is clear that in all major regions, 
changes in poverty benefited those closer to 
the poverty line more than those further away 
from it. Ultra poverty rates decreased less than 
they would have had everyone’s income grown 
equally, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa and in 
Latin America and the Caribbean. 
 Progress in reducing hunger was measured 
with the help of  the Global Hunger Index 
(GHI)—an index designed to capture three 
dimensions of  hunger: lack of  economic access 
to food, shortfalls in the nutritional status of  
children, and child mortality. The findings of  
the Global Hunger Index show that most hun-
ger hot spots today are in Sub-Saharan Africa 
and South Asia. 
 In Sub-Saharan Africa, overall progress 
against hunger in the 1990s was slow. The 
proportion of  people who were food-energy 
deficient decreased, but there was very little 
improvement in underweight in children and 
in the under-five mortality rate. The high 
under-five mortality rate echoes the high prev-
alence of  ultra poverty in this region. South 
Asia made large strides in combating hunger in 
the 1990s, but despite the remarkable improve-
ment in child nutritional status in South Asia, 
the region still has the highest prevalence of  
underweight in children in the world. Because 
it has a higher rate of  child malnutrition than 
Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia’s GHI score is 
only slightly better than Sub-Saharan Africa’s 
despite the fact that its dollar-a-day poverty rate 
is significantly lower—by about 10 percentage 
points. Why is South Asia’s child malnutrition 
rate higher than Sub-Saharan Africa’s, when it 
does so much better with respect to poverty 
reduction? Studies suggest that the low status 
of  women in South Asia compared to Sub-
Saharan Africa is at the root of  the region’s 
nutritional status gap. 
 The slow rate of  reduction in ultra poverty, 
and components of  the Global Hunger Index 
suggest that business as usual will not be 
sufficient to reach the most deprived within 
an acceptable period of  time. 
5.2 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POOREST  
AND HUNGRY
We analyzed country-level survey data from 
20 countries in Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and 
Latin America and the Caribbean to identify 
certain characteristics of  the poorest and hun-
gry. The characteristics we chose represent 
those that are both important and measurable 
in some comparable way across countries and 
settings. We also reviewed literature on the 
characteristics and causes of  poverty in these 
countries. 
 We found that, in general the poorest are 
by and large also hungry, although not every-
one classified as hungry lives on less than $1 
a day. Looking at the characteristics of  the 
poorest, we found that the poorest are those 
from excluded groups, those living in rural 
remote areas with little education, those with 
few assets, and—in Asia—those without land. 
Despite a global trend toward an increase in the 
proportion of  poor in urban areas, incidences 
of  poverty are higher in rural areas and there 
is a tendency toward greater rural–urban dif-
ferences as poverty deepens. Additionally, the 
poorest and most food-insecure households are 
located furthest from roads, markets, schools, 
and health services. In each of  the 20 coun-
tries there are some groups, considered sepa-
rate from the majority, that have a consistently 
higher prevalence of  poverty and hunger. Indi-
viduals in groups excluded from regional prog-
ress against poverty remain among the poorest 
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in Asia. In Latin America, indigenous peoples 
were also found to be overrepresented among 
the poor, and increasingly so further below the 
dollar-a-day poverty line. In nearly all study 
countries, the proportion of  adult males with-
out schooling is almost double or more among 
the ultra poor than among the non-poor, and 
children from poorer families were also found 
to be less likely to go to school.  
Causes of poverty and hunger
Our review of  the literature on the causes of  
persistent poverty and hunger shows that the 
location of  a household—its country of  resi-
dence and its location within the country—has 
a large impact on potential household welfare. 
However, against the backdrop of  institutions, 
technology, and infrastructure determined by 
a household’s location, there are causes of  
persistent poverty and hunger that operate 
at the individual or group level. Two themes 
underlie many of  these explanations: traps 
and exclusion. The inability of  poor house-
holds to invest in the education and assets of  
their children, the constrained access to credit 
for those with few assets, and the lack of  pro-
ductive labor of  the hungry are all indicative 
of  the presence of  a trap in which poverty 
begets poverty and hunger begets hunger. The 
systematic exclusion of  certain groups from 
access to resources and markets also increases 
their propensity to be poor, and changes only 
slowly over time, also giving rise to persistent 
poverty and hunger.
 The coincidence of  severe and persistent 
poverty and hunger is consistent with the pres-
ence of  a poverty trap existing for very poor 
households. When this is the case, then pov-
erty and hunger inherited at birth—or result-
ing from unfortunate and unexpected events 
in the lifetime of  an individual—can persist for 
many years. Indeed, unexpected events in the 
life of  a household, especially health shocks, 
were found to have persistent effects and to 
explain the descent of  many households into 
poverty.
 Together, these findings motivate a focus 
on policies and programs that are particu-
larly effective in improving the welfare of  
the world’s poorest and hungry. The analysis 
suggests that interventions to insure the poor 
against health shocks, address the exclusion 
of  certain groups, prevent child malnutrition, 
and enable investment in education and other 
capital for those with few assets are essential 
to help the poorest move out of  poverty.
 These findings also highlight the impor-
tance of  improving our knowledge and under-
standing of  who the world’s poorest and hun-
gry are. It is only with carefully collected, 
context-specific, and time-relevant data that 
it is possible to correctly design and evaluate 
policies and interventions for improving the 
welfare of  the most deprived. 
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The measures of  poverty incidence and number of  poor used in the analysis of  regional and 
global poverty trends in Chapter 2 of  this report come from PovcalNet. PovcalNet is an interac-
tive computational tool that has been developed by a team at the World Bank Research Group 
to allow users to calculate poverty measures for different poverty lines and country groupings 
based on household survey data. The data provided are the same as the data used in Chen and 
Ravallion’s estimates of  global poverty (Chen and Ravallion 2007). Details on the methodology 
can be found in Chen and Ravallion (2004), but the main techniques and assumptions are sum-
marized here.
 Nationally representative household survey data are used to generate per capita consumption 
or income aggregates (in constant US PPP) for each household in a given country for a given 
year. These aggregates are then weighted by the size of  the household and the number of  people 
each household represents (from survey sample weights) to generate a distribution of  individual 
consumption or income for each country. A parametric specification of  the underlying Lorenz 
curve is then fitted for each distribution.171 This specification is used by PovcalNet to allow the 
user to calculate different measures of  poverty and inequality.
 Currently, PovcalNet brings together more than 500 nationally representative household sur-
veys from more than 100 countries across 23 years. In bringing together different types of  data 
to generate standard measures of  poverty, the tool addresses the following four issues:
• Income versus consumption: Measures of  individual consumption are preferred to measures 
of  individual income for measuring poverty. In more than half  of  the surveys, consump-
tion aggregates are used (this is true for all the surveys in South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, 
and the Middle East and North Africa). In about one-quarter of  the cases when income is 
used, it is possible to adjust the income measure by a ratio of  the difference between the 
mean consumption and the mean income. In the remaining cases, unadjusted income data 
are used. The difference this makes was tested using surveys with both consumption and 
income data: consumption estimates of  poverty are a couple of  percentage points higher 
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than estimates from income data, but the difference is not statistically significant. For the 
regional estimates presented here, the main implication is that poverty measures in Latin 
America are likely to be lower by a couple of  percentage points than they would be had 
more consumption data been available.
• Actual versus tabulated data: The most frequently used data were raw household survey 
data, but occasionally specially designed grouped tabulations were constructed from the 
raw data following the guidelines of  the World Bank Research Group team. Details of  the 
guidelines given and the use of  group data are in Chen, Datt, and Ravallion (1994).
• Interpolation of  estimates: Country estimates are available at three-year intervals between 
1981 and 2004 (except that 2001 was used instead of  2002). However, household surveys are 
often conducted less regularly than every three years (nine countries have only conducted 
one household survey) and may take place in years other than those for which poverty 
estimates are made available. To generate estimates for the same years for each country, 
estimates from years in which household surveys were conducted are interpolated using esti-
mates of  growth in private consumption from national accounts data to adjust for changes 
in the mean (but not the shape) of  the distribution. More details on the method used for 
interpolation are in Chen and Ravallion (2004).
• Missing countries in regional and global estimates: Estimates are based on the data that are 
available. For some regions, there is less coverage than for others and this should be taken 
into account when interpreting the regional and global estimates. The region with the least 
amount of  coverage (74 percent of  the population) is the Middle East and North Africa.
The basis of  this data on household surveys and the care with which it has been compiled allows it 
to generate fairly accurate country and regional poverty estimates—to the extent that comparable 
cross-country estimates of  poverty can be generated—for three-year intervals from 1981 to 2004. 
There is a trade-off  between coverage and accuracy in bringing together this data; in general, the 
data are most accurate for the 1990s and early 2000s, given the time it takes for surveys to be pro-
cessed and made available and the fact that survey coverage was weak in the 1980s. In this report, 
we only use data from 1990 onward, which means the trends presented are quite accurate.
MEASURES OF DOLLAR-A-DAY, SUBjACENT, MEDIAL, AND ULTRA POVERTY
Using PovcalNet, estimates of  regional headcount poverty incidence (in other words, the propor-
tion of  people in poverty) and numbers were obtained from 1990 to 2004 for dollar-a-day poverty 
(representing a US$1.08 PPP a day or US$32.74 PPP a month poverty line). 
 Two other regional estimates were also obtained: estimates for headcount poverty rates and 
numbers at poverty lines of  US$0.81 PPP a day (US$24.56 PPP a month) and US$0.54 PPP a day 
(US$16.37 PPP a month). These were used with the US$1.08 PPP a day estimates to generate 
the following three classifications of  poverty: 
• Subjacent poor: those living on between US$1.08 PPP and US$0.81 PPP a day
• Medial poor: those living on between US$0.81 PPP and US$0.54 PPP a day
• Ultra poor: those living on less than US$0.54 PPP a day
SUBjACENT, MEDIAL, AND ULTRA POVERTY DECOMPOSITION ANALYSIS
For each region, the change in the incidence and number of  poor was further decomposed into 
changes in subjacent, medial, and ultra poverty incidences and numbers. The contribution of  
decreases in the incidence of  each type of  poverty is depicted in Figure 2.12 by simply comparing 
the reductions in incidence of  each type of  poverty. 
 To calculate the change in poverty that would have resulted from equal growth in all incomes, it 
was assumed that incomes within countries and regions were lognormally distributed (a common 
assumption in the inequality literature [see Bourguignon (2003) and Klasen and Misselhorn 
(2006)]) such that the distribution of  income in 1990 was lognormally distributed with mean y 
and standard deviation σ. Bourguignon (2003) shows that in this case, the poverty rate, P
t 
, can 
be calculated from only the mean and standard deviation of  income by: 
    
      
(1)
where z is the poverty line and ∏ is the cumulative normal distribution. When incomes are 
lognormally distributed, the standard deviation can be calculated from the Gini coefficient of  
income (G) by: 
         
(2)
where ∏-1 is the inverse of  the cumulative normal distribution.
Using (1) it is possible to determine the growth in income commensurate with the observed change 
in dollar-a-day headcount poverty between 1990 and 2004 by calculating the estimated level of  
mean income, y2004 , that would give the observed headcount poverty estimate of  P2004 (1.08) if  the 
standard deviation of  the distribution had stayed the same ( σ1990 ): 
 
          
Using this estimate of   y2004 , headcount poverty estimates P2004 (0.81) and P2004 (0.54) can be 
determined and from this, an expected change in subjacent, medial, and ultra poverty can be 
generated.
 Country Gini Indices were taken from PovcalNet. For regions, the standard deviation of  the 
regional distribution of  income was taken directly from Besley and Burgess (2003). Milanovic’s 
estimates of  the distribution of  world income from household survey data were used for an esti-
mate of  the Gini of  the developing world (Milanovic 2002). 
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A GLOBAL HUNGER 
INDEX: CONCEPT AND 
METHODOLOGY
Based on the conceptual framework presented in Figure A2.1, the Global Hunger Index (GHI, 
used in Chapter 2 of  this report) was designed to capture several dimensions of  hunger, defined 
as follows:
• insufficient availability of  food (as compared to requirements),
• shortfalls in nutritional status, and
• premature mortality caused directly or indirectly by undernutrition.
 This definition goes beyond food-energy deficiency at the household level, which is the focus 
of  the Food and Agriculture Organization of  the United Nations (FAO) measure of  undernourish-
ment172 (FAO 1996a). Sufficient dietary energy availability at the household level does not guaran-
tee that food intake meets the dietary requirements of  individual household members, nor does 
it imply that health status permits the biological utilization of  food. However, the outcomes of  
insufficient quantity, quality, or safety of  food as well as the consequences of  a failure to utilize 
nutrients biologically are encompassed in the above three-dimensional definition.
 While it would be desirable to assign more than one indicator to each of  the dimensions defined 
above, data availability is limited, especially for the prevalence of  micronutrient deficiencies (often 
referred to as “hidden hunger”). Consequently, the following three indicators were selected to 
represent the three dimensions: 
• the proportion of  undernourished as estimated by FAO, reflecting the share of  the popula-
tion with inadequate dietary energy intake (the proportion of  people who are food-energy 
deficient), 
• the prevalence of  underweight in children under the age of  five, indicating the proportion of  
children suffering from weight loss and/or reduced growth, and
• the under-five mortality rate, partly reflecting the fatal consequence of  the synergy between 
inadequate dietary intake and unhealthy environments.
Final Outcomes for the Individual
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Source:  Adapted from UNICEF 1990, Smith and Haddad 2000, von Braun et al. 1998, Tomkins and Watson 1989. 
FIGURE A2.1 Determinants, Effects, and Outcomes of Hunger and Undernutrition
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 All three indicators were selected to monitor progress toward the Millennium Development 
Goals (United Nations 2001).173 A common feature of  food-energy deficiency, underweight preva-
lence in children, and child mortality is that they are assumed to be associated with or—in the 
case of  the latter two indicators—partly caused by micronutrient deficiencies. Thus, although no 
indicator of  vitamin or mineral deficiencies can be included in the Index due to insufficient data 
availability, the GHI is expected to reflect micronutrient deficiencies to some extent.
 The Index combines the percentage of  people from the entire population who are food-energy 
deficient with the two indicators that deal with children under five. This ensures that both the situ-
ation of  the population as a whole and that of  children, a particularly physiologically vulnerable 
subsection of  the population, are captured (Wiesmann 2006). Children’s nutritional status deserves 
particular attention because malnutrition puts them at high risk of  permanent physical and mental 
impairment and death (WHO 1997).
 The proportion of  people who are food-energy deficient and the prevalence of  underweight 
in children both have the same shortcoming: they do not reveal the most tragic consequence of  
hunger: premature death (Wiesmann 2006). The same level of  child malnutrition in two countries 
can have quite different effects on the proportion of  malnutrition-related deaths among children, 
depending on the overall level of  child mortality (Pelletier et al. 1994). This disadvantage of  the 
indicator of  child malnutrition is mitigated by the inclusion of  the under-five mortality rate (Wies-
mann 2006). Clearly, the mortality data comprise other causes of  death than malnutrition, and the 
actual contribution of  child malnutrition to mortality is not easy to track because the proximate 
cause of  death is frequently an infectious disease (Pelletier et al. 1994). However, about 53 percent 
of  deaths among children under five worldwide are attributable to malnutrition (Caulfield et al. 
2004).
 For aggregation into the Global Hunger Index, the three selected indicators are equally weighted; 
see Box A2.1 for details on the calculation and the data sources.
LIMITATIONS OF THE GLOBAL HUNGER INDEX
It should be noted that there is no unambiguous way to derive weights or choose the aggregation 
function for the purpose of  index calculation. The simplest possibility is usually equal weighting or 
“natural averaging” of  the partial indicators of  the Index. Principal components analysis (a special 
form of  factor analysis that serves to condense information) is frequently used in order to derive 
weights from an empirical basis. This approach was chosen to explore options for weighting the 
GHI (see Wiesmann 2006). Each of  the weights derived from principal components analysis for the 
three indicators is so close to one-third that it suggests equal weighting of  the Index components. 
Exploring rank correlations of  the GHI with index versions based on modified weights shows that 
the Index is not very sensitive to moderate changes in weighting factors (Wiesmann 2006).  
 Another option to modify the aggregation function of  the index is the standardization of  its com-
ponents, which is usually applied to harmonize different measurement units (Szilágyi 2000). Even 
for indicators that are expressed in a common metric (such as the three GHI components that are 
all given as percentages), standardization may be advisable. Yet, despite the divergent ranges of  the 
three GHI components, rankings based on index versions with standardized components essentially 
BOX A2.1    Calculation of the GHI and Data Sources
The calculation of  GHI scores is restricted to developing countries and countries in transition for which 
measuring hunger is considered most relevant. Developed countries are not included, because hunger 
has been largely overcome in these countries, and because overconsumption is considered a much greater 
problem than a lack of  food (see Wiesmann 2006 for the selection criteria). Table 1 below provides an 
overview of  the data sources for the Global Hunger Index. The first column indicates the reference year 
of  the GHI and the second column specifies the respective number of  countries for which the Index can 
be calculated.
The Global Hunger Index is calculated as follows: 
   
when GHI = Global Hunger Index,
 PUN = proportion of  the population undernourished (in percent),
 CUW = prevalence of  underweight in children under five (in percent), and
 CM = proportion of  children dying before age five (in percent).
All three index components are expressed in percentages, and the results of  a principal components 
analysis suggest equal weighting. Higher GHI scores indicate more hunger. The Index varies between a 
minimum of  0 and a maximum of  100. However, the maximum value of  100 would only be reached if  all 
children died before their fifth birthday, the whole population was food-energy deficient, and all children 
under five were underweight. Likewise, the minimum value of  0 does not occur, because this would mean 
that 0 percent of  people were food-energy deficient, that no child under five was underweight, and that 
no child died before his or her fifth birthday. Even the most highly developed countries have under-five 
mortality rates greater than 0.
 Table 1—Data Sources for the Global Hunger Index (GHI) 
 Number of   
 countries  Reference 
GHI with GHI Indicators years Data sources 
1981 89 -Percentage of  undernourished 1979-1981a -FAO 1999, author’s estimates
  -Prevalence of  underweight in  1977-1982b -WHO 2006,c UN ACC/SCN 1993,  
      children under five       author’s estimates
  -Under-five mortality rate 1980 -UNICEF 1995 
1992 97 -Percentage of  undernourished 1990-1992a -FAO 2004, author’s estimates 
  -Prevalence of  underweight in  
      children under five 1987-1992b -WHO 2006,c UN ACC/SCN 1993,  
        author’s estimates 
  -Under-five mortality rate 1992 -UNICEF 1994 
1997 118 -Percentage of  undernourished 1995-1997a -FAO 2004, author’s estimates 
  -Prevalence of  underweight in  1993-1998b -WHO 2006,c author’s estimates
      children under five 
  -Under-five mortality rate 1997 -UNICEF 1999
2003 116 -Percentage of  undernourished 2000-2002a -FAO 2004, author’s estimates 
  -Prevalence of  underweight in  1999-2003b -WHO 2006,c author’s estimates
      children under five   
  -Under-five mortality rate 2003 -UNICEF 2005 
a Three-year average.
b Latest survey in this period.
c The methodology applied for the WHO Global Database on Child Growth and Malnutrition is described in de 
   Onis and Blössner (2003).
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contain the same information as the ranking of  the GHI without standardization, again showing 
the robustness of  the Index to modifications of  its aggregation function (Wiesmann 2006).  
 Therefore, the preference for a particular set of  weights (equal weights as opposed to any other 
possible set of  weights) and the use of  unstandardized index components should not give too much 
cause for concern. Whereas the weighting of  composite indices tends to be a point of  contention 
due to its unavoidable arbitrariness, investing time and resources in improving the database might 
often be more worthwhile than extensively discussing weights. 
 Weaknesses in the data used for the GHI have been discussed extensively in the literature. Con-
cerns have been raised about the reliability of  all three parameters FAO uses to estimate the propor-
tion of  undernourished (dietary energy supply per capita, derived from macro data on agricultural 
production, net trade flows and stock changes, and uses other than food consumption; the variation 
of  dietary energy intakes across households; and minimum dietary energy requirements (see FAO 
1996a). The lack of  consideration of  intra-household food allocation has also been criticized (Sved-
berg 1998). The validity of  the data about children is restricted by sampling and estimation errors 
and possible small inadequacies in international reference standards (see Klasen 2007) and, in the case 
of  the under-five mortality rate, is partly dependent on the reliability of  government statistics.
 However, the computation of  the GHI is likely to decrease the impact of  measurement errors 
in its three components (assuming that random measurement errors for the three indicators are 
independent of  each other, given the different sources of  the data). Nonetheless, a distortion of  
GHI values for a few countries due to unreliable data for at least one partial indicator cannot be 
excluded. However, to the extent that the GHI promotes a synopsis of  food security and nutrition 
indicators, this may help to detect errors and inconsistencies within the datasets.
 On a more general note, the virtue of  using composite indices to condense information, which 
facilitates the use of  statistics by policymakers and the public, is contrasted with the loss of  detail 
due to aggregation. However, this argument applies only if  an index is intended to replace its par-
tial indicators. The GHI is meant to complement rather than substitute for existing food security 
and nutrition indicators, and the Index can be easily decomposed due to its simple construction 
(compare Figure 2.15 showing regional trends for the GHI and its components). In fact, the partial 
indicators of  the GHI might be given greater attention if  the Index is able to mobilize political will 
for improving food and nutrition security. 
 Whereas international indices are better suited than single indicators to capture multifaceted 
phenomena, the weighting of  the components defines trade-offs that may not be in accordance 
with national priorities. Yet the robustness of  the GHI to modifications in its weighting factors 
means that countries pursuing national priorities deviating from the relative importance attached 
to GHI components by the weights would not be significantly disadvantaged in terms of  their rank-
ing position. Also, as already mentioned, all three index components have been selected as target 
indicators for the Millennium Development Goals to which 189 countries have already committed 
themselves.
 A more comprehensive discussion on the transformation, standardization, weighting, and aggre-
gation of  indicators for composite indices as well as the pros and cons of  international indices can be 
found in Wiesmann (2004). Further details on the choice of  indicators and the statistical properties 
of  the GHI are reported in Wiesmann (2006). For a recent critique of  FAO’s indicator of  undernour-
ishment and the measurement of  child malnutrition, see Smith, Alderman, and Aduayom (2006) 
and Klasen (2007).
Nationally representative household expenditure surveys were used to conduct an analysis of  the 
incidence of  poverty and hunger, the correlations among poverty and hunger, and the character-
istics of  the poor in 20 selected countries. Appendix 3 describes the data and methodology used 
in this analysis, which is presented in Chapter 3 of  the report. 
DATA
The surveys were conducted using two- or three-stage stratified sampling designs, thus ensuring 
full geographic coverage and representativeness at the national level. When using complex 
sampling designs instead of  simple random sampling, it is important to correct for the design 
so that any calculated statistics apply to the population group of  interest (Deaton 1997). Here, 
the sampling weights provided with the surveys and the variables delineating the strata and 
community of  residence for each household are used to correct for the sampling design in the 
calculation of  all measures.  
 Table A3.1 gives some basic information on the surveys. Most were conducted in the latter half  
of  the 1990s or early 2000s, with Peru (1994) being the only exception. For most, data collection 
was distributed evenly throughout a full year in order to capture seasonal variability. Some surveys 
took place over only three to six months, however. The number of  study households retained 
after data cleaning ranges from 1,800 for Timor-Leste to 119,059 for India, the country with the 
largest population. More information on the data collection for the Sub-Saharan African and South 
Asian countries as well as Laos is given in Smith, Alderman, and Aduayom (2006) and Smith and 
Subandoro (2005). Information for the remaining countries can be found in World Bank (2005e), 
Vietnam Statistical Publishing House (2000), World Bank (2005f ), World Bank (2003), Gobierno 
de Nicaragua (2001), and World Bank (1998b).
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METHODS OF CALCULATING INDICATORS OF POVERTY AND HUNGER
All of  the datasets rely on expenditures data rather than monetary income to measure income, 
and thus poverty. The incidences of  poverty for the poverty groups (subjacent, medial, and ultra) 
are calculated by determining whether each study household’s per capita total expenditure falls 
within (or below, for the ultra poor) the cut-offs when denominated in local currencies. The local 
currency cut-offs are calculated based on each country’s purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange 
rate in a base year, the base year Consumer Price Index (CPI), and the survey year CPI to calculate 
a PPP exchange rate for the survey year (Sillers, undated).174 To take into account the fact that the 
cost of  living is generally higher in urban than rural areas, mostly due to higher food and housing 
costs, urban poverty lines are adjusted upward using ratios of  the urban to rural poverty lines 
reported in Ravallion, Chen, and Sangraula (2007). Note that for some countries, the dollar-a-day 
poverty rates reported here differ from those published by the World Bank (for example, World 
Bank 2007). This is due to the fact that per capita household expenditures have been subjected to 
different data cleaning protocols and, in some cases, calculated differently.   
 With respect to measurement of  the hunger indicators, the surveys collected data on all foods 
acquired by households, including foods purchased, foods consumed out of  own production, and 
in most cases, foods received in kind. The methods of  data collection differ across the countries 
in a number of  respects, including the number of  foods for which data were collected, recall 
periods, how long the data were collected for each household, and whether the diary or interview 
method was used. Smith and Subandoro (2005) show that, despite these differences, estimates 
of  the hunger measures from household expenditure surveys are largely comparable across the 
countries.
 The data collected from households consist of: (1) expenditures on each food, and/or 
(2) quantities acquired of  each food, which are often reported in non-metric or “local” units of  
measure, for example, bunches or cans. The first essential step in calculating incidences of  food-
energy deficiency is to convert the data to metric quantities (grams or kilograms). To do so, 
reported expenditures on each food are divided by the food’s metric price; reported quantities 
in local units of  measure are multiplied by the metric weight of  one local unit of  the food. The 
energy content of  each food acquired can then be determined using food composition tables. 
Each household’s total per capita dietary energy availability is calculated by summing up across 
the foods acquired. Finally, each person in each household is assigned a “1” if  household dietary 
energy availability falls within (or below) the respective hunger group (again: subjacent, medial, 
or ultra) cut-off  and a “0” otherwise. The survey design-corrected mean of  the resulting dummy 
variable is the incidence of  hunger for each hunger group (see Smith and Subandoro 2007). Cal-
culation of  the low diet-quality indicator takes place by allocating foods acquired to food groups, 
summing the number of  groups to create a diet diversity score, and assigning people a “1” if  their 
household’s score is less than 5 and a “0” otherwise.
 A more complete explanation of  the data processing and cleaning for the Sub-Saharan African 
and South Asian countries as well as Laos can be found in Smith and Subandoro (2005) and 
Smith, Alderman, and Aduayom (2006). For the remaining countries, see World Bank (2005e), 
Vietnam Statistical Publishing House (2000), World Bank (2005f ), World Bank (2003), Gobierno 
de Nicaragua (2001), and World Bank (1998b).
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TABLE  A4.1a    Budget Share: Living on Less Than $1 a Day (percent)
       All other 
Countries Food Clothing Fuel Housing Health Education expenses
    
Sub-Saharan	Africa	        
Burundi 74.8 3.8 0.0 0.4 1.9 1.2 17.9
   Rural 75.0 3.8 0.0 0.3 1.9 1.2 17.8
   Urban 64.8 2.1 0.2 3.4 2.7 1.9 25.0
Ghana 66.7 6.5 3.1 2.7 2.8 3.7 14.5
   Rural 68.9 6.6 2.6 2.5 2.8 3.1 13.6
   Urban 60.3 6.3 4.4 3.3 3.1 5.5 17.1
Malawi 71.2 4.6 3.1 4.7 0.7 0.3 15.4
   Rural 74.8 4.4 2.2 3.6 0.6 0.2 14.2
   Urban 50.5 5.3 8.7 10.9 1.6 0.6 22.4
Rwanda 85.6 3.8 0.1 0.5 0.0 2.5 7.6
   Rural 86.4 3.8 0.0 0.2 0.0 2.3 7.2
   Urban 67.7 4.7 1.2 5.7 0.0 5.7 15.0
Mozambique 69.8 3.3 9.1 8.2 0.3 0.7 8.6
   Rural 70.7 3.5 9.2 8.0 0.2 0.6 7.8
   Urban 65.7 2.7 8.7 9.1 0.7 1.4 11.7
Zambia 71.9 4.2 4.3 0.9 1.9 1.6 15.2
   Rural 74.6 4.2 3.3 0.2 1.7 1.2 14.8
   Urban 63.8 4.0 7.1 3.2 2.4 2.6 16.9
South	Asia       
Bangladesh 64.8 7.1 9.3 0.6 2.4 1.7 14.0
   Rural 65.6 7.1 9.3 0.0 2.4 1.6 13.9
   Urban 60.1 6.8 9.4 4.1 2.3 2.3 15.0
India 64.2 7.7 8.7 0.5 3.4 1.2 14.4
   Rural 65.1 7.8 8.7 0.1 3.4 1.0 14.1
   Urban 61.0 7.3 9.0 1.8 3.4 1.9 15.6
Pakistan 55.3 9.5 8.4 8.6 3.8 1.6 12.8
   Rural 56.1 9.7 8.3 7.4 4.1 1.2 13.2
   Urban 52.5 8.7 8.9 12.7 3.0 3.0 11.2
East	Asia       
Vietnam 59.8 5.8 6.1 5.2 6.2 5.3 11.5
   Rural 63.7 6.3 5.8 3.8 6.5 4.2 9.6
   Urban 49.3 4.5 7.1 8.9 5.4 8.1 16.7
Central	Asia       
Tajikistan 71.8 3.7 4.8 8.1 3.1 5.3 3.2
   Rural 70.7 4.1 5.1 8.2 2.9 5.2 3.9
   Urban 74.1 2.8 4.3 8.0 3.6 5.5 1.6
Latin	America       
Guatemala 50.3 5.5 1.3 14.5 2.9 1.7 23.8
   Rural 50.5 5.5 1.3 14.3 2.8 1.8 23.8
   Urban 47.6 5.3 1.3 16.7 3.7 1.2 24.2
Nicaragua 51.6 3.2 4.9 13.7 5.4 5.5 15.7
   Rural 51.5 3.7 4.0 14.9 5.9 5.1 14.9
   Urban 51.7 2.8 5.8 12.5 4.9 6.0 16.3
Peru 66.5 6.4 5.7 8.6 0.4 2.1 10.3
   Rural 72.3 6.1 3.6 7.4 0.4 1.8 8.4
   Urban 54.0 7.0 10.3 11.2 0.3 2.9 14.3
TABLE  A4.1b    Budget Share: Living on $1 a Day and Above (percent)
       All other 
Countries Food Clothing Fuel Housing Health Education expenses
Sub-Saharan	Africa       
Burundi 77.1 3.3 0.2 1.1 1.6 1.0 15.7
   Rural 79.0 3.2 0.0 0.7 1.5 0.9 14.7
   Urban 56.8 4.1 1.4 6.3 2.5 2.5 26.4
Ghana 60.4 7.1 3.0 2.1 3.4 3.2 20.8
   Rural 64.7 7.0 2.3 1.5 3.4 2.4 18.7
   Urban 53.3 7.3 4.2 3.0 3.3 4.5 24.3
Malawi 66.6 6.1 2.5 4.6 0.8 0.6 19.0
   Rural 69.9 6.0 2.0 3.5 0.7 0.4 17.5
   Urban 34.5 6.7 6.8 15.0 1.5 2.3 33.1
Rwanda 72.2 4.2 0.4 1.9 0.0 2.0 19.3
   Rural 78.1 3.7 0.1 0.1 0.0 1.4 16.5
   Urban 50.3 5.9 1.6 8.5 0.0 3.9 29.8
Mozambique 68.0 4.2 8.9 6.1 0.3 0.5 12.0
   Rural 69.9 4.3 9.0 5.7 0.2 0.3 10.6
   Urban 60.0 3.6 8.1 7.6 0.4 1.0 19.3
Zambia 61.4 8.2 5.3 2.2 2.9 2.1 17.9
   Rural 63.2 9.5 5.4 0.6 2.8 1.7 16.8
   Urban 59.0 6.6 5.1 4.2 3.1 2.7 19.3
South	Asia       
Bangladesh 51.4 6.8 7.1 1.8 3.1 4.7 25.1
   Rural 54.0 7.0 7.3 0.1 3.3 4.1 24.3
   Urban 43.5 6.3 6.3 7.0 2.6 6.7 27.7
India 55.9 6.9 7.6 1.9 5.3 2.3 20.1
   Rural 58.8 7.0 7.7 0.5 5.6 1.6 18.8
   Urban 49.3 6.7 7.4 5.2 4.6 3.8 23.2
Pakistan 50.5 8.4 7.8 12.3 4.5 2.6 13.8
   Rural 52.6 8.9 8.1 9.0 4.8 1.8 14.7
   Urban 45.4 7.3 7.1 20.1 3.9 4.7 11.6
East	Asia       
Vietnam 57.1 5.4 5.6 5.3 5.1 5.0 16.6
   Rural 59.9 5.7 5.3 4.2 5.3 4.5 15.0
   Urban 46.4 3.8 6.8 9.5 3.9 6.9 22.7
Central	Asia       
Tajikistan 67.0 4.8 3.3 6.8 5.2 4.2 8.7
   Rural 67.2 4.8 3.7 7.2 4.9 3.6 8.7
   Urban 66.7 4.7 2.6 6.2 5.8 5.4 8.6
Latin	America       
Guatemala 43.7 4.5 1.9 13.6 6.8 3.5 26.0
   Rural 51.0 4.9 1.3 11.1 6.2 2.0 23.5
   Urban 34.6 4.0 2.7 16.7 7.5 5.3 29.2
Nicaragua 44.1 3.4 4.8 13.8 6.6 6.3 21.0
   Rural 48.6 3.5 4.3 11.2 9.3 4.6 18.5
   Urban 42.7 3.3 4.9 14.6 5.8 6.8 21.9
Peru 47.9 5.7 5.6 15.5 0.9 4.0 20.4
   Rural 65.4 6.3 3.4 7.9 0.8 2.0 14.2
   Urban 41.9 5.4 6.3 18.1 1.0 4.6 22.7
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TABLE  A4. 1c    Budget Share (subjacent poor) (percent)
       All other 
Countries Food Clothing Fuel Housing Health Education expenses
Sub-Saharan	Africa       
Burundi 78.41 3.61 0.02 0.32 1.35 1.04 15.26
   Rural 78.62 3.63 0.01 0.27 1.32 1.03 15.12
   Urban 67.63 2.34 0.25 2.94 3.08 1.59 22.18
Ghana 65.2 6.8 3.1 2.3 2.9 4.0 15.7
   Rural 68.0 6.9 2.4 2.1 2.7 3.4 14.5
   Urban 57.7 6.5 5.1 2.8 3.4 5.7 18.9
Malawi 71.0 5.2 2.7 4.2 0.8 0.3 15.8
   Rural 74.2 5.1 1.9 3.3 0.6 0.2 14.6
   Urban 46.5 5.8 8.5 11.4 2.0 0.8 25.1
Rwanda 82.9 4.0 0.1 0.5 0.0 2.2 10.2
   Rural 84.2 4.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.9 9.8
   Urban 64.1 4.4 1.5 7.7 0.0 6.2 16.1
Mozambique 70.0 4.0 8.4 6.6 0.2 0.6 10.2
   Rural 71.0 4.2 8.3 6.5 0.2 0.5 9.3
   Urban 64.9 2.9 9.0 7.2 0.4 1.2 14.4
Zambia 65.3 6.4 5.7 1.6 2.4 1.7 16.9
   Rural 67.3 7.2 5.4 0.3 2.4 1.3 16.1
   Urban 61.6 4.9 6.3 4.0 2.5 2.5 18.2
South	Asia       
Bangladesh 63.1 7.1 8.9 0.7 2.7 2.1 0.1
   Rural 64.1 7.2 9.0 0.0 2.7 2.0 0.1
   Urban 57.5 6.8 8.7 4.6 2.4 2.9 0.1
India 64.0 7.5 8.5 0.5 3.7 1.2 14.6
   Rural 64.9 7.6 8.4 0.1 3.7 1.0 14.3
   Urban 60.4 7.1 8.8 2.2 3.8 2.0 15.8
East	Asia       
Vietnam 59.3 5.9 6.0 5.2 5.8 5.8 12.0
   Rural 62.7 6.5 5.6 3.9 6.2 4.7 10.3
   Urban 49.1 4.2 7.1 9.0 4.7 8.9 17.1
Latin	America       
Nicaragua 51.3 3.6 5.0 11.9 5.7 5.5 17.1
   Rural 52.5 4.0 3.7 11.6 6.8 4.6 16.8
   Urban 50.5 3.3 5.7 12.1 5.0 6.1 17.3
TABLE  A4. 1d    Budget Share (medial poor) (percent) 
       All other 
Countries Food Clothing Fuel Housing Health Education expenses
Sub-Saharan	Africa       
Burundi 77.44 3.54 0.01 0.3 1.64 1.23 15.84
   Rural 77.58 3.55 0.01 0.27 1.64 1.22 15.73
   Urban 64.57 1.99 0.25 3.02 2.2 1.95 26.02
Ghana 67.9 6.3 3.0 2.8 2.8 3.5 13.7
   Rural 69.9 6.4 2.7 2.5 2.9 2.8 12.9
   Urban 62.5 6.1 4.0 3.6 2.7 5.4 15.7
Malawi 71.8 4.2 3.3 4.7 0.7 0.2 15.1
   Rural 75.9 3.9 2.2 3.6 0.6 0.2 13.6
   Urban 51.4 5.5 8.4 10.2 1.4 0.7 22.5
Rwanda 85.4 3.6 0.1 0.3 0.0 1.6 9.1
   Rural 86.2 3.5 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.5 8.7
   Urban 67.5 4.7 1.3 4.7 0.0 4.8 17.0
Mozambique 70.0 3.5 9.7 7.5 0.3 0.7 8.3
   Rural 70.8 3.5 9.7 7.4 0.2 0.6 7.8
   Urban 65.8 3.2 9.8 8.1 0.6 1.3 11.2
Zambia 69.4 5.3 4.8 1.1 1.9 1.6 15.9
   Rural 71.8 5.6 4.0 0.2 1.7 1.2 15.5
   Urban 63.4 4.4 6.9 3.3 2.4 2.6 17.0
South	Asia       
Bangladesh 66.3 7.1 9.4 0.6 2.1 1.4 0.1
   Rural 67.0 7.1 9.4 0.0 2.2 1.3 0.1
   Urban 62.2 6.8 9.7 4.1 2.0 1.9 0.1
India 65.4 7.6 9.0 0.4 3.0 1.0 13.7
   Rural 66.3 7.7 9.0 0.0 2.9 0.8 13.3
   Urban 62.4 7.3 9.2 1.4 3.0 1.7 15.0
East	Asia       
Vietnam 61.3 5.6 6.3 5.1 6.8 4.3 10.6
   Rural 65.7 5.9 6.0 3.6 7.1 3.3 8.3
   Urban 50.1 4.7 7.1 8.8 5.9 6.7 16.6
Latin	America       
Nicaragua 52.8 3.1 4.6 12.2 5.6 5.7 15.9
   Rural 53.2 3.8 3.3 12.5 6.5 5.2 15.6
   Urban 52.4 2.6 5.8 12.1 4.8 6.2 16.1
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TABLE  A4.1e    Budget Share (ultra poor) (percent)
       All other 
Countries Food Clothing Fuel Housing Health Education expenses
Sub-Saharan	Africa       
Burundi 69.5 4.2 0.0 0.4 2.5 1.4 22.0
   Rural 69.5 4.3 0.0 0.4 2.5 1.4 21.9
   Urban 60.7 1.9 0.0 4.3 2.7 2.2 28.2
Ghana 68.6 6.1 3.0 3.8 2.8 3.0 12.7
   Rural 69.6 6.2 2.9 3.6 2.7 2.6 12.4
   Urban 64.4 5.9 3.5 4.7 3.0 4.7 13.8
Malawi 70.8 3.5 4.2 5.8 0.7 0.2 14.7
   Rural 74.7 3.3 3.0 4.5 0.5 0.2 13.9
   Urban 55.4 4.2 9.2 11.2 1.5 0.4 18.0
Rwanda 87.1 3.9 0.0 0.6 0.0 3.3 5.0
   Rural 87.8 3.8 0.0 0.4 0.0 3.2 4.8
   Urban 71.2 5.0 0.8 4.7 0.0 6.3 12.1
Mozambique 66.7 2.7 9.7 11.7 0.4 0.9 7.9
   Rural 66.8 2.9 10.4 11.6 0.2 0.7 7.4
   Urban 66.4 2.0 7.4 12.0 0.9 1.6 9.7
Zambia 76.0 2.6 3.4 0.6 1.7 1.5 14.2
   Rural 78.4 2.6 2.3 0.2 1.5 1.3 13.7
   Urban 65.8 2.9 7.8 2.4 2.3 2.8 16.0
South	Asia       
Bangladesh 66.3 7.0 10.7 0.5 2.5 1.1 0.0
   Rural 67.1 6.9 10.7 0.0 2.3 1.0 0.0
   Urban 62.8 7.3 10.8 2.5 3.3 1.2 0.1
India 59.5 10.4 9.5 0.2 2.8 1.4 16.3
   Rural 59.8 10.8 9.5 0.0 2.8 1.3 15.8
   Urban 58.8 9.2 9.4 0.8 2.6 1.7 17.5
East	Asia       
Vietnam 57.9 4.9 7.2 6.2 8.5 4.9 10.3
   Rural 67.1 4.7 7.2 3.5 8.3 2.3 6.9
   Urban 48.2 5.2 7.2 9.1 8.8 7.6 13.8
Latin	America       
Nicaragua 50.8 3.1 5.0 16 5.1 5.4 14.6
   Rural 50.1 3.6 4.5 17.6 5.3 5.2 13.7
   Urban 52.0 2.4 5.9 13.4 4.8 5.7 15.8
TABLE  A4. 2    Demographic Composition and Female-Headed Households:  Above and Below $1  
 a Day
 Above $1 a day Below $1 a day
 Total Total
 Household dependency Female-headed Household dependency Female-headed
Countries size ratio household size ratio household 
 (number) (percent) (percent) (number) (percent) (percent)
Sub-Saharan	Africa     
Burundi 4.4 105.1 22.1 5.5 148.4 30.4
   Rural 4.4 107.7 22.5 5.5 148.4 30.3
   Urban 4.7 77.3 18.0 6.2 142.4 35.9
Ghana 3.9 91.3 32.3 6.0 150.1 31.2
   Rural 4.1 101.4 30.7 6.1 153.5 28.5
   Urban 3.5 75.1 35.1 5.7 140.3 39.0
Malawi 4.1 90.5 23.9 5.2 135.1 28.6
   Rural 4.1 94.3 24.6 5.2 142.5 31.0
   Urban 3.8 55.9 17.3 4.9 93.4 15.2
Rwanda 4.5 86.0 27.4 5.2 126.0 34.1
   Rural 4.3 88.5 28.5 5.2 125.8 33.9
   Urban 5.0 76.8 23.3 5.8 131.4 38.1
Mozambique 4.1 85.7 23.3 5.8 138.9 19.3
   Rural 3.9 85.2 23.9 5.8 137.9 18.2
   Urban 5.1 87.9 20.9 6 143.4 24.2
Zambia 4.0 73.3 23.0 5.6 122.1 24.7
   Rural 3.7 79.1 26.1 5.4 125.4 26.4
   Urban 4.3 66.4 19.1 6.4 112.4 19.3
South	Asia       
Bangladesh 6.2 83.2 6.5 6.1 122.5 6.0
   Rural 6.3 87.9 6.0 6.0 124.6 5.7
   Urban 5.9 68.8 7.8 6.2 110.2 7.4
India 4.5 66.9 10.2 5.8 111.0 9.1
   Rural 4.7 72.4 10.5 5.8 113.7 8.9
   Urban 4.1 53.9 9.4 5.8 101.1 9.9
Pakistan 6.6 115.9 8.4 8.9 180.4 4.6
   Rural 6.6 123.7 8.8 8.8 185.4 4.0
   Urban 6.5 96.9 7.5 9.3 162.9 7.0
Sri Lanka 4.4 61.8 17.1 5.5 79.9 22.1
   Rural 4.4 61.9 16.3 5.4 81.2 21.6
   Urban 4.6 60.8 22.2 6.5 67.2 27.6
East	Asia       
Vietnam 5.2 82.4 21.8 6.3 113.0 21.1
   Rural 5.2 87.2 17.2 6.4 125.3 15.9
   Urban 4.8 64.2 39.2 6.0 79.3 35.2
Central	Asia       
Tajikistan 5.9 106.8 19.6 7.3 134.5 18.2
   Rural 6.6 111.2 14.1 7.8 142.2 13.8
   Urban 4.7 98.1 30.1 6.4 117.0 28.0
Latin	America       
Guatemala 5.1 111.1 6.2 7.5 175.4 1.1
   Rural 5.5 123.6 4.9 7.5 176.5 1.2
   Urban 4.6 95.6 7.9 7.5 162.3 0.0
Nicaragua 4.3 70.7 32.0 6.2 117.8 24.9
   Rural 4.2 76.6 21.7 6.3 122.1 17.8
   Urban 4.3 69.0 35.1 6.1 113.3 32.3
Peru 5.1 87.2 17.9 7.1 152.2 11.6
   Rural 5.1 105.6 11.5 6.9 161.2 9.0
   Urban 5.1 80.9 20.2 7.7 132.5 17.3
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TABLE  A4. 4    Adult Education (population age 18 and over):  Above and Below $1 a Day (percent)
 Less than $1 a day $1 a day and above
 Completed primary Completed primary
 education No schooling education No schooling 
Countries Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
Sub-Saharan	Africa       
Burundi 23.5 17.3 59.4 77.6 42.6 37.2 46.7 62.7
   Rural 23.0 16.7 59.8 77.9 34.4 29.2 51.4 67.1
   Urban 47.0 34.2 35.7 58.6 84.2 81.4 8.6 16.8
Ghana 52.9 29.1 38.8 60.8 75.5 51.4 17.7 38.2
   Rural 48.1 24.3 43.2 65.9 70.5 41.5 21.1 45.8
   Urban 67.1 42.6 25.5 46.7 84.0 68.3 12.0 25.1
Malawi 50.4 27.9 26.9 49.3 60.2 38.4 17.3 39.0
   Rural 44.0 22.5 31.2 54.2 56.4 33.7 19.0 41.9
   Urban 79.8 60.4 4.9 16.0 92.0 87.5 2.1 4.1
Rwanda 27.1 23.5 31.2 43.4 53.7 45.1 15.9 28.5
   Rural 26.0 22.4 31.7 44.3 45.6 37.6 19.1 33.8
   Urban 47.9 44.4 20.4 28.4 78.1 69.8 6.2 10.9
Mozambique 10.2 2.8 32.2 22.6 19.4 8.7 27.4 24.9
   Rural 6.4 1.3 34.1 21.6 9.2 2.7 32.7 25.3
   Urban 24.5 9.4 25.2 26.7 44.3 26.0 14.4 23.8
Zambia 51.4 35.5 10.6 25.2 67.2 55.0 5.3 16.1
   Rural 42.6 26.1 13.9 31.1 52.9 34.7 9.0 27.1
   Urban 69.7 57.9 3.7 11.1 79.8 75.3 2.0 5.2
South	Asia       
Bangladesh 28.8 15.9 66.5 81.0 63.9 46.8 31.6 48.9
   Rural 27.8 14.9 67.8 82.3 58.3 41.5 36.8 54.5
   Urban 33.7 21.1 60.1 74.2 80.7 62.5 16.2 32.4
India 37.0 15.6 48.5 76.6 62.8 39.7 25.4 50.8
   Rural 32.6 11.5 53.2 81.7 54.2 29.1 32.1 61.0
   Urban 52.1 30.2 32.4 58.8 83.1 67.0 9.5 24.5
Pakistan 24.8 5.6 64.4 92.5 48.3 21.7 38.2 73.3
   Rural 20.8 2.3 69.9 96.6 41.4 12.4 45.5 84.1
   Urban 38.1 16.9 46.5 78.6 63.0 43.8 22.7 47.7
Sri Lanka 81.8 74.7 12.3 17.8 88.3 87.0 4.5 9.5
   Rural 80.7 74.2 12.6 17.8 87.3 86.4 4.9 10.2
   Urban 91.7 78.4 8.7 17.5 94.0 90.4 2.4 4.8
East	Asia       
Vietnam 61.5 50.2 10.5 23.0 72.1 56.0 4.2 14.7
   Rural 56.5 43.7 12.9 28.1 81.6 70.1 4.9 16.4
   Urban 73.6 64.6 4.8 11.1 74.2 59.2 2.2 9.1
Central	Asia       
Tajikistan 95.2 92.8 4.3 6.3 97.4 94.0 1.7 4.7
   Rural 95.4 92.1 4.0 7.4 97.4 93.5 1.7 5.2
   Urban 94.8 94.5 5.2 3.7 97.5 95.2 1.8 3.5
Latin	America       
Guatemala 46.1 25.8 49.3 72.5 68.5 55.2 26.5 41.0
   Rural 45.5 25.6 49.3 72.3 58.6 40.7 36.9 56.0
   Urban 54.6 29.8 49.7 74.7 81.5 72.2 12.7 23.5
Nicaragua 66.9 64.6 31.6 34.5 89.6 88.3 9.1 10.3
   Rural 55.7 55.1 41.9 43.6 79.0 77.4 18.8 21.5
   Urban 79.3 73.6 20.1 26.0 93.1 91.1 5.9 7.4
Peru 84.3 65.2 1.9 3.1 93.0 84.9 0.7 1.4
   Rural 80.9 57.6 2.2 3.3 88.3 71.5 1.4 3.0
   Urban 90.1 75.6 1.3 2.7 94.5 88.4 0.4 1.0
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TABLE  A4. 6    Net Primary School Enrollment (percentage of children ages 6-11 attending   
 school):  Above and Below $1 a Day
 Less than $1 a day $1 a day and above 
Countries Boys Girls All  Boys Girls All
Sub-Saharan	Africa       
Burundi 42.7 33.4 38.2  59.2 55.3 57.2
   Rural 42.6 33.1 37.9  57.0 52.8 54.9
   Urban 55.3 59.3 57.3  87.2 84.6 85.8
Ghana 77.4 73.9 75.7  90.8 88.1 89.5
   Rural 73.5 70.2 72.0  88.8 86.7 87.8
   Urban 89.4 84.2 86.9  94.9 91.0 92.9
Malawi 77.0 75.9 76.5  80.1 81.2 80.6
   Rural 76.3 75.2 75.7  78.7 80.8 79.8
   Urban 82.1 81.1 81.6  94.7 85.6 90.0
Rwanda 71.8 72.5 72.1  82.8 83.1 83.0
   Rural 71.6 71.8 71.7  80.2 81.4 80.8
   Urban 74.6 83.5 79.6  92.4 89.5 91.0
Zambia 51.4 53.4 52.4  63.6 68.3 65.9
   Rural 46.3 47.7 47.0  52.1 58.6 55.2
   Urban 63.3 66.5 64.9  75.6 76.6 76.1
South	Asia       
Bangladesh 67.5 70.8 69.1  82.5 85.2 83.8
   Rural 68.7 71.0 69.9  81.4 85.3 83.3
   Urban 60.4 69.7 64.9  86.5 85.1 85.8
India 65.8 58.3 62.2  83.9 78.4 81.3
   Rural 64.0 55.1 59.8  81.4 74.6 78.3
   Urban 72.9 70.5 71.7  91.8 90.8 91.3
Pakistan 41.7 28.6 35.3  71.3 55.8 63.8
   Rural 37.8 20.9 29.6  67.7 47.7 58.1
   Urban 56.4 55.7 56.1  81.8 77.9 79.9
Sri Lanka 90.7 93.5 92.4  97.3 97.6 97.4
   Rural 91.7 93.4 92.8  97.3 97.5 97.4
   Urban 84.8 94.6 89.8  97.0 98.5 97.7
East	Asia       
Vietnam 88.7 87.0 87.8  96.7 95.7 96.2
   Rural 87.4 85.7 86.5  97.0 95.2 96.1
   Urban 94.0 93.1 93.6  94.7 99.4 97.0
Central	Asia       
Tajikistan 68.1 70.4 69.3  76.4 73.8 75.2
   Rural 67.8 68.5 68.2  75.8 74.0 75.0
   Urban 69.0 76.5 72.8  78.2 73.4 75.8
Latin	America       
Guatemala 50.4 39.6 44.8  70.3 64.9 67.6
   Rural 53.8 40.7 46.8  66.6 61.5 64.1
   Urban 20.3 22.0 21.0  77.1 71.3 74.3
Nicaragua 77.8 78.6 78.2  91.8 92.1 91.9
   Rural 72.2 74.1 73.1  88.1 91.6 90.0
   Urban 84.6 84.3 84.4  93.0 92.3 92.7
Peru 90.0 88.8 89.4  96.1 94.6 95.4
   Rural 86.9 88.0 87.5  93.5 93.4 93.4
   Urban 95.4 90.9 93.5  97.1 95.2 96.2
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TABLE  A4. 7    Net Primary School Enrollment (percentage of children ages 6-11 attending   
 school): Subjacent, Medial, and Ultra Poverty
 Subjacent poor Medial poor Ultra poor 
Countries Boys Girls All Boys Girls All Boys Girls All
Sub-Saharan	Africa       
Burundi 47.19 35.39 41.71 45.78 36.55 41.1 36.5 29.3 32.9
   Rural 46.86 34.73 41.24 45.62 36.28 40.89 36.5 29.1 32.7
   Urban 66.58 66.16 66.36 60.65 58.08 59.26 39.4 51.6 45.1
Ghana 82.0 75.1 78.6 80.4 75.0 78.0 58.8 67.2 62.4
   Rural 79.1 72.2 75.8 76.2 71.1 73.9 56.2 63.1 59.2
   Urban 89.4 82.2 85.7 93.6 85.6 89.9 73.5 90.9 81.0
Malawi 75.8 74.9 75.3 78.7 76.5 77.6 76.7 77.5 77.1
   Rural 75.3 74.7 75.0 78.2 75.5 76.8 74.8 75.8 75.3
   Urban 80.7 76.0 77.9 81.9 82.3 82.1 83.3 88.2 85.1
Rwanda 77.2 80.0 78.8 75.6 74.9 75.3 67.5 67.8 67.7
   Rural 76.3 79.0 77.8 75.6 74.3 75.0 67.6 67.5 67.5
   Urban 86.3 91.8 89.4 75.5 83.4 80.5 65.3 75.6 70.4
Zambia 61.3 62.8 62.1 56.4 54.6 55.5 46.2 49.7 47.9
   Rural 56.8 55.0 55.8 50.5 49.0 49.8 42.4 45.4 43.9
   Urban 66.7 73.5 70.2 67.0 64.2 65.6 58.6 64.1 61.3
South	Asia       
Bangladesh 73.0 76.3 74.6 64.5 68.5 66.4 57.4 59.8 58.7
   Rural 73.2 76.5 74.7 66.5 69.0 67.7 58.6 58.3 58.4
   Urban 71.6 75.5 73.5 53.3 65.4 58.9 51.9 66.9 59.7
India 70.9 63.9 67.6 60.9 52.6 56.9 51.2 43.1 47.5
   Rural 68.8 60.7 64.9 59.2 49.0 54.4 49.0 40.9 45.2
   Urban 80.3 78.5 79.5 67.3 65.3 66.3 56.5 48.8 53.1
East	Asia       
Vietnam 92.9 89.7 91.4 83.4 85.8 84.6 64.5 67.8 66.3
   Rural 92.3 89.1 90.8 81.1 84.0 82.6 36.8 52.0 46.1
   Urban 96.4 93.4 95.0 91.0 92.0 91.5 92.9 96.0 94.4
Latin	America       
Nicaragua 88.4 85.4 86.9 82.4 86.0 84.2 71.3 72.3 71.9
   Rural 81.3 80.8 81.1 79.8 84.6 82.2 66.3 68.9 67.7
   Urban 94.1 87.9 90.8 84.7 87.2 86.0 79.8 79.4 79.6
TABLE  A4.8    Land Ownership in Rural Areas:  Above and Below $1 a Day
 Less than $1 a day $1 a day and above
  Own less than Average size  Own less than Average size
Countries Own no land 0.5 hectare of land in area Own no land 0.5 hectare of land in area
 (percent) (percent) (100m2) (percent) (percent) (100m2)
Sub-Saharan	Africa	       
    Ghana 67.0 74.2 141.9 63.3 74.0 304.9
    Malawi 12.6 41.4 73.1 15.0 36.1 88.4
    Rwanda 3.3 62.0 57.5 3.7 44.8 92.1
    Mozambique 3.7 4.1 220.0 5.3 6.9 180.3
    Zambia 10.0 10.0 1302.8 19.1 19.1 1420.1
South	Asia       
    Bangladesh 57.6 85.1 23.8 35.8 62.0 90.0
    Pakistan 76.9 87.8 27.9 64.2 76.5 112.2
East	Asia       
    Vietnam 30.7 87.7 25.9 27.1 84.3 32.8
Latin	America       
    Guatemala 39.7 53.2 258.8 48.8 59.6 247.0
    Nicaragua 53.6 91.9 63.9 69.9 92.2 109.5
    Peru 7.1 26.4 220.4 9.4 25.0 578.8
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TABLE  A4. 9    Land Ownership Status in Rural Areas: Subjacent, Medial, and Ultra Poverty
 Subjacent poor Medial poor Ultra poor 
  Own less   Own less   Own less
  than 0.5 Average  than 0.5 Average  than 0.5 Average
 Own no hectare size of Own no hectare size of Own no hectare size of
 cultivable cultivable land cultivable cultivable land cultivable cultivable land
Countries land land in area land land in area land land in area
 (percent) (percent) (100m2) (percent) (percent) (100m2) (percent) (percent) (100m2) 
Sub-Saharan	Africa       
    Ghana 68.6 76.5 126.8 68.0 76.3 183.0 60.4 62.8 92.3
    Malawi 13.5 37.8 78.8 12.1 42.1 69.8 10.9 50.9 62.4
    Rwanda 3.3 53.3 72.7 2.6 59.4 58.7 3.9 68.4 48.9
    Mozambique 3.5 4.3 214.0 3.6 3.8 220.0 3.9 3.9 226.4
    Zambia 16.0 16.0 1334.2 10.5 10.5 1356.7 7.9 7.9 1264.5
South	Asia       
    Bangladesh 51.1 80.5 30.8 61.1 88.2 19.5 74.9 94.4 8.3
East	Asia       
    Vietnam 28.5 86.2 28.0 32.8 89.8 23.1 57.9 100.0 9.2
Latin	America       
    Nicaragua 61.2 11.6 91.4 56.9 14.7 93.1 48.9 46.1 91.4
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TABLE  A4. 10    Access to Electricity, and Ownership of Radio and Television:   
 Above and Below $1 a Day
 Less than $1 a day $1 a day and above 
Percentage with:   Electricity Radio Television  Electricity Radio Television
Sub-Saharan	Africa       
Ghana 17.1 38.7 6.8  46.8 53.2 25.1
   Rural 6.7 36.9 2.7  24.0 48.2 14.9
   Urban 47.2 43.7 18.7  84.2 61.3 41.7
Malawi 2.5 4.9 0.1  6.6 7.2 2.0
   Rural 0.2 4.5 0.1  1.5 6.7 0.5
   Urban 15.8 7.1 0.0  55.7 12.3 16.9
Rwanda 1.3 25.8 0.1  12.8 57.5 4.7
   Rural 0.5 24.3 0.0  1.9 51.2 0.9
   Urban 16.7 57.2 1.3  53.5 81.3 18.9
Zambia 8.6 38.0 9.6  27.3 55.7 27.9
   Rural 0.9 29.8 1.7  4.9 40.1 7.4
   Urban 31.6 63.0 33.6  55.9 75.7 54.1
Mozambique 1.2 21.5 1.7  6.9 34.6 7.5
   Rural 0.3 18.8 1.4  1.1 27.0 2.9
   Urban 5.3 33.6 3.1  3.1 66.5 27.1
South	Asia       
Bangladesh 15.4 9.7 4.0  48.3 17.6 29.7
   Rural 7.8 9.5 1.4  33.3 20.2 16.0
   Urban 58.5 10.6 18.9  94.3 9.7 71.8
India 40.3 22.1 11.9  67.7 35.9 37.9
   Rural 31.4 20.8 5.6  56.5 35.1 25.2
   Urban 72.1 26.8 34.4  94.2 37.9 67.9
Pakistan 51.3 15.0 12.0  72.8 41.6 39.0
   Rural 43.0 13.4 5.6  64.2 37.6 26.7
   Urban 80.9 20.6 34.3  93.7 51.1 68.9
Sri Lanka 30.6 55.0 20.2  61.8 78.0 56.1
   Rural 29.5 54.7 17.7  58.1 77.1 52.9
   Urban 42.3 57.4 44.7  86.1 83.9 76.8
East	Asia       
Vietnam 66.0 36.5 43.7  80.8 48.2 64.4
   Rural 54.7 34.5 33.4  76.1 46.5 58.2
   Urban 96.8 41.7 70.8  98.9 54.6 88.0
Central	Asia       
Tajikistan 98.2 ... 60.4  98.7 ... 77.8
   Rural 98.0 ... 53.5  98.5 ... 72.6
   Urban 98.7 ... 75.7  99.0 ... 87.6
Latin	America       
Guatemala 31.9 29.1 3.9  74.4 25.4 55.4
   Rural 30.5 30.5 2.6  58.6 28.5 35.2
   Urban 47.8 13.9 19.2  94.0 21.5 80.6
Nicaragua 56.9 42.6 42.5  91.3 28.2 79.7
   Rural 31.2 54.2 21.9  68.1 38.4 54.5
   Urban 83.7 30.6 64.1  98.3 25.1 87.2
Peru 29.1 96.4 29.8  77.6 93.3 80.5
   Rural 11.9 99.6 13.5  27.5 96.4 44.9
   Urban 66.5 90.9 57.5  95.0 92.4 91.3
...  means no data.
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TABLE  A4. 11    Access to Electricity, and Ownership of Radio and Television: Subjacent, Medial,  
 and Ultra Poverty
 Subjacent poor Medial poor Ultra poor 
Percentage with: Radio Television Electricity Radio Television Electricity Radio Television Electricity
Sub-Saharan	Africa       
Ghana 41.9 11.3 22.4 37.8 3.6 14.5 30.6 0.8 6.9
   Rural 37.4 4.7 8.7 38.3 1.1 6.0 32.5 0.7 2.5
   Urban 54.3 29.4 59.8 36.7 10.3 37.8 22.6 0.9 24.6
Malawi 6.4 0.2 2.9 3.5 0.0 2.3 3.4 0.0 1.6
   Rural 6.6 0.2 0.0 2.6 0.0 0.5 2.1 0.0 0.0
   Urban 5.2 0.0 25.2 8.1 0.0 11.3 8.3 0.0 8.0
Mozambique 24.0 1.8 1.8 21.4 1.7 0.8 17.6 1.2 0.8
   Rural 20.3 1.3 0.7 19.0 1.6 0.1 16.0 1.0 0.0
   Urban 43.8 4.8 8.0 34.5 2.6 4.5 22.5 1.9 3.4
Rwanda 37.6 0.1 2.6 28.8 0.1 0.8 17.3 0.0 0.9
   Rural 35.3 0.0 0.9 27.2 0.0 0.3 16.4 0.0 0.5
   Urban 70.0 1.1 26.8 61.9 2.9 12.1 40.3 0.0 11.6
Zambia 51.0 18.3 16.3 41.6 12.3 10.9 30.8 4.6 4.1
   Rural 39.8 3.8 1.6 32.5 1.9 1.2 25.2 0.9 0.6
   Urban 71.2 44.6 43.1 64.7 38.6 35.4 55.2 20.6 19.5
South	Asia       
Bangladesh 11.9 5.9 20.6 9.0 2.8 11.8 1.7 0.4 5.7
   Rural 11.7 1.9 11.8 8.8 1.1 4.8 1.6 0.0 1.1
   Urban 12.8 28.3 70.8 10.4 13.0 53.6 2.4 1.9 26.2
India 25.5 14.0 43.1 18.1 9.3 36.4 9.7 4.6 33.2
   Rural 24.1 6.9 34.1 16.4 3.7 27.0 8.8 2.1 27.5
   Urban 30.8 41.6 78.2 23.4 27.9 67.4 12.0 10.9 47.8
East	Asia       
Vietnam 38.1 48.0 68.8 32.0 34.1 60.7 27.7 26.8 60.7
   Rural 36.6 38.7 59.4 28.0 20.3 46.6 22.5 14.9 30.1
   Urban 42.6 76.0 97.1 42.5 69.5 97.1 32.8 38.4 93.0
Latin	America       
Nicaragua 30.3 63.3 81.2 40.5 49.4 65.7 52.1 24.0 34.4
   Rural 42.6 38.8 55.7 57.1 29.3 40.2 56.7 11.3 16.9
   Urban 23.0 78.0 96.5 26.4 66.5 87.4 44.0 46.3 65.3
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TABLE  A4. 12    Characteristics of Indigenous Groups in Peru among Subjacent, Medial, and  
 Ultra Poor
 Subjacent Medial Ultra
Indigenous population, national=25.2% poor poor poor
Indigenous population (%) by poverty groups 47.9 64.8 85.3
Net primary school enrollment rate for boys (6–11 years) (%)   
Spanish language mother tongue  91.5 80.5 84.0
Indigenous 100.0 87.3 83.6
Total 93.4 83.5 83.6
Net primary school enrollment rate for girls (6–11 years) (%)   
Spanish language mother tongue  87.3 89.5 82.1
Indigenous 86.3 100.0 88.6
Total 86.7 93.1 86.8
Net primary school enrollment rate for all children (6–11 years) (%)   
Spanish language mother tongue  89.5 84.8 82.8
Indigenous 93.1 92.0 85.8
Total 90.1 87.7 85.2
Adult male (>=18 years) completed primary education (%)   
Spanish language mother tongue  85.1 92.6 76.5
Indigenous 83.2 83.4 73.8
Total 84.4 88.2 74.5
Adult female (>=18 years) completed primary education (%)   
Spanish language mother tongue  73.4 75.4 54.8
Indigenous 53.1 63.1 49.3
Total 66.6 68.5 50.5
No schooling adult male (>=18 years) (%)   
Spanish language mother tongue  1.2 1.2 5.8
Indigenous 1.3 2.9 3.3
Total 1.2 2.0 4.0
No schooling adult female (>=18 years) (%)   
Spanish language mother tongue  4.0 2.3 7.2
Indigenous 3.7 3.0 2.5
Total 3.9 2.7 3.4
Household size by ethnicity   
Spanish language mother tongue  7.7 7.4 6.3
Indigenous 6.4 7.1 7.4
Total 7.1 7.2 7.2
Total dependency ratio (%)   
Spanish language mother tongue  142.1 178.4 147.1
Indigenous 135.2 155.0 185.9
Total 138.9 163.3 180.2
Electricity (%)   
Spanish language mother tongue  34.9 42.6 21.2
Indigenous 34.1 18.5 11.2
Total 34.5 27.0 12.7
––––
NOTES: The ethnic groups are based on maternal language. The indigenous consist mainly of  Quechua and Aymara 
tribal language speakers. Household-level analysis is based on the maternal language of  the head.
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TABLE  A4. 13    Characteristics of Indigenous Groups in Guatemala among Subjacent, Medial,  
  and Ultra Poor
 Subjacent Medial Ultra
Indigenous population, national=38.9% poor poor poor
Indigenous population (%) by poverty group 74.7 73.9 77.5 
Net primary school enrollment rate for boys (6–11 years) (%)   
Spanish language mother tongue  65.3 93.1 0.0
Indigenous 59.8 57.8 56.7
Total 61.7 74.4 45.3
Net primary school enrollment rate for girls (6–11 years) (%)   
Spanish language mother tongue  47.7 76.2 0.0
Indigenous 47.3 55.6 100.0
Total 47.4 61.3 100.0
Net primary school enrollment rate for all children (6–11 years) (%)   
Spanish language mother tongue  56.8 88 0.0
Indigenous 52.5 56.7 77.5
Total 53.8 68.8 68.6
Adult male (>=18 years) completed primary education (%)   
Spanish language mother tongue  56.2 31.0 19.8
Indigenous 43.8 45.7 30.2
Total 47.1 40.4 28.9
Adult female (>=18 years) completed primary education (%)   
Spanish language mother tongue  49.2 47.2 55.7
Indigenous 18.3 17.7 12.1
Total 28.1 27.1 17.6
No schooling adult male (>=18 years) (%)   
Spanish language mother tongue  43.8 59.6 80.2
Indigenous 48.8 54.3 69.8
Total 47.5 56.2 71.1
No schooling adult female (>=18 years) (%)   
Spanish language mother tongue  50.8 52.8 44.3
Indigenous 80.2 76.9 73.1
Total 70.9 69.2 69.5
Household size by ethnicity   
Spanish language mother tongue  8.2 8.0 5.0
Indigenous 7.4 6.7 8.5
Total 7.6 7.1 7.7
Total dependency ratio (%)   
Spanish language mother tongue  153.8 233.2 124.1
Indigenous 169.4 195.8 188.4
Total 165.4 205.7 174.0
Electricity (%)   
Spanish language mother tongue  41.7 43.9 56.9
Indigenous 31.5 24.1 0.0
Total 34.1 29.2 12.8
––––
NOTES: The ethnic groups are based on reported ethnicity and maternal language. The indigenous consist mainly 
of  the Mayan and non-Mayan (Garifuna and Xinka) ethnic groups. Household-level analysis is based on ethnicity 
and maternal language of  the head. 
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1 The developing world consists of  six regions: East 
Asia and the Pacific, South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, 
Latin America and the Caribbean, Europe (eastern) 
and Central Asia, and the Middle East and North 
Africa (in decreasing order by total population).
2 We have adopted the World Bank’s definition of  
the extreme poor people of  the world as those who 
live on less than one international dollar per day 
($1.08 to be more precise) per person, measured at 
the 1993 purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange 
rates for consumption. See Appendix 1 for details on 
the method of  deriving the PPP exchange rates. 
3 Although the poverty gap ratio and the distribu-
tion-sensitive squared poverty gap ratio could be 
used to measure the depth and the severity of  pov-
erty, respectively, we used the head count measure 
of  poverty because its interpretation is straightfor-
ward.
4 To be more precise, subjacent poverty is defined 
as the proportion of  the population living on 
between $0.81 and $1.08 a day; medial poverty as 
between $0.54 and $0.81 a day; and ultra poverty as 
below $0.54 a day. All are measured at the 1993 PPP 
exchange rates.
5 “Africa makes a fool of  our idea of  justice. It makes 
a farce of  our idea of  equality. It mocks our pieties; 
it doubts our concern; and questions our commit-
ment.” Bono.
6 Poverty traps have been found to be present in 
Madagascar (Barrett et al. 2006), Kenya (Barrett 
et al. 2006), South Africa (Adato, Carter, and May 
2006), and Cote d’Ivoire (Barrett, Bezuneh, and 
Aboud 2001), but have not been found to be present 
in Russia (Loshkin and Ravallion 2004), China ( Jalan 
and Ravallion 2004), and Mexico (Antman and McK-
enzie 2005), although the researchers did find con-
siderable persistence of  poverty over time.
7 Household data were not available for China so 
it was not included in the countries considered in 
Chapter 3. However, Vietnam was included, as were 
Laos and Timor-Leste.
8 India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka are con-
sidered in Chapter 3.
9 A lack of  access to household data prohibits us 
from examining Nigeria in Chapter 3, but a number 
of  other significant Sub-Saharan African countries 
are included (such as Zambia and Mozambique).
10 Peru, Nicaragua, and Guatemala are considered 
in the country-level analysis conducted in Chapters 
3 and 4.  
11 Spearman rank correlation = 0.79, p-value=0.000, 
sample size is 89 countries. Interestingly, the rank 
correlations of  the GHI with all four international 
poverty measures (poverty headcount ratio at $1 
and $2 a day, poverty gap at $1 and $2 a day) exceed 
the rank correlations of  these poverty indicators 
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with any of  the index components (see Wiesmann 
2006).
12 A more detailed explanation of  the hunger indi-
cators, including measurement reliability issues, 
can be found in Smith, Alderman, and Aduayom 
(2006).
13 Poverty estimates for Ethiopia were not included 
because they were deemed to be unrealistically low. 
Those for Laos were not included because expendi-
tures data are not available for this analysis.
14 Calorie consumption could not be estimated for 
Vietnam and Peru because data on quantities of  food 
consumed were not available in the household sur-
vey datasets for these countries.
15 The reader should keep in mind that although it 
is true that rural dwellers are more physically active 
than urban dwellers and thus will tend to have a 
higher actual energy requirement, this study uses 
the requirement for light activity to distinguish the 
hungry from those who are not hungry, a minimum 
normative requirement below which a person is 
defined to be food-energy deficient regardless of  
his or her actual activity level.
16 It is worth noting that the strongest deviation 
from 100 percent overlap is for Nicaragua, where 
only 57 percent of  poor people are hungry, and this 
is most likely due to overestimation of  poverty rates 
as a result of  an overly high PPP. 
17 Only hunger data were calculated for Laos and 
Ethiopia, and data on key characteristics were not 
available for Kenya, Senegal, and Timor-Leste.
18 Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Peru, and Guate-
mala were omitted because the number of  observa-
tions in ultra poverty was too small for analysis.
19 UNAIDS/UNICEF/USAID 2002.
20 The net enrollment rate (NER) is the ratio of  
enrollment by children of  the official targeted age 
(we used ages 6-11 for the five-year primary school 
cycle) in a given level of  schooling (such as primary) 
to the total number of  children of  the official tar-
geted age. The NER excludes under-age and over-age 
children. As age of  children was not included in the 
Mozambique dataset, it could not be included in this 
analysis.
21 Household survey data on the ownership of  cul-
tivable land were available for only 12 countries.
22 No electricity data were available for Burundi, 
which is why it is missing in the tables and figures 
for electricity.
23 UNFPA 2004, p. 48.
24 Recently, some cross-country regression analy-
ses suggest that the world income distribution is 
developing in a way that is consistent with poorer 
countries remaining poor and middle-income and 
rich countries becoming richer (Azariadis and Sta-
churski 2005, for example). However, others pro-
vide evidence that is more in line with convergence 
(Kraay and Raddatz 2007). From the current analy-
sis, it appears that the jury is still out on whether 
poverty begets poverty on a national level.
25 Azariadis and Stachurski 2005. 
26 Sen 2000.
27 Rodrik 2003.
28 Ravallion 2001, Fields 2001, Dollar and Kraay 
2002, Kraay 2006.
29 World Bank 2000b, Ravallion and Chen 1997.
30 Also see Besley and Cord 2007; Grimm, Klasen, 
and McKay 2007.
31 Besley and Burgess 2003.
32 Ravallion, Chen, and Sangraula 2007.
33 Collier 2007.
34 Messer, Cohen, and Marchione 2001.
35 World Bank 2002c.
36 Blattman and Lundberg 2007, World Bank 
2002c.
37 Baquet and van Herp 2000.
38 Bucagu 2000, UNDP 1999.
39 Messer, Cohen, and Marchione 2001.
40 World Bank 1998a, p. 13.
41 World Bank 2002c.
42 Rwelamira and Kleynhans 1996.
43 Green 1994, Criel 1998.
77 Bouis et al. 1998.
78 Hoddinott and Kinsey 2001.
79 Behrman, Gaviria, and Szekely 2001.
80 World Bank 2002a.
81 World Bank 2003a.
82 Barrett et al. 2006, p. 259.
83 Mango et al. 2004 and Randrianjatovo 2004, 
cited in Barrett et al. 2006.
84 Krishna 2004.
85 Kabeer 2002.
86 World Bank 2004, p. 37.
87 World Bank 2003b.
88 World Bank 2004.
89 Hoogeveen 2005.
90 Gomart 2003.
91 World Bank 1996b.
92 World Bank 2003a.
93 HelpAge International 2002, p. 3.
94 Ainsworth and Filmer 2002.
95 Ghana National Commission on Children 
1997.
96 There is a large literature on the relationship 
between height and earnings, height and cognitive 
development, and height and progress through 
schooling. Hoddinott and Kinsey (2001) review 
this literature.
97 Becker and Tomes 1986.
98 Quisumbing 2006a (many of  the following 
examples are drawn from the literature review in 
this paper).
99 TANGO International 2003b, World Bank 
2002a.
100 World Bank 2003b.
101 King and Lillard 1987, Deolalikar 1993, King 
and Bellew 1991, Behrman and Knowles 1999.
102 Neri et al. 2000, Jacoby and Skoufias 1997, 
Behrman, Gaviria, and Szekely 2001. 
44 UNDP 1999.
45 Collier 2007, Messer and Cohen 2006.
46 Collier 2007.
47 Ravallion, Chen, and Sangraula 2007.
48 World Bank 2005a.
49 World Bank 1995a.
50  Sachs 2001.
51 Baker 2004.
52 UNDP 2001.
53 World Bank 2005c.
54 World Bank 1995c.
55 TANGO International 2003a.
56 Alwang et al. 2005. 
57 Jalan and Ravallion 2002.
58 Kabeer 2005.
59 World Bank 2003b.
60 Figueroa and Barron 2005.
61 Hill and Christiaensen 2006.
62 World Bank 2003c.
63 World Bank 2002b.
64 Khandker, Balcht, and Koolwal 2006.
65 World Bank 1994.
66 World Bank 1996a.
67 Redding and Venables 2004.
68 Robinson 1999.
69 Barrett et al. 2006.
70 World Bank 2005a. 
71Alderman 1996, Jalan and Ravallion 1999, 
Dercon and Krishnan 2000.
72 Narayan-Parker et al. 2000.
73 Jalan and Ravallion 1999.
74 Dercon 2004.
75 World Bank 2005a. 
76 World Bank 2003a. 
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103 Patrinos and Psacharapolous 1992.
104 Banerjee et al. 2005.
105 Quisumbing 2006b. 
106 Fafchamps and Quisumbing 2005.
107 Subbarao and Coury 2004.
108 Siaens, Subbarao, and Wodon 2003.
109 Case, Paxson, and Ableidinger 2002.
110 Beegle, De Weerdt, and Dercon 2006. 
111 Subbarao and Coury 2004.
112 Ntozi et al. 1999, Ramphele 2001.
113 Harper, Marcus, and Moore 2003, p. 545. 
114 Banerjee and Duflo, forthcoming.
115 World Bank 2005c.
116 World Bank 2004.
117 Baulch and McCulloch 1998, Wodon 1999.
118 Gang, Sen, and Yun 2006.
119 World Bank 2003b.
120 Lanjouw, 2007.
121 World Bank 2002a.
122 World Bank 1996a.
123 Gomart 2003. 
124 Quisumbing, Estudillo, and Otsuka 2004.
125 Bardhan and Udry 1999.
126 Banerjee and Duflo, forthcoming.
127 World Bank 1995c, p. 8.
128 World Bank 1995a.
129 World Bank 2005a, 2003a.
130 Banerjee and Duflo. forthcoming.
131 Carter and Barrett 2006.
132 World Bank 2005a.
133 Lybbert et al. 2004.
134 Adato, Carter, and May 2006.
135 Azariadis and Stachurski 2005.
136 Dercon 1996.
137 Morduch 1995, Rosenzweig and Binswanger 
1993, Fafchamps and Pender 1999.
138 Barrett et al. 2006.
139 Dercon 2002.
140 Hoddinott 2006.
141 Carter et al. 2007.
142 Bardhan and Udry 1999.
143 Barrett and Foster 2007, p. 254.
144 de Weerdt 2004.
145 Rao and Ibanez 2003.
146 Besley, Pande, and Rao 2005.
147 Agarwal 1994.
148 World Bank 1996a.
149 World Bank 2005c.
150 World Bank 1995a.
151 World Bank 2004.
152 World Bank 1996a.
153 Mahbub ul Haq Human Development Center 
2000.
154 World Bank 2002a.
155 Haddad et al. 1996.
156 Kakwani and Subbarao 2005.
157 World Bank 2005c.
158 Shepherd 2007, p. 19.
159 Kabeer 2005.
160 World Bank 2006b.
161 World Bank 2004.
162 Hall and Patrinos 2005.
163 Hall and Patrinos 2005.
164 Borooah 2005.
165 World Bank 2003b.
166 Sainath 2000. 
167 Durlauf  2006.
120   NOTES
168 Conley and Udry 2003.
169 Hoff  and Pandey 2004.
170 World Bank 2005a.
171  It calculates two alternative specifications of  
the Lorenz curve—the General Quadratic (Villase-
nor and Arnold) and the Beta model (Kakwani) and 
gives the specification that is best for the data.
172 In fact, the FAO measure currently captures a 
narrow aspect of  food security as defined by heads 
of  state and other high-level representatives of  the 
international community at the World Food Summit 
in 1996: “Food security exists when all people, at 
all times, have physical and economic access to 
sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their 
dietary needs and food preferences for an active and 
healthy life” (FAO 1996b, Paragraph 1).  
173 Eradicating extreme poverty and hunger and 
reducing child mortality are part of  the Millennium 
Development Goals. As specific targets, these goals 
include halving the proportion of  people who suffer 
from hunger and the proportion of  people living 
below $1 a day between 1990 and 2015, and reducing 
the under-five mortality rate by two-thirds in the 
same period (United Nations 2001).
174 The PPP exchange rates and base year CPIs are 
taken from Sillers (undated). The survey year CPIs 
are from IMF (2007).
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